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CAREGIVER PAYMENTS AND THE OBLIGATION
TO GIVE CARE OR SHARE
MERLE H. WEINER*
INTRODUCTION
THE law disserves parents who are the primary caregivers for their chil-dren.  Some parents perform a disproportionate amount of caregiv-
ing labor, but receive little or nothing in return from the other parent.  In
order to be eligible for any sort of remedy for this freeloading, the law
generally requires that the caregiver was married and performed the dis-
proportionate caregiving during the marriage.  Unmarried caregivers are
left with few, if any, remedies, and divorcing caregivers find that alimony
(or, as it is sometimes called today, “spousal support” or “maintenance”)
fails to address adequately their post-divorce caregiving.
This article argues that parents should have a legal obligation to share
fairly the caregiving responsibility for their children, regardless of whether
the parents are married, unmarried, separated, or divorced.  Every parent
should be obligated “to give care or share,” i.e., to pay compensation to
the other parent for any disproportionate and unfair caregiving that oc-
curs.  This general obligation should be imposed without delay, despite
the fact that the legal solution will be untidy.  A broad mandate that a
court make “fair” a breach of the obligation to give care or share will allow
courts to determine immediately, on a case-by-case basis, the appropriate
remedy for each caregiver’s particular situation.  A broad mandate will
also lay the groundwork for improvements to a complicated area of the
law.  The claimants’ awards and judicial assessments of “unfairness” can
inform the development of future adjudication guidelines.
This article proceeds in six parts.  First, it explains why a legal remedy
is needed for some disproportionate caregiving.  It isolates disproportion-
ate and unfair caregiving as the problem, and suggests that freeloading (by
one parent off of the caregiving labor of the other parent) constitutes the
unfairness.  Second, the article argues that all caregivers, not just married
caregivers, should have a remedy for freeloading because “mooching” is
wrong regardless of the parents’ marital status.  If anything, the rise of
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unwed childbearing and the extreme freeloading that unmarried
caregivers sometimes experience suggest that a legal remedy is essential.
Third, the article describes the inadequacy of the existing law for divorc-
ing caregivers, that is, even for those caregivers who are thought
“deserving.”
The second half of the article then discusses ways in which the law
might change to better redress the unfairness experienced by caregivers.
The fourth part examines contemporary reform proposals, including
those by the American Law Institute and several scholars.  These propos-
als, if adopted, would move the law in the right direction, but they all fail
as complete solutions because they exclude certain caregivers and rely on
rigid formulas or theories.  The article’s fifth part proposes a general legal
obligation applicable to all parents, and argues against ossifying the law’s
development by selecting now a particular approach or theory to govern
the claims.  Rather, courts should assess “unfairness” by examining the rel-
evant facts and then use the full range of available theories from the ali-
mony context to craft the most appropriate remedy for each case.  Finally,
the sixth part of the article explores the disadvantages that might arise if
this proposal were adopted.
This article is one part of a much larger project by this author that
focuses on the development of a legal status for parents of the same child.
Cambridge University Press will publish that longer work, entitled The Par-
ent-Partner Status in American Family Law.  That book details several other
inter se legal obligations that arguably should also exist between parents.
If adopted, the proposed obligations together would create a new legal
status for parents and further a reconceptualization of American family
law around parenthood.  Consequently, this article’s proposal for
caregiver compensation is best understood as one possible component of
a new legal status.  The book contains several justifications for the new
status that are not reproduced here, but those justifications also support
this particular proposal.  I commend the forthcoming book to readers in-
terested in a more complete picture of the role that caregiver compensa-
tion might play in the development of a new status and the benefits that
such a status would provide.
I. FREELOADING OFF OF THE CAREGIVER
“Caregivers” are defined here as parents, whether married, divorced,
or unmarried, who perform a disproportionate amount of caregiving for
their children.  Parents rarely split caregiving labor in half.  Caregivers
often experience economic and other disadvantages from performing a
disproportionate amount of this work, especially when they are not in a
sharing relationship such as marriage.  However, without more, neither
the disproportionality of the caregiving nor the hardship associated with
disproportionate caregiving justifies the imposition of a legal obligation
on the other parent to redress the situation.  Rather, a legal remedy is
2
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appropriate because some caregivers’ disproportionate burden is “unfair,”
or more particularly, the other parent acts “wrongfully.”1  Wrongful behav-
ior exists when a parent unilaterally retains the benefit of the caregiver’s
labor without giving anything of sufficient value to the caregiver in ex-
change, even though caregiving for their child is their shared responsibil-
ity.  This type of wrongful behavior is typically called “freeloading,”2 and
unfortunately, it is widespread among parents.
A. Freeloading Patterns
The type of behavior that causes concern falls into some pretty identi-
fiable patterns.  Sometimes one parent is freeloading off of the other par-
ent by allowing her3 to perform all of the caregiving and giving her
nothing in return.  The most egregious situation is when one parent to-
tally abdicates his responsibility and leaves the other parent with no choice
at all about how to share work or resources.  The abdicating parent gives
the caregiving parent nothing for her efforts and may not even provide
child support, but instead goes off to do his own thing.  The caregiving
parent must then struggle to provide for the child’s material and non-
material needs alone.  A similar lopsidedness can arise when a court
awards primary custody to one parent while the other parent is free of
most caregiving obligations, and the court provides the caregiver with no
compensation for her future caregiving work.
Another unfair pattern arises when the parties have an agreement
about the sharing of caregiving and market labor, but the agreement is
repugnant in some way that makes the arrangement unjust.  Imagine, for
example, that the caregiver agrees to do all the caregiving in exchange for
the market worker’s promise not to beat her.  The market worker already
has that legal obligation, so he is giving her nothing in exchange for the
caregiving.4  In addition, the very nature of the exchange is offensive to
1. See June Carbone, The Futility of Coherence: The ALI’s Principles of the Law, 4
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 65 (2002) (citing Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The
Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855, 878–89 (1988)).
2. Norman E. Bowie has described well how freeloading violates Kant’s first
categorical imperative, a variation of the golden rule. See Norman E. Bowie, Kant-
ian Ethical Thought, in THE ETHICS OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS 61, 62–64 (John W. Budd & James G. Scoville eds., 2005).  The other moral
and policy bases for a caregiver payment can be found in MERLE WEINER, THE
PARENT-PARTNER STATUS IN AMERICAN FAMILY LAW (Cambridge University Press)
(forthcoming).
3. The female pronoun is used for the caregiver and the male pronoun is
used for the market worker, as these gendered patterns persist.  Of course, the
gender of the caregiver and market worker could be reversed, or the roles could
be shared, or the pronouns could be the same for the caregiver and market worker
in same-sex couples, but for simplicity’s sake, the stereotypical genders are as-
signed to these roles.  [EDITOR’S NOTE: The Villanova Law Review requires the use
of gender-neutral language, but has permitted the author’s use of gender-specific
language for the purposes of this article.]
4. Contract law would classify such a contract as lacking “consideration.”  The
absence of consideration is not always determinative of “unfairness.”  For example,
3
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modern sensibilities.  Or, consider a situation in which the parties’ agree-
ment violates public policy.  The parties agree, for example, that the
mother will do all of the caregiving in exchange for the father’s promise
not to contest custody if the parties ever divorce.  Such a contract would
be unenforceable because it violates the public’s interest in having a court
determine custody based upon the best interests of the child.5  The
caregiver who acts for years on the assumption that she would get some-
thing in exchange for her efforts, experiences an unfairness when the ben-
efit of her bargain disappears, even for a good reason like public policy.
Unfairness can also exist when one party breaches an otherwise unob-
jectionable agreement.  Imagine, for example, that the parties agree that
the mother will provide caregiving and the father will work in the market,
and both parties will share the father’s income.  If the father withholds his
income from the mother, he would breach their agreement and would be
acting unfairly.  Similarly, spouses may agree that the mother will stay
home and watch the child until the child is ten years old and the father
will support the family financially.  If the father refuses to support the
mother because they divorce, but the child is only five years old, the father
is treating the mother unfairly.6
Some people might dispute whether any unfairness exists in the last
example because, they would claim, the couple’s original agreement no
longer governs their relationship once they divorce.  After all, both parties
assumed that they would be romantically involved forever, or at least until
the child turned ten years old, and that assumption turned out to be incor-
rect.  Sometimes—but not always—a party can be released from a contract
when a fundamental assumption underlying the contract dramatically
changes.7
But this reasoning is questionable.  First, it assumes that the parents’
agreement about the caregiving and related compensation is an enforcea-
ble agreement, subject to the normal rules of contracting.  However, it is
not.  Courts will not enforce contracts between spouses about such funda-
mental family arrangements.  Sometimes a statute precludes it.8  Other
times, courts employ common law contract doctrine and find a lack of
a married father might support his family in exchange for the mother’s caregiving.
This arrangement might also lack consideration, but it is not unfair.
5. One might label this contract unconscionable.  Unconscionable can mean
the contract tries to eliminate “fundamental duties otherwise imposed by the law,”
or “seek[s] to negate the reasonable expectations of the nondrafting party,” or the
main terms are “unreasonably and unexpectedly harsh.”  8 SAMUEL WILLISTON &
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed. 2012).
6. See Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the
Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423, 2431 (1994).
7. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 651 (2012) (discussing contract that is “frus-
trated because of changed conditions” not due to party’s fault, and where parties
did not assume that condition would ever occur).
8. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-3-7 (2013) (“Husband and wife shall not con-
tract with each other, so as to entitle the one to claim or receive any compensation
from the other for work and labor, and any contract between them whereby one
4
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consideration, or they refuse enforcement because the agreement violates
public policy.9
Second, even if the couple’s agreement were an enforceable contract,
as it might be if they were unmarried,10 the father’s breach should only be
excused if the couple’s romantic relationship is an essential foundation of
their agreement.  Arguably, however, the parties’ co-parenting relation-
ship is the essential foundation of their agreement, and that relationship
continues until their child reaches the age of majority.  The parties’ agree-
ment never specified that the caregiving arrangement would end upon the
termination of the parents’ romantic relationship, even though the parties
could have foreseen that possibility and addressed it.  Their silence sug-
gests that the romantic relationship was not an essential foundation of
their agreement.
Third, the reasoning assumes that the father’s obligation going for-
ward has no connection to the caregiver’s past acts, which may have been
performed in reliance on their agreement.  While her past acts may have
been compensated already, either during the relationship or with a prop-
erty award upon divorce, that is not necessarily so, especially if the family
had few resources.  Therefore, his obligation to pay her in the future may
represent compensation for her past work.  Consequently, even if changed
circumstances were to release the father from any future obligation under
their agreement, the changed circumstances would not affect his liability
for obligations already incurred.
Fourth, the father’s argument also assumes that the mother’s caregiv-
ing going forward should be uncompensated, or that he can unilaterally
determine the terms of the compensation.  Even if the couple’s original
shall claim or shall receive compensation from the other for services rendered,
shall be void.”).
9. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model
for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 230–31 (1982) (“Frequently by statute, and
even more often by judicial precedent, spouses are prohibited from varying the
legal terms of the marriage ‘contract.’  This prohibition is grounded either directly
on the bar against varying the incidents of marriage, or indirectly on related theo-
ries of no consideration.  Based on these policy analyses, courts have refused to
enforce such agreements between spouses as: payment by one spouse to another
for domestic, child care, or other services in the home; [and] . . . alteration of
statutory duties of support . . . .”); see also Twila L. Perry, The “Essentials of Marriage”:
Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 16–17 (2003)
(noting that household labor is an essential of marriage and essentials cannot con-
stitute consideration under contract law).
10. See Allen M. Parkman, The Contractual Alternative to Marriage, 32 N. KY. L.
REV. 125, 148 (2005) (“Traditionally, agreements between unmarried couples that
attempted to create rights and obligations similar to marriage were unenforceable.
However, the recent trend has been to enforce contracts between cohabitating
adults unless the agreement depends solely on unlawful meretricious relations.
Courts have been willing to enforce contracts between unmarried couples based
on common law principles of implied contract, equitable relief and constructive
trust.  Most of these cases deal with contracts for distributing assets when a rela-
tionship ends.  Still, the decisions imply that the courts will enforce contracts speci-
fying transfers during marriage and liquidated damages at dissolution.”).
5
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agreement assumed the existence of a romantic relationship, and that
agreement ceases to apply because of changed circumstances, there is no
reason why the costs of future caregiving should be allocated solely to one
of the parties by default.
B. Freeloading, Really?
Now some readers might think that it is too harsh to use the term
“mooch” to characterize the fathers in the above scenarios.  While they
might benefit from the other parent’s performance of a disproportionate
amount of the caregiving labor, in many situations the caregiver appears
to be volunteering her labor.  It is wrong to label someone a mooch just
because that person provides nothing in exchange for a gift, because—
after all—it was a gift.  And it is true that caregivers typically provide their
services without expectation of compensation in the traditional sense.
But it also goes too far to say that all caregivers choose to give their
services away for free.  It is simply impossible to assess whether caregivers
intend to gift their labor or whether they merely acquiesce in a regime
that often fails to compensate them for the freeloading.  In many situa-
tions, there is no remedy available, especially if the caregiver never mar-
ried the child’s other parent.  In fact, it makes more sense to assume that
caregivers are merely acquiescing, and not gifting their labor, because
when caregivers do have a remedy—which tends to be at the time of di-
vorce for married caregivers—those caregivers seek redress and point to
their caregiving contributions as justifying the remedy.  They do not act as
if they were gifting their services, with no need for redress.
Certainly, many caregivers provide their caregiving without an express
promise of compensation because they do not believe the other parent
will treat them unfairly.  They believe they are getting (or will get) some-
thing of value in return, including a share of the fruits of the other par-
ent’s market work.  The caregiver’s assumption about the fairness of the
arrangement is most likely to be vindicated when the parents are, and stay,
in a long-term loving relationship, typically marriage.  But often relation-
ships end and expectations become frustrated.
Still other caregivers probably care for their children without a prom-
ise of compensation because caregiving is a core component of who they
are, and they are happy to do the work for free.  For these caregivers, the
other parent’s (or child’s) appreciation for their efforts may be sufficient
remuneration.  These caregivers’ feelings are reinforced by strong cultural
norms surrounding motherhood: society highly values the act of mother-
ing and expects it to be uncompensated.
The martyrdom of these caregivers may be noble, but their selfless
behavior is cheapened because they often forego something that they
never had a right to anyway.  Put another way, they forego nothing.  Their
martyrdom, coupled with the law’s assumption that their caregiving is usu-
ally a gift, masks and fosters exploitation by the other parent.  It is one
6
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thing for a caregiver to waive compensation voluntarily because she feels
that she does not need or want it, but it is quite another thing to make her
automatically a “volunteer” by denying her any legal claim to
compensation.
Now some might point out that caregivers are not forced to do the
caregiving so that their continued act of caregiving means that the situa-
tion must be Pareto-optimal.  In many other situations in which there is an
unfair allocation of work, the party who is suffering the disproportionate
and unfair work burden can simply walk away.  If the person does not walk
away, then the situation is typically thought to be Pareto-optimal and the
person is not “exploited,” at least not sufficiently to justify government
intervention.11
But, of course, caregiving is not like any other relationship of ex-
change.  Children are not commodities.  A caregiver’s connection to her
child and her desire to do what is best for her child mean she cannot
simply walk away if the situation is unfair.  Nor would we want that result.
Nor does the law allow her to remedy the situation as others in the com-
mercial world might.  Caregivers cannot simply say, like Little Red Hen in
the famous folk tale, “You did not do a fair share of the work to raise this
child so you do not get to share in the joy of knowing him or her.”  The
child is not like a loaf of bread to be parceled out.
Finally, some people may caregive without compensation because that
arrangement is a quid pro quo for a sole custody award at the end of the
parents’ romantic relationship.  The parents may never even discuss this
bargain.  The parent who wants sole custody may fear that even asking for
caregiver compensation would trigger a counterproposal for shared
caregiving, and so no request is made.  In fact, the fear is understandable
because some parents do seek custody solely for purposes of lowering their
child-support obligation.12
The law facilitates a parent’s ability to take advantage of the caregiver
by ignoring the issue of caregiver compensation.  To see how, compare the
law’s treatment of child support.  Caregivers are under less pressure to
forego child support in exchange for custody because the child’s right to
child support is unwaiveable, and the caregiver’s income is irrelevant to a
custody determination.  If caregivers had an unwaiveable right to caregiver
compensation, the law could similarly minimize the pressure to forego
caregiver compensation in exchange for custody.
The unique dynamics of caregiving require that the law provide a
remedy to rectify the unfairness that can sometimes attend this activity.
11. Cf. Amy L. Wax, Something for Nothing: Liberal Justice and Welfare Work Re-
quirements, 52 EMORY L.J. 1, 18 (2003).
12. See, e.g., Susan Beth Jacobs, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind “The Best Interest
of the Child” Standard in Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 845, 846 (1997);
Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of
Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 168, 168 (1984); Jana B. Singer & William L. Reyn-
olds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497, 503 (1988).
7
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Otherwise, freeloading and exploitation will continue.  Lest there be any
misunderstanding, the remedy proposed is a monetary one for the
caregiver.  While lawmakers might try instead to equalize the dispropor-
tionate caregiving between the parents, that response would be foolish: no
remedy should ever require a parent to perform caregiving.  Apart from
the fact that the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
might preclude such a remedy (the Amendment prohibits involuntary ser-
vitude),13 such a remedy might endanger the child.  A parent who is reluc-
tant to caregive may become resentful if he or she has to caregive, and may
take the resentment out on the child.  Rather, here the proposed remedy
is simply to award the caregiver sufficient financial compensation to rectify
the unfairness.
II. THE ABSENCE OF A REMEDY FOR UNMARRIED CAREGIVERS
Unmarried caregivers typically lack a remedy for disproportionate
and unfair caregiving.  Contrary to some popular misconceptions, child
support does not provide unmarried caregivers an adequate remedy for
their efforts,14 just as it does not negate the divorcing caregiver’s need for
13. See Nathan B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth Amendment, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2020, 2091–92 (2009) (recognizing that, in some contexts, ordering
specific performance may fall afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment).
14. Child support does not incorporate adequate compensation for caregiv-
ing efforts expended by the child’s custodian.  At best, child support may include
funds for some, but not all, of the costs associated with third-party care.  Child
support regimes differ in their treatment of child care costs, but they usually em-
ploy one or more of the following methods to address them: incorporate the cost
of child care into the base child support award; provide an add-on for child care
expenses on top of the base award and allocate those expenses between the par-
ents; consider child care expenses or time spent with the child to be a deviation
factor; and, permit deductions from gross income for child care costs. See generally
LAURA MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
§ 7.02 (2013).  “Regardless of the method used, all guidelines require that child
care expenses be work-related and reasonable.” Id. The income-shares model,
which is the most popular method for calculating child support, incorporates the
cost of child care into the base amount.  The figures found in child support tables
are based upon expenditure data from the Census Bureau’s Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey.  That data includes child care and education expenses as a category.
See COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., MASSACHUSETTS CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES QUAD-
RENNIAL REVIEW: FINAL REPORT OF THE 2012 TASK FORCE 20–21 (June 2013) [here-
inafter QUADRENNIAL REVIEW].  However, a child support award that relies solely on
the base amount to cover child care costs likely undercompensates for those costs
because the expenditure data comes from intact households only.  The amount of
caregiving that is “paid for” in intact families is presumably less than in divorced or
non-marital/non-cohabiting families because an intact family may have a second
parent available to watch the child when the first parent works.  Consequently, a
child support award may undercompensate for the real expense of child care in a
divided family.  Moreover, since any expenses incurred must be reasonable, courts
may require the custodial parent to shoulder alone “unreasonable” expenses,
which may be determined by the care’s cost rather than the caregiver’s need.  For
example, a state that allows incurred expenses to be deducted from gross income
may depart downward from the guideline amount if the expense was dispropor-
tionate to the custodial parent’s income. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
8
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a property division or alimony award.  A caregiver’s non-marital status
does not result in any more child support than a divorcing caregiver
receives.
The law tends to use marriage to differentiate between parents who
will, and will not, have inter se obligations to the other parent beyond
child support.  The marriage line seems antiquated because so many chil-
dren are now born outside of marriage.  Over thirty years ago, New Zea-
land recognized the need for change and extended a “maintenance”
remedy to any parent who provided day-to-day care for the child, even if
the parents never lived together.15  It is time for the United States to up-
date its laws.
A. The Marriage Divide
In the United States, unmarried caregivers (unlike divorcing
caregivers) typically have no access to alimony and property awards to
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 12 (Aug. 1, 2013) [hereinaf-
ter CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES]; QUADRENNIAL REVIEW, supra, at 71.  If a child sup-
port regime requires child care expenditures before caregiving costs are shared
(such as when a state deducts actual out-of-pocket child care costs from the gross
incomes of both parents before computing their respective share of child sup-
port), then caregivers without such expenditures are disadvantaged.  This would
include caregivers who watch their children full-time instead of working in the
market.  This would also include caregivers who engage in market work, but can-
not afford all of the necessary child care even with child support.  Such custodial
parents may have modified their activities (reduced their work hours, for example)
or found no-cost solutions (such as relative care), but child support will not com-
pensate the caregiver for these extra burdens.  Very importantly, the child support
awards do not compensate a custodial parent for time spent alone with the child
during those periods for which child care is not needed, such as from dinnertime
until the next morning when work begins.  Additional responsibilities fall upon the
caregiver when the parents live apart, and impose a range of costs on her (includ-
ing opportunity costs regarding employment and leisure).  Nor are caregivers’
losses captured by an upward adjustment when the nonresident parent exercises
less than the standard visitation assumed by the guidelines (in Massachusetts, stan-
dard visitation is 30 percent of the time with the children). See QUADRENNIAL RE-
VIEW, supra, at 70.  Such an adjustment can help, but the hidden costs that the
guidelines themselves do not recognize are not captured by an upward adjustment
either.  Also, adjustments only work for caregivers if the nonresident parent exer-
cises more than standard visitation.  Finally, in some states, such as Massachusetts,
advocates have argued that child support now precludes a custodian’s ability to
obtain alimony, thereby potentially entrenching losses that have never been ade-
quately captured by child support.  Massachusetts’ new alimony law precludes a
court from basing alimony on combined gross income that was used to calculate
child support.  Some have interpreted this provision to mean that alimony is un-
available for anyone with a combined gross income below $250,000, the top in-
come level for which the child support guidelines apply. See QUADRENNIAL REVIEW,
supra, at 66–67.  Others have extended the argument to those with incomes above
$250,000 also. See Ronald A. Witmer & Mark Warner, Factors Utilized in Determining
Alimony, in MASSACHUSETTS DIVORCE LAW PRACTICE § 9.6 (Mass. Continuing Legal
Educ., Inc., Practice Manual MDLPMI MA-CLE 9-1, 2012).
15. See PATRICK PARKINSON, FAMILY LAW AND THE INDISSOLUBILITY OF
PARENTHOOD 264 (2011) (citing Family Proceedings Act 1980, section 79 (N.Z.)).
9
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remedy disproportionate and unfair caregiving.  Most states lack domestic
partner legislation,16 which might afford such remedies; but even when a
domestic partnership option exists, unmarried couples with children often
do not opt into the system.17  Similarly, common-law marriage, which
changes an unmarried couple into a married one, would provide some
cohabiting caregivers with access to property division and alimony.  But
few states still allow common-law marriage, and many caregivers do not
qualify even where it exists.  The few progressive states that automatically
impose marital-like remedies on unmarried couples generally require that
those couples had a marriage-like relationship,18 and not all caregivers
qualify.
While many states allow unmarried parties to access the equitable
remedies discussed in Marvin v. Marvin,19 the Marvin remedies are rela-
tively unhelpful.  Claimants often lack evidence of any of the following: an
unjust enrichment (i.e., that the caregiving was not a gift),20 a monetary
16. Approximately seven states have domestic partnership or civil union stat-
utes. See Jackie Gardina, Same-Sex Marriages in Bankruptcy: A Path Out of the Public
Policy Quagmire, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 411 (William L.
Norton, Jr. ed., 2013); Civil Unions and Domestic Partnership Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF
ST. LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/civil-unions-and-domes-
tic-partnership-statutes.aspx (last updated Dec. 20, 2013) (listing Nevada, Oregon,
Washington, Hawaii, Maine, and Wisconsin as having either limited or broad do-
mestic partnerships available).  These regimes typically apply only to same-sex, not
opposite-sex, couples. See Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573,
591 (2013).  Some domestic partnership and civil union laws have been rendered
redundant by same-sex marriage, which is now permitted in seventeen states and
the District of Columbia. See Civil Unions and Domestic Partnership Statutes, supra.
17. One gets a rough sense of this reality by examining the number of couples
with domestic partnerships in Nevada, a state that permits both same-sex and op-
posite-sex couples to register.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, approxi-
mately 7.3% of 1,000,000 households in Nevada were unmarried partner
households. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN FACT FINDER, 2012 AMERICAN COM-
MUNITY SURVEY 1-YEAR ESTIMATES, S1101.  Although there are approximately 73,000
unmarried partner households, there are only 3,790 registered partnerships as of
June 20, 2012. See SECRETARY OF STATE ROSS MILLER, BIENNIAL REPORT JULY 1,
2010–JUNE 30, 2012, at 15 (Sept. 15, 2012).
18. See, e.g., Charlotte K. Goldberg, The Schemes of Adventuresses: The Abolition
and Revival of Common-Law Marriage, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 483, 483
(2007) (discussing abolition of common-law marriage in California).  Factors iden-
tified, although not exclusive, were “continuous cohabitation, duration of the rela-
tionship, purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources and services for joint
projects, and the intent of the parties.” In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764,
770 (Wash. 2000) (citing Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995)).
19. 557 P.2d 106, 109–10 (Cal. 1976); see also Steven K. Berenson, Should Co-
habitation Matter in Family Law?, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 289, 296 (2011) (“A majority
of states have followed at least some aspects of [Marvin].”).
20. See Cynthia Lee Starnes, Alimony Theory, 45 FAM. L.Q. 271, 286–87 (2011);
see also Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980) (“As a matter of
human experience personal services will frequently be rendered by two people
living together because they value each other’s company or because they find it a
convenient or rewarding thing to do.”).  Caregiving itself has been insufficient to
support a quantum meruit claim to another’s property. See, e.g., Rowson v. De-
noyer, No. 11-P-1156, 2012 WL 2051151, at *1–2 (Mass. App. Ct. June 8, 2012)
10
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contribution to the property in dispute,21 a common intention to share
ownership of the property,22 wrongdoing23 (often narrowly construed),24
or a “confidential relationship.”25  Reform efforts exist to expand the equi-
table remedies, but these efforts are not necessarily that beneficial for
caregivers.  For example, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Un-
just Enrichment has a new remedy for unmarried couples.26  The com-
mentary suggests that services qualifying for a remedy must not be part of
the “reciprocal contributions normally exchanged between cohabitants
whether married or not,”27 and one commentator stated that the Restate-
ment’s express language does not apply to the situation in which an un-
married cohabitant raises the couple’s children while the other cohabitant
(allowing claim for quantum meruit for actual value of services performed remod-
eling house; domestic partnership alone did not give rise to claim for one-half of
house titled in partner’s name); Northrup v. Brigham, 826 N.E.2d 239, 243–44
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (allowing quantum meruit claim, but distinguishing case
from one in which person provided services “ordinarily rendered by a wife in main-
taining the home and in performing the usual household duties” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Mangsen v. Costa, No. 050313, 2009 WL 1082377, at *7 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2009) (holding that quantum meruit claim requires underlying
agreement about exchange).  Another historic limit on unjust enrichment is that it
is not available “to claimants who reasonably could have negotiated a consensual
exchange.” See Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabi-
tants, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 712 (2006).
21. See, e.g., Maria v. Freitas, 832 P.2d 259, 264 (Haw. 1992) (finding plaintiff
did not establish elements of constructive trust); Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E.2d 1,
4–6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (finding property did not accumulate in constructive
trust and lack of Ohio precedent allowing “cohabiting individuals to recover under
a constructive trust theory for contributions to a relationship”).
22. See 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 132 (2013) (discussing resulting trusts “where
the acts or expressions of the parties indicate an intent that a trust relation result
from their transaction”).
23. See, e.g., Jordan v. Mitchell, 705 So. 2d 453, 457–58 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)
(requiring proof of wrongdoing to support theory of unjust enrichment in context
of imposing constructive trust); Maria, 832 P.2d at 264 (discussing equitable estop-
pel and finding no evidence of willful misleading).
24. See Northrup, 826 N.E.2d at 245 (finding record did not support construc-
tive trust and unjust enrichment theories).
25. See Jordan, 705 So. 2d at 461 (“A confidential relationship exists when
‘confidence is reposed by one party in another, and the trust or confidence is
accepted under circumstances which show it was founded on intimate personal
and business relations existing between the parties, which gave the one [advantage
or] superiority over the other.’” (citation omitted)).  A constructive trust can be
imposed for abuse of a confidential relationship, but cohabitation alone—without
marriage—is not per se evidence of such a relationship. See id. at 461–62.  This can
be true even if the parties have a child together. See, e.g., Tarry, 649 N.E.2d at 1,
6–7 (fourteen years of cohabitation and birth of child did not create confidential
and fiduciary relationship between parties).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28
(2011).  Section 28 allows a claim upon dissolution of a relationship when two
people have “formerly lived together in a relationship resembling marriage,” and
one “made substantial, uncompensated contributions in the form of property or
services” to a specific asset owned by the other. See id.
27. Id. at cmt. d.
11
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acquires all the assets.28  Moreover, the Restatement requires that the un-
married couple had a cohabiting relationship “resembling marriage” in
order for one of its members to invoke the new provision’s protections.29
While an unmarried caregiver might contract for a remedy,30 con-
tracts between unmarried parents are “rare,”31 probably because unwed
parties mistakenly believe that “some legal protections are available,”32 or
they never think of entering a contract.  Of course, contracts may also be
rare because one party has nothing to gain by contracting.  Moochers are
unlikely to want to contract since the current law benefits them so com-
pletely.  Implied contract claims are not a solution either because courts
often want to see marital-like cohabitation,33 which may not exist, or
courts find the terms of the agreement too amorphous to be
enforceable.34
The bottom line is that many unmarried caregivers are out of luck
when it comes to having a successful remedy for their disproportionate
and unfair caregiving.35  Moreover, the patchwork of available remedies
leaves most unmarried caregivers in legal limbo while they caregive.  The
caregiver rarely knows ahead of time whether or not a court adjudicating
28. See Sherwin, supra note 20, at 729–30.  Professor Sherwin also recom-
mends against courts adopting the Restatement’s relaxed interpretation of unjust
enrichment in the cohabitation context. See id. at 736–37.  Her words of caution
may stop courts from adopting the relevant Restatement’s recommendations at all.
The author, in fact, recommends that perhaps status-based claims would be a bet-
ter way to afford relief. See id. at 720.
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra
note 26, § 28(1).
30. Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for De-
pendency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 255 (2004) (“Many courts have adopted this
view [that ordinary contract principles apply to agreements between cohabiting
parties] in recent years and have been ready to enforce these contracts.”).
31. See Ira Mark Ellman & Sanford L. Braver, Lay Intuitions About Family Obliga-
tions: The Case of Alimony, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 209, 234 n.32 (2012); see also
Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1365, 1367 (2001) (“[F]ew couples (married or unmarried) . . . make express
contracts at all . . . .”).
32. Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 145 n.2 (Mass. 1998) (citing Twila L.
Perry, Dissolution Planning in Family Law: A Critique of Current Analyses and a Look
Toward the Future, 24 FAM. L.Q. 77, 77 n.1 (1990)).
33. See Goldberg, supra note 18, at 488; see, e.g., Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d
430, 437–38 (W. Va. 1990) (holding court may order property division between
unmarried cohabitants who held themselves out as husband and wife; order may
be based on implied contract principles); Maria v. Freitas, 832 P.2d 259, 263–65
(Haw. 1992) (holding implied-in-fact contract did not exist to benefit cohabitant
of nineteen years and co-parent, and refusing to award her separate property of
partner or support payments even though couple was known as “husband and
wife” to some members of public and claimant had homemaking role throughout
relationship).
34. Cause of Action by Same-Sex or Heterosexual Unmarried Cohabitant to
Enforce, 35 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 295 § 2 (Dec. 2013).
35. See Berenson, supra note 19, at 297 (“[F]ew ‘palimony’ plaintiffs receive
significant recoveries from the courts.”).
12
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claims at the end of her romantic relationship will find present all of the
prerequisites necessary to recovery.  This uncertainty gives caregivers false
hope and leaves them vulnerable if the relationship ends.
B. The Prevalence and Difficulty of Unwed Caregiving
The current legal framework is unfortunate because of the number of
unmarried caregivers, the frequency of disproportionate caregiving, the
effects of the disproportionality, and the externalities imposed on inno-
cent parties.
First, non-marital births are no longer an anomaly.  In 2009, almost
1,700,000 children were born to unmarried parents.36  In percentage
terms, approximately forty-one percent of the births each year are to un-
married women, up from about five percent in 1960.37
Second, unmarried caregivers often do a disproportionate share of
the caregiving labor.  Whenever the parents live apart, the caregiving work
will fall largely on the parent with physical custody of the child.  In one
study, approximately fifty percent of the unwed mothers did not cohabit
with the father at the time of birth, and nine percent of the mothers had
little or no contact at all with the fathers.38  Unwed mothers overwhelm-
ingly have physical custody of their children.39  Over time, unmarried
mothers’ relationships with their children’s fathers often deteriorate, and
the fathers’ involvement in their children’s lives falls off.  In the study
mentioned above, by the child’s fifth birthday, sixty-three percent of all
fathers were living away from the mother and child,40 and less than half of
36. See Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births: Preliminary Data for 2009, CDC NAT’L
VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 4 (2010) (reporting total number of births to unmarried wo-
men fell from 1,726,566 in 2008 to 1,693,850 in 2009).
37. See id.; see also PEW RESEARCH CTR., AS MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD DRIFT
APART, PUBLIC IS CONCERNED ABOUT SOCIAL IMPACT 15 (2007) (discussing rise of
non-marital childbearing in United States from 1960 to 2005).  This rise in the
percentage of births that are non-marital is mainly attributable to the fact that
fewer married women are having children, but the actual number of non-marital
births is nonetheless notable in and of itself. See Andrew J. Cherlin, American Mar-
riage in the Early Twenty-First Century, FUTURE CHILD.: MARRIAGE & CHILD WELLBEING,
Fall 2005, at 33, 35, available at http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/
publications/journals/article/index.xml?journalid=37&articleid=105.
38. See SARA MCLANAHAN, IRWIN GARKINKEL & RONALD B. MINCY, FRAGILE FAMI-
LIES, WELFARE REFORM, AND MARRIAGE 2 (Brookings Inst. Policy Brief No. 10, 2001),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2001/12/childrenfami-
lies-mclanahan.
39. See Glendessa M. Insabella et al., Individual and Coparenting Differences Be-
tween Divorcing and Unmarried Fathers, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 290, 298 (2003) (finding at
initiation of court proceedings, 86 percent of unmarried mothers had primary
physical custody, 8.3 percent of fathers had primary physical custody, and 5.6 per-
cent had joint physical custody).
40. See Marcia J. Carlson, Sara S. McLanahan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn,
Coparenting and Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement with Young Children After a Nonmarital
Birth, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 461, 461, 472 (2008) (using data from The Fragile Families
and Child Wellbeing Study).
13
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the children with nonresident fathers had ongoing contact with their fa-
thers.  Thirty-seven percent of the children with nonresident fathers had
no contact with their fathers in the previous one to two years.41  In an-
other study, unwed fathers who paid child support averaged only sixty-one
days of contact per year with their children.42  Fathers with regular visita-
tion commonly exercise their visitation on evenings and weekends—an
arrangement that minimizes the chance that caregiving will interfere with
his work obligations.
These patterns are evident among teenage mothers too.  Approxi-
mately 400,000 children each year are born to teenagers.43  Most teen fa-
thers are not married to the mothers of their children, nor do they live
with them.44  Many of these girls find themselves doing a disproportionate
amount of the caregiving.  Some scholars report that “teenage mothers are
likely to receive little in the form of direct caregiving from the baby’s fa-
ther.”45  While other family members often help these girls,46 a girl’s
parenting obligations still reduce her leisure,47 impact her own educa-
tion,48 exact psychological costs (such as increased worries and anxieties),
and require considerable physical labor.49  While teenagers are not the
largest group of unmarried parents, the imbalance in parenting responsi-
bility among this population is notable because the youngest mothers are
likely to have the greatest vulnerabilities among unmarried caregivers
generally.
Third, unmarried caregivers of all ages experience hardship from
their caregiving.  Being a “single parent” is difficult, especially when that
parent also works or attends school.  One divorced mother described
41. See id. at 473.
42. See Robert I. Lerman, Capabilities and Contributions of Unwed Fathers, FU-
TURE CHILD.: FRAGILE FAMILIES, Fall 2010, at 73–74, available at http://www.future
ofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/journals/article/index.xml?jour
nalid=73&articleid=531.
43. See CDC VITAL SIGNS, PREVENTING TEEN PREGNANCY IN THE U.S. 1 (2011),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/pdf/2011-04-vitalsigns.pdf.
44. RESILIENCE ADVOCACY PROJECT, WHO CARES ABOUT TEEN DADS?  HOW FAM-
ILY COURT REFORM CAN HELP BREAK A CYCLE OF POVERTY 2 (Resilience Advoc. Proj.
Policy Brief No. 1, 2012), available at http://resiliencelaw.org/wordpress2011/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/Teen-Father-White-Paper-FINAL-VERSION.pdf.
45. Loretta Pinkard Prater, Never Married/Biological Teen Mother Headed House-
hold, in SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES: DIVERSITY, MYTHS AND REALITIES 305, 314 (Shirley
M. H. Hanson et al. eds., 1995); see also Celeste A. Lemay et al., A Qualitative Study
of the Meaning of Fatherhood Among Young Urban Fathers, 27 PUB. HEALTH NURSING
221, 222 (2010).
46. See RACHEL CONNELLY & JEAN KIMMEL, THE TIME USE OF MOTHERS IN THE
UNITED STATES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY 131 (2010).
47. See Margaret Mietus Sanik & Teresa Mauldin, Single Versus Two Parent Fami-
lies: A Comparison of Mothers’ Time, 35 FAM. REL. 53, 55–56 (1986).
48. See Prater, supra note 45, at 311–12.
49. See James T. Fawcett, The Value of Children and the Transition to Parenthood,
in TRANSITIONS TO PARENTHOOD 16 (Rob Palkovitz & Marvin B. Sussman eds.,
1988) (identifying categories of costs of having children, including physical costs).
14
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caregiving without a partner: “ ‘Being a single mom is exhausting.  When
you parent alone, you are the breadwinner, the bread maker, the police,
the comforter, taxi driver.  Not to mention all the things that go along
with owning a home and an automobile.’”50  A contributor to SingleMom
.com revealed that being a single mother is hard because “it’s unending,
there isn’t ever a break, there isn’t a backup plan.  No matter what, every-
thing hinges on you.”51  Even women who parent alone by choice (typi-
cally an economically privileged bunch) speak about the tremendous work
it entails.  Lori Gottlieb’s article in The Atlantic chided “single-mom books”
for not mentioning the following:
[O]nce you have a baby alone, not only do you age about 10
years in the first 10 months, but if you don’t have time to shower,
eat, urinate in a timely manner, or even leave the house except
for work, where you spend every waking moment that your child
is at day care, there’s very little chance a man—much less The
One—is going to knock on your door and join that party.52
Professor Anne Alstott’s words seem particularly apt for caregivers
who do not cohabit with the other parent: “[It] is not that parents feel
burdened, but . . . they are burdened.”53
Caregiving often has adverse economic consequences for the
caregivers.  Caregiving can come at the expense of market work, and mar-
ket work brings income, retirement benefits, and Social Security credit.54
Even a caregiver who combines market and non-market work with a flexi-
ble or part-time job faces economic repercussions from those accommoda-
tions.55  Caregivers who work fulltime suffer financially too.  Researchers
have repeatedly noted a wage gap for women with children.56  Estimates
vary, but several researchers have mentioned a wage penalty of approxi-
50. Erin Andersen, Going It Alone: Single Moms Share Their Stories, LINCOLN J.
STAR (May 12, 2012), http://journalstar.com/lifestyles/family/going-it-alone-sin-
gle-moms-share-their-stroeis/article_d705611c-0879-5b55-a402-fb7efb7d26c4.html.
51. This is a Marathon, SINGLEMOM.COM, http://www.singlemom.com/this-is-
a-marathon/#comments (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
52. Lori Gottlieb, Marry Him!, THE ATLANTIC, March 2008, available at http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/marry-him/306651/.
53. ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND
WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS 56 (2004).
54. See ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPOR-
TANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 77–78 (2001).
55. See id. at 89; see also Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers, Myths, and the Law of
Divorce: One More Feminist Case for Partnership, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203,
209, 215–17 (2006) (describing costs of motherhood).
56. See, e.g., Deborah J. Anderson et al., The Motherhood Wage Penalty Revisited:
Experience, Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and Work-Schedule Flexibility, 56 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 273, 291 (2003) [hereinafter Anderson et al., Motherhood Wage Penalty
Revisited]; Deborah J. Anderson et al., The Motherhood Wage Penalty: Which Mothers
Pay It and Why, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 354, 354 (2002) [hereinafter Anderson et al.,
Motherhood Wage Penalty]; Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for
Motherhood, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 204, 204, 219 (2001); see also ALSTOTT, supra note 53,
15
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mately four to five percent if a woman has one child.57  The economic
effects of caregiving persist over time and leave an indelible mark of
“caregiver” on these workers’ paychecks.  The American Law Institute re-
ported: “Economic studies demonstrate that responsibility for the care of
children ordinarily has a significant continuing impact on parental earn-
ing capacity.  This effect is not limited to parents who withdraw from full-
time employment.  It is also observed among primary caretakers who con-
tinue full-time market labor.”58
In contrast, the other parent—the one who does less than half of the
caregiving—experiences real economic benefits from being less encum-
bered by caregiving responsibilities.  A person can usually earn much
more money by being the perfect employee, that is, someone with few
caregiving obligations to divert him or her away from employment respon-
sibilities.  Studies show that workers without children tend to make more
money, even after controlling for variables like education and years of em-
ployment.59  Similarly, fathers whose partners are stay-at-home moms earn
on average thirty percent more than fathers in families with two-career
parents.60  Having less responsibility for caregiving means that a market
worker has more time for work.  Even an unemployed parent benefits if
the other parent does most of the caregiving.  The unemployed parent has
more time to look for a job, go to school, or engage in leisure.
Fourth, and finally, the absence of a remedy for unmarried caregivers
produces externalities.  While the economic repercussions of caregiving
are often imposed on the caregiver, the costs are sometimes also imposed
on those with no biological connection to the child.  For example, taxpay-
ers bear some of the costs of caregiving when the caregiver receives public
assistance, although this externality might be unavoidable if the father is
poor too.  Additionally, the costs often are shifted to the caregiver’s subse-
quent partner.  Unmarried parents, like divorced parents, frequently re-
at 172; Rebecca Glauber, Marriage and the Motherhood Wage Penalty Among African
Americans, Hispanics, and Whites, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 951, 958 (2007).
57. See Budig & England, supra note 56, at 220 (finding “remaining mother-
hood penalty of about 4 percent per child”); Glauber, supra note 56, at 954–55
(discussing how findings of current study are consistent with Budig and England
study in which “women with one child pay a 3% wage penalty”).
58. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 5.05 cmt. d (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]; see also id. reporter’s notes,
cmt d; Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as Suckers: Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse,
90 IOWA L. REV. 1513, 1523–24 (2005).
59. See, e.g., Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on Women’s Wages, 62 AM.
SOC. REV. 209, 216 (1997); Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the “Family Gap” in Pay for
Women with Children, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 137, 143 (1998); see also Anderson et al.,
Motherhood Wage Penalty Revisited, supra note 56, at 282.
60. Tamar Lewin, Men Whose Wives Work Earn Less, Studies Show, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 12, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/12/us/men-whose-wives-work-
earn-less-studies-show.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
16
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couple with others after breaking up,61 although a child can reduce a
caregiver’s likelihood of re-partnering.62  If the caregiver’s new relation-
ship is a marital relationship, then her new spouse will have a legal obliga-
tion of support.  That support obligation will include the obligation to pay
alimony at their relationship’s end, even if her need for alimony arises
from caregiving for a non-joint child.  If the unmarried caregiver enters a
cohabiting relationship, rather than marriage,63 then her new partner fre-
quently contributes to her support, despite the absence of a legal obliga-
tion to do so.64  At the same time, the non-custodial parent will typically
61. BENDHEIM-THOMAN CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON CHILD WELLBEING & SOC. IN-
DICATORS SURVEY CTR., FRAGILE FAMILIES RESEARCH BRIEF NO. 39, PARENTS’ RELA-
TIONSHIP STATUS FIVE YEARS AFTER A NON-MARITAL BIRTH 2 (2007), available at
http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/briefs/ResearchBrief39.pdf.
62. Mothers remarry less than childless women. See Sharon H. Bzostek et al.,
Mother’s Repartnering After a Nonmarital Birth, 90 SOC. FORCES 817, 820 (2012) (citing
studies); see also Leslie Buckle et al., Marriage as a Reproductive Contract: Patterns of
Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage, 17 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 363, 371 (1996).
Women with children under six years old have the lowest remarriage rate of all.
See Megan M. Sweeney, Remarriage of Women & Men After Divorce, 18 J. FAM. ISSUES
479, 493 (1997) (finding thirty-seven percent reduction in chance of marriage
compared to women with no children).  Perhaps not surprisingly, a divorced wo-
man’s chance of cohabitating with a new partner is also negatively affected if she
has a child at home. See Paul M. de Graaf & Matthijs Kalmijn, Alternative Routes in
the Remarriage Market: Competing-Risk Analyses of Union Formation After Divorce, 81
SOC. FORCES 1459, 1462–66, 1489 (2003); see also Bzostek et al., supra, at 820.  In
contrast, fathers’ remarriage prospects decline generally only when their children
are teenagers or older, probably because fathers are not typically the primary cus-
todian for their young children; therefore, their children are less of an impedi-
ment to new relationships. See Sweeney, supra, at 496–97. But see Frances
Goldscheider et al., Navigating the “New” Marriage Market: How Attitudes Toward Part-
ner Characteristics Shape Union Formation, 30 J. FAM. ISSUES 719, 722 (2009) (citing
studies that showed children have no effect, or even positive effect, on men’s
union formation, although noting studies rarely distinguish residential status of
parent).
63. A woman with a nonmarital birth is much more likely to cohabit with than
marry her new partner. See Zhenchao Qian et al., Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing, Mari-
tal Prospects and Mate Selection, 84 SOC. FORCES 473, 481 (2005).
64. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Hetero-
sexual Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 23–24 (2007) (“A majority of [ ] cohabi-
tants . . . maintain joint finances.”).  While “virtually all” cohabitants with a
common child pool their income, similar statistics are not available for situations
in which the cohabitants have a child in the home, but that child is the child of
only one of the parties. See id. at 35.  Chances are, however, that the sharing behav-
ior is higher than for cohabitants without a child in the home, but lower than for
cohabitants with a common child in the home.  While the number of cohabitants
who support a partner who caregives for a non-joint child is unknown, it appears
unexceptional judging from all of the questions on the internet about the tax con-
sequences of doing so. See, e.g., Bez513, How/Can I Claim Deductions for My Girl-
friend and Her Daughter That Lived with Me All Year?, TURBOTAX ANSWERXCHANGE
(2011), https://ttlc.intuit.com/questions/1474490-how-can-i-claim-deductions-for-
my-girlfriend-and-her-daughter-that-have-lived-with-me-all-year; Can I Claim My
Girlfriend and Her 2 Sons as Dependents on My Taxes?, YAHOO! ANSWERS (2009), http:/
/answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20100108052926AAVJpGh; If My Girl-
friend and Her Children Live with Me and Their Father Isn’t Around, Can I Claim My
17
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pay nothing for the economic effects of the caregiving.  The biological
father’s obligation to the caregiver differs significantly from his support
obligation to his child, where biology determines which adult has financial
obligations to support the child.65  States are very reluctant in the child
support context to impose the cost of raising a child on someone who is
not the biological parent, such as a stepparent.66
C. An Unjust Line
While marriage imposes on spouses the legal obligation to support
each other during the ongoing relationship and, at times, when it is over,
unmarried caregivers cannot rely on marriage to the other parent as the
solution.  First, many people do not want to marry, often for good reasons.
Some consider the institution unjust and blame it for perpetuating rigid
gender roles.67  Some do not want to marry because the other party is
abusive or a risk to the family.68  Yet others refuse to marry until they and
their partners are economically secure, so that their marriage will have a
greater chance of surviving.69  Second, marriage is not an option for every-
one because the law sometimes makes it unavailable, such as for many gay
and lesbian parents, or for parents who have children with already-mar-
ried individuals.  Third, and particularly important, it takes two willing
parties to marry.  There are cases where the caregiver wants to marry, but
the other parent does not agree, thereby depriving the caregiver of the
law’s divorce remedies for disproportionate and unfair caregiving.  In
sum, marriage is not a solution for everyone.
Girlfriend and Her Children as Dependents?, H&R BLOCK, YOUR TAX QUESTIONS AN-
SWERED, http://www.hrblock.com/tax-answers/services/jsp/article.jsp?article_id=
66387 (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
65. See Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between
Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 612 (2009).
66. 59 AM. JUR. 2d Parent and Child § 12 (2014); Carol Rogerson, The Child
Support Obligation of Step-parents, 18 CANADIAN J. FAM. L. 9, 41 (2001).
67. See Joanna M. Reed, Not Crossing the “Extra Line”: How Cohabitors with Chil-
dren View Their Unions, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1117, 1124 (2006) (giving examples
of individuals dissuaded from marriage because of gender roles associated with it);
cf. Brad Pitt, My List, ESQUIRE MAG., Oct. 2006, at 166 (explaining his reluctance to
marry until same-sex marriage is legal).
68. Many unmarried couples with children break up because of domestic vio-
lence, cheating, crime, imprisonment, and drug and alcohol use. See Kathryn Edin
& Joanna M. Reed, Why Don’t They Just Get Married?  Barriers to Marriage Among the
Disadvantaged, FUTURE CHILD.: POSTSECONDARY EDUC. U.S., Fall 2005, at 123, availa-
ble at http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/journals/arti-
cle/index.xml?journalid=37&articleid=109 (noting, for example, that over half of
women in one study cited “a chronic pattern of domestic violence,” and 40 percent
noted “flagrant infidelities”).
69. See KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA J. KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR
WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 129–30 (2005); Edin & Reed, supra
note 68, at 122–23.
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III. THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING REMEDIES FOR MARRIED CAREGIVERS
Channeling people into marriage also does not solve the freeloading
problem because the law permits freeloading among divorced parents.
Married couples frequently divorce.70  The law governing divorce is itself
insufficiently attentive to justice for caregivers.  In fact, couples typically
divorce when their children are very young and there remains considera-
ble caregiving to be done.71  But, courts rarely focus on this fact to justify a
compensatory remedy for future caregiving work.
A. The Segmentation of Caregiving
The inadequacy of divorce law is best seen by breaking caregiving into
three time periods: caregiving that occurs before the marriage; caregiving
that occurs during the marriage; and caregiving that occurs after the end
of the marriage.  Caregivers are likely to receive a remedy for the caregiv-
ing that occurs during the marriage, but not for caregiving during the
other two time periods.
Most states provide divorcing caregivers an equitable share of the
couple’s marital property,72 and thereby reward disproportionate marital
caregiving when it would be unfair not to do so.  The 1973 Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act (UMDA) specifically mentions as a relevant factor to
the division of property the “contribution or dissipation of each party in
the acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in value of the
respective estates, and the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the
family unit.”73  The theory behind the UMDA’s approach is that marriage
is a partnership, and both parties are entitled to share in the fruits of that
partnership, whether the fruits are well-adjusted children or the acquisi-
tion of material wealth.  The UMDA also permits the court to consider the
caregiver’s need,74 which can be influenced by marital caregiving.  A few
70. See NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT & INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE STATE OF OUR
UNIONS: WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS: THE NEW MIDDLE AMERICA 71 (W. Bradford
Wilcox ed., 2010) (“The average couple marrying for the first time now has a life-
time probability of divorce or separation somewhere between 40 and 50
percent.”).
71. “Twenty-five percent of married couples in the United States divorce in
the five years following a baby’s birth.”  Hara Estroff Marano, Parenting: Here Comes
Trouble, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 14.  The average time until divorce for
first marriages is eight years. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Most People
Make Only One Trip down the Aisle, but First Marriages Shorter (Sept. 19, 2007), http://
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/most-people-make-only-one-trip-down-the-
aisle-but-first-marriages-shorter-census-bureau-reports-58151357.html.
72. See BARTH H. GOLDBERG, VALUATION OF DIVORCE ASSETS § 10:4 (rev. ed.
2013).
73. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 [Alternative A] (amended 1973),
9A U.L.A. 288 (1998) (emphasis added).
74. For example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) sets forth a
number of factors to consider. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 notes of
decisions 151–270 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 347–98 (1998).  Only Alternative A
expressly sets forth the needs of the parties as a relevant factor to consider.
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states also use a property award to address a caregiver’s premarital caregiv-
ing,75 so long as the caregiver later married the other parent.
Divorcing caregivers can also receive alimony, although the reasons
for which caregivers receive it differ from place to place.  Alimony is some-
times used to compensate the caregiver for her marital caregiving activity.
She might be entitled to part of the other parent’s enhanced earning ca-
pacity when her caregiving contributed to the market worker’s enhanced
earning capacity.76  Alternatively, alimony is sometimes used to remedy
the caregiver’s loss in earning capacity caused by marital caregiving,77 es-
pecially when the divorcing couple lacks adequate property to compensate
the caregiver for her economic sacrifices, which is often the case.78  This
approach is recommended in the American Law Institute’s Principles of
the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations (ALI Prin-
ciples), as discussed below.
Perhaps most commonly, however, alimony is used to address the di-
vorcing caregiver’s “need” that arose from marital caregiving, so long as
her husband has the ability to pay.  Depending upon the jurisdiction and
era,79 the alimony award might reflect what the recipient needs after di-
vorce to stay off welfare,80 perhaps what she needs to survive at the same
standard of living as during the marriage,81 or perhaps only what she
needs to rehabilitate herself so that she can reenter the work force and
support herself.82
Parents who will caregive after divorce might also receive alimony for
their need.  Courts still tend to allocate physical custody primarily to one
75. See, e.g., Alimony Reform Act of 2011, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 48
(2012) (defining “length of the marriage”); Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Reforming
Alimony: Massachusetts Reconsiders Postdivorce Spousal Support, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
13, 28, 29 n.84 (2013).
76. Most states do not consider enhanced earning capacity to be property
since the income is only realized after the marriage ends; therefore, courts some-
times capture it instead through an alimony award.
77. See Starnes, supra note 20, at 273.
78. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Maturing Law of Divorce Finances: Toward Rules and
Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 801, 809 (1999).
79. The UMDA allows an award for maintenance and includes a list of factors
relevant to the determination of a just award. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT
§ 308(b) (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 446 (1998).  Need seems to be the dominant
consideration.  In fact, a prerequisite to an award is that the recipient lacks suffi-
cient property to provide for his or her reasonable needs and cannot work to meet
those needs, or is a custodian of a child and should not be expected to seek em-
ployment outside the home. See id. § 308(a).  The Reporters for the American Law
Institute note that while need is the dominant justification for spousal support,
need is a weak  explanatory rationale for why the ex-spouse is obligated to pay the
support as opposed to society. See PRINCIPLES § 4.09 cmt. d.
80. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 308 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 446
(1998).
81. See id. § 308(b)(3).
82. See Katharine K. Baker, Contracting for Security: Paying Married Women What
They’ve Earned, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1193, 1200 (1988).
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party at divorce, typically the mother, who then does most of the caregiv-
ing.83  The caregiving may reduce that parent’s ability to support herself.
The UMDA explicitly states that need plus ongoing caregiving (that might
interfere with paid labor) can justify a maintenance award.84  However,
courts are uncharitable in permitting caregiving after divorce to substitute
for paid labor, and they rarely award alimony for this purpose.85  Any such
award is generally limited to a short duration.86  In fact, one study found
that financial awards are often inversely related to the amount of caregiv-
ing to be performed after the relationship ends: the more custody a wo-
man receives (e.g., sole custody), the less likely she is to receive alimony.87
Most importantly, apart from a property award for past caregiving and
an alimony award predicated on need, divorcing caregivers are unlikely to
receive anything else.  Caregivers are usually not compensated for caregiv-
ing that occurs during the post-divorce period.  Courts rarely recognize
that regardless of need, caregivers deserve a remedy because they give
something to the other parent that deserves compensation.  Former Ohio
State law professor Joan Krauskopf explained a long time ago that an
award for post-divorce caregiving could be accommodated under existing
alimony theory because alimony is available to “fairly share gains and
losses in personal earning capacity”88 in order to prevent unjust enrich-
ment.89  However, courts then, and still today, rarely make the parties
share the economic burden of (or gains from) caregiving after divorce.90
83. See Insabella et al., supra note 39, at 298 (reporting at initiation of court
proceedings, 60 percent of mothers had primary physical custody, 8 percent of
fathers had primary physical custody, and 32 percent had joint physical custody).
After the court proceedings conclude, it appears that mothers have primary cus-
tody more often. See Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S
L.J. 19, 61 n.264 (1995) (maternal custody exists in approximately 90 percent of
cases, and most cases are decided by settlement instead of litigation); see also Maria
Cancian & Daniel R. Meyer, Who Gets Custody?, 35 DEMOGRAPHY 147, 149–50 (1998)
(reporting that between 1992 and 1994, 73.7 percent of mothers were awarded
primary physical custody in twenty-one Wisconsin counties).
84. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 308(a) (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A.
446 (1998).
85. Professor Ann Estin reports that few courts award alimony to allow one
parent to care for the couple’s child. See Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony,
and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 727, 731 (1993).
86. See id. at 738.
87. Susan Elgin, Alimony Guidelines: Is It Time?, MD. B.J., May–June 2005, at 46,
50.
88. Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching for
Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253, 266 (1989).  There are other purposes,
including to compensate for loss of marriage prospects and for physical or mental
injury. See id. at 266–67.
89. See id. at 260.
90. See id. at 265.  As a general matter, spousal support is a relatively rare
remedy.  Only six percent of the total cases examined in 2003 at all income levels
had alimony awards. See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MAR-
RIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 128 (2008).  Ann Estin noted twenty
years ago, “caregiving . . . is almost entirely irrelevant when courts resolve the fi-
21
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The reason courts have been reluctant to provide caregivers a remedy
for their post-divorce caregiving relates to the “clean break” philosophy
that has infiltrated divorce law.  That philosophy encourages courts to dis-
entangle the couple economically at divorce, if possible.  The idea
emerged from the UMDA, promulgated approximately forty-five years
ago,91 and remains strong today.  In 1996, Professor Milton Regan called it
“the predominant aim” of divorce law’s treatment of financial obliga-
tions.92  In 2012, Professor Starnes reported that the laws at divorce still
“remain wed to the clean-break myth that divorce can end or minimize all
economic ties between spouses with children.”93  The doctrine has re-
mained steadfast even though it is now antiquated, in light of the way di-
vorced parents today are entangled during their child’s minority,
including from child support and custody.
nancial incidents of divorce, even where it has produced substantial long-term eco-
nomic effects for family members.”  Estin, supra note 85, at 721.  As she points out,
this is especially true for younger families “subject to new and different norms of
family life in which self-sufficiency and autonomy are of primary importance.” Id.
at 722.  Scholar Joan Williams noted that poor women “have not traditionally been
awarded alimony.” See Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead?  Beyond a New Theory of Ali-
mony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2231 (1994).  Permanent alimony appears to have become
increasingly disfavored over time.  Lenore Weitzman reported that approximately
fourteen percent of divorced women received alimony in 1978. LENORE WEITZ-
MAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 168 (1985).  In 2009, approximately thirty years
later, the number of people receiving permanent alimony appears to be more like
two percent. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Marital Status of People 15 Years and over,
by Age, Sex, Personal Earnings, Race, and Hispanic Origin, tbl.A1 (2009), http://www
.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2009.html (reporting
13,308,000 as number of divorced women age fifteen years and older), and U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement,
Source of Income in 2009—People 15 Years and over, All Races (2009), http://www.cen-
sus.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032010/perinc/new08_181.htm (reporting 320,000
women age fifteen years and older receiving alimony); see also Heather Ruth
Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79, 81, 85 (1986)
(finding “less than 7% of spouses receive spousal maintenance awards, and less
than 2% receive awards of unlimited duration” in study of Vermont divorce cases
from October 1982 to February 1983).
91. See Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV.
225, 261 n.162 (1997) (citing UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT (amended 1973), 9A
U.L.A. 101–506 (1998)).
92. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Postmodern Family Law: Toward a New Model of Status,
in PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 157, 174
(David Popenoe, Jean Bethke Elshtain & David Blankenhorn eds., 1996); see also
Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership Pretense and Career Assets: The Ascendancy
of Self over the Marital Community, 81 B.U. L. REV. 59, 75 (2001) (citing Milton C.
Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J.
2303, 2314 (1994)); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Dis-
course on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U.
CHI. L. REV. 67, 85, 108 (1993) (noting that partnership model views divorce as
termination of parties’ mutual responsibilities).
93. Cynthia Lee Starnes, Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and
Co-parenting Commitments, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 199 (2012).
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B. Uncaring Reforms
Recent reforms of alimony law have disadvantaged caregivers and
have made it more unlikely that they will receive adequate compensation
at divorce for their marital or post-marital caregiving.  For example, Massa-
chusetts’s Alimony Reform Act of 201194 hamstrings judges in their efforts
to afford caregivers’ justice, although it is touted as “the latest and the
most comprehensive” of efforts to reform alimony in the United States,95
and a “model for consideration elsewhere.”96  The Act is problematic for
caregivers in at least six ways.
First, caregiving is not expressly relevant to an alimony award.  No-
where are courts told to remedy a caregiver’s disproportionate and unfair
caregiving, performed either during the marriage or after divorce.  The
fact that someone is, has been, or will be the caregiver for the parties’
child is not listed as a relevant factor to a court’s determination of the
type, amount, or duration of alimony.97  While caregiving might be rele-
vant indirectly to some of the listed factors,98 Massachusetts’s new statute
specifically eliminated as a relevant factor the “contribution of each of the
parties as a homemaker to the family unit,”99 although it was included in
the prior law.  Nor is caregiving mentioned in the nonexclusive list of fac-
tors that could support deviation from the guidelines, either for an initial
award or for a modified award.100
Second, the statute insufficiently recognizes a compensatory rationale
for marital caregiving.  The statute has four categories of alimony: general
term, rehabilitative, reimbursement, and transitional.  The statute does
not mention as one of alimony’s purposes the compensation of a caregiver
for her lost earning capacity attributable to her marital caregiving.101  Nor
94. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (2012).
95. Kindregan, supra note 75, at 15.
96. Id. at 18.
97. The factors to be considered are the following:
[L]ength of the marriage; age of the parties; health of the parties; in-
come, employment and employability of both parties, including em-
ployability through reasonable diligence and additional training, if
necessary; economic and non-economic contribution of both parties to
the marriage; marital lifestyle; ability of each party to maintain the mari-
tal lifestyle; lost economic opportunity as a result of the marriage; and
such other factors as the court considers relevant and material.
Ch. 208, § 53(a).
98. Professor Kindregan’s notes elaborate a little on each of these factors, but
they do not discuss caregiving. See Kindregan, supra note 75, at 37–38 &
nn.132–41.
99. Drapek v. Drapek, 503 N.E.2d 946, 950 (Mass. 1987) (quoting MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 208, § 34 (1984)).  A homemaking contribution is still relevant to a prop-
erty award. See ch. 208, § 34.
100. See ch. 208, § 53(e).  Nor do Professor Kindregan’s notes mention
caregiving as a factor in this context. See Kindregan, supra note 75, at 39–40 &
nn.149–57.
101. See Kindregan, supra note 75, at 35–36 & n.124.
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is there any entitlement to a market worker’s enhanced earning capacity.
Instead the emphasis is on economic need.  While “reimbursement ali-
mony”102 potentially affords a caregiver access to the other parent’s en-
hanced earning capacity, a caregiver must have been married less than five
years to qualify for this type of alimony103 (as well as for transitional ali-
mony).104  Reimbursement alimony is limited to recently married couples
because these couples are the most likely couples to have an insufficient
amount of property accumulated for compensating a spouse’s contribu-
tion.105  Of course, couples married longer than five years might also have
inadequate property available for compensatory purposes, but the statute
draws a bright line regarding eligibility.
Third, and very importantly, post-marital caregiving is ignored as a
reason for compensation; it is potentially relevant only to general term
alimony.  Reimbursement alimony only reimburses for marital contribu-
tions;106 it does not address a caregiver’s future contributions to the other
parent’s prosperity through caregiving.  “Rehabilitative alimony” is availa-
ble for one who can “become economically self-sufficient by a predicted
time.”107 Its focus is not on compensating caregiving, but rather helping
one transition away from caregiving to paid work.  “General term alimony”
is available for one who is “economically dependent,”108 and future
caregiving may justify economic dependence.109  However, the Massachu-
setts’s statute lacks a provision, like in the UMDA, that says a court can
excuse a recipient’s lack of labor force participation when the recipient is
caregiving.  A caregiver’s eligibility for general term alimony is made even
more ambiguous because the statute allows a court to impute income to a
caregiver,110 and its express inclusion of rehabilitative alimony, with no
exemption for caregivers, makes a caregiver’s continued economic depen-
102. “Reimbursement alimony” is “to compensate the recipient spouse for ec-
onomic or noneconomic contribution to the financial resources of the payor
spouse, such as enabling the payor spouse to complete an education or job train-
ing.”  Ch. 208, § 48.  It is not for support but is compensatory. See Kindregan, supra
note 75, at 25 n.56.  It is not modifiable. See ch. 208, § 51(b).
103. See ch. 208, § 48.
104. “Transitional alimony” is “to transition the recipient spouse to an ad-
justed lifestyle or location as a result of the divorce.” Id.  It is only available if the
recipient has been married less than five years. See id.  It is essentially meant to
help the recipient get back to a premarital standard of living after a short mar-
riage. See Kindregan, supra note 75, at 36.  It terminates within three years of di-
vorce.  Ch. 208, § 52(a).  Transitional alimony is clearly not designed to help a
caregiver “transition” to a life of caregiving without simultaneous market work.
105. See Kindregan, supra note 75, at 35.
106. The contribution must have been made to the “payor spouse,” and after
divorce neither party contributes anything to a “spouse,” since the parties are di-
vorced. See ch. 208, § 48.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Kelley v. Kelley, 835 N.E.2d 315, 317–22 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)
(sixteen-year marriage).
110. See ch. 208, § 53(f).
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dence on the other parent questionable.  Although rehabilitative alimony
had previously been viewed suspiciously by the Massachusetts courts, one
court recently observed that the reform legislation specifically provides for
it.111
Fourth, even if a caregiver might receive alimony for her post-divorce
caregiving, the law imposes some strict time limits on the alimony’s dura-
tion, unless a deviation is required in the interests of justice.  For a mar-
riage lasting between five and ten years, general term alimony shall
continue “for not longer than 60 percent of the number of months of the
marriage.”112  Only if the marriage lasted more than twenty years is indefi-
nite alimony expressly permissible.113  A caregiver who divorces after six
years of marriage is entitled to only about forty-three months of general
term alimony (seventy-two months multiplied by sixty percent).  If the
caregiver has a two-year-old child at the time of the divorce, the child will
be less than six years old when the general term alimony ends.  Moreover,
rehabilitative alimony is presumptively limited to five years.114  While the
statute allows a court to delay the beginning of alimony until the conclu-
sion of child support payments,115 the relevant provision does not appear
to extend the alimony time limits otherwise, although as one commenta-
tor said, “the meaning of this provision is far from clear.”116
Fifth, the statute caps the amount of alimony someone can receive
and thereby potentially undercompensates the caregiver.  With the excep-
tion of reimbursement alimony (for which someone married more than
five years is ineligible and which only focuses on marital caregiving), ali-
mony is not supposed to “exceed the recipient’s need or 30 to 35 percent
of the difference between the parties’ gross incomes established at the
time” the alimony order is entered.117  While a court can deviate from this
limit,118 the numerical formula sends a powerful message.  Even if a par-
ent will perform one-hundred percent of the caregiving going forward,
the caregiver is not entitled to half of the other parent’s income as a pre-
sumptive matter.  In addition, the cap is calculated at the time of divorce,
so a caregiver will never recover for her labor’s enhancement of the other
parent’s income over the coming years.  In fact, the law expressly excludes
as a reason to modify an order the fact that the obligor has additional
income from a second job or overtime, so long as that additional source of
111. See Kowalska-Davis v. Davis, No. 10-P-2191, 2012 WL 602770, at *1 n.5
(Mass. App. Ct. Feb. 27, 2012).
112. Ch. 208, § 49(b)(2).
113. See id. § 49(c).
114. See id. § 50(b).  It may be extended for unforeseen compelling reasons if
it would not cause an undue burden on the payor. See id. § 50(b)(1), (3); Kindre-
gan, supra note 75, at 34.
115. Ch. 208, § 53(g).
116. Witmer & Warner, supra note 14, § 9.6.
117. Ch. 208, § 53(b).
118. Id.
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income was acquired after the entry of the initial order.119  This bar exists
even if the obligee’s disproportionate caregiving is the reason the obligor
could earn the additional income.
Sixth, both general term alimony and rehabilitative alimony end if
the caregiver enters a new relationship.  Not only does it terminate when
the recipient remarries,120 but the 2011 reform also specifies that general
term alimony would terminate upon cohabitation with someone for three
months or longer,121 so long as the cohabitants have a “common house-
hold.”122  It is irrelevant if the cohabitants do not share a life together as a
couple, or if the cohabitant has no legal obligation, or desire, to support
the caregiver.123
In sum, the segmentation of caregiving into time periods helps show
the gaps and inadequacies in the law.  When the romantic relationship
ends, most states only provide a remedy for a caregiver’s past caregiving so
long as the parties were married at the time.  Even divorcing caregivers,
however, may encounter an inadequate remedy for marital caregiving if
the couple lacks much property, and the judge employs alimony reluc-
tantly to address the injustice.  Unwed caregivers typically lack any remedy
at the end of their romantic relationship to address the unfairness attribu-
table to past caregiving.  Future caregiving, whether by divorced or unmar-
ried individuals, will typically also be uncompensated.  Recent reform
efforts in some places will hamper judges’ ability to use alimony to afford
divorcing caregivers an adequate remedy for future caregiving.
The law should tie the remedies for disproportionate and unfair
caregiving to the act of caregiving and not to marriage.  The costs of
caregiving and the benefits conferred by caregiving do not differ depend-
ing upon whether the parents are unmarried, married, or divorced.  The
law should provide a remedy to any parent that provides disproportionate
and unfair caregiving.  Such is necessary to deter parents from taking ad-
vantage of the caregiving parent.124
IV. THE INCOMPLETENESS AND RIGIDITY OF REFORM PROPOSALS
Family law scholars have recommended that the law in the United
States change to better recognize caregivers’ efforts.  Proposals have been
made to both expand the categories of caregivers who are eligible for
awards and to better address post-divorce caregiving.  One important ef-
119. Id. § 54(b).
120. See id. §§ 49(a), 50(a).  This applies to general term and rehabilitative
types of alimony.
121. See id. § 49(d); Kindregan, supra note 75, at 31.  Remarriage and cohabi-
tation rules do not apply to reimbursement or transitional alimony. See ch. 208,
§§ 51, 52.
122. Ch. 208, § 49(d).
123. See Kindregan, supra note 75, at 31 n.94, 32.
124. See June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Commu-
nity, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 359, 405–06 (1994).
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fort is found in the ALI Principles.125  Other recent and important contri-
butions include the works of Professors Ayelet Blecher-Prigat and Cynthia
Starnes.126  Despite the fact that all of these reform proposals would move
the law forward if adopted, these reform proposals are uniformly problem-
atic in two ways: first, the proposals do not apply to all caregivers; and
second, the proposals try to limit judges’ discretion.
A. The ALI’s Proposal and Its Problems
The ALI Principles use three tools to remedy the unfairness that
caregivers experience: a child support supplement, a property award, and
a spousal support award upon divorce.  All of these awards, even together,
fail to provide a complete remedy for all caregivers.  In addition, the ALI
Principles lack any sort of coherent normative message that all parents
have an obligation to the other parent to share the costs of caregiving
fairly.  In fact, the ALI Principles send the opposite message because of the
eligibility requirements for its three awards.
Many parents are ineligible for the property and spousal support rem-
edies because these require either a marriage or a domestic partnership.
The ALI Principles define domestic partners as two people who “for a sig-
nificant period of time share a primary residence and a life together as a
couple.”127  Couples with a “common child” who maintain “a common
household” for a “cohabitation parenting period” also have a domestic
partnership.128  The state sets the length of the “cohabitation parenting
period,” but the drafters implied that a two-year period would be a reason-
able choice.129  The requirement that the individuals share a “primary res-
idence” is meant to exclude “casual and occasional relationships, as well as
extramarital relationships conducted by married persons who continue to
reside with a spouse.”130  Of course, this formulation will exclude many
couples who have children but who do not cohabit or will not cohabit for
the requisite period of time.  The child support supplement covers a wider
array of parents but nonetheless excludes many categories of caregivers,
and it is quite limited in the amount of relief it confers, as described
below.
125. See generally PRINCIPLES.  The provisions in the American Law Institute’s
Principles are heavily influenced by Professor Ira Ellman’s earlier work, The Theory
of Alimony. See generally Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1989).
126. Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, The Costs of Raising Children: Toward a Theory of Fi-
nancial Obligations Between Co-parents, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 179 (2012);
Starnes, supra note 93, at 238.
127. PRINCIPLES § 6.03(1).
128. Id. § 6.03(2).
129. Id. § 6.03 cmt. d.
130. Id. cmt. c.
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1. Child Support Supplement
The ALI Principles’ child support supplement is designed so that par-
ents, whether married or unmarried,131 share the caregiver’s loss of earn-
ings from “appropriate[ ] limits [on] market employment in order to
provide care for a child.”132  The caregiver’s loss is calculated as the differ-
ence between what the caregiver would earn in full-time employment and
what the caregiver does earn (or would earn) in employment consistent
with the child’s needs.  That loss is allocated between the parents in pro-
portion to their full-time incomes, unless that would be “inequitable.”133
The drafters of the ALI Principles made the child support supplement
available to all caregivers, regardless of marital or cohabitation status, by
attaching it to child support.134  Broad eligibility advances thought on this
topic considerably, although the ALI’s child support supplement is not a
panacea.
As an initial matter, the remedy does not permit all caregivers to re-
cover their losses.  If the caregiver works full-time, she is ineligible for the
remedy even if caregiving “foreclose[s] more lucrative employment oppor-
tunities.”135  So, a full-time store clerk cannot recover her loss even
though she rejected a higher paying management position because the
position’s inflexible hours would have interfered with her care for their
child.  In addition, certain caregivers may not benefit from the remedy
because they are outside of a category that makes it “presumptively” per-
missible to limit market employment: when the child is under three; when
there are three or more children under ten; when the child is disabled; or,
when the cost of child care is more than the parent’s expected earn-
ings.136  Even a caregiver that benefits from the presumption may receive
nothing if her care is “inappropriate or excessive in terms of the child’s
needs.”137  Parental care is not automatically deemed more appropriate
than day care for children in these categories that trigger the presump-
tion.  That parental care can be “inappropriate” or “excessive” for a two
year old is arguably an outrageous proposition.  Nor need any weight nec-
essarily be given to an earlier parental agreement that parental care would
occur.  Consequently, if a caregiver can access employment with “on-site
131. Id. § 3.01 cmt. b.
132. Id. § 3.052A(1).
133. See id. § 3.052A(5)–(6).
134. See id. § 3.052A cmt. a.  By moving and relabeling the provision, it be-
came subject to the principle that a parent’s support obligation to the child does
not depend upon the parent’s legal or social relationship to the other parent. See
id. § 3.01 & cmt. b.  One of the objectives of Chapter 3 is to treat residential par-
ents fairly and to ensure that “child-support rules take into account a child’s need
for care.” Id. § 3.04(3), (6).
135. Id. § 3.052A cmt. d.
136. See id. § 3.052A(2).  These are not the only times when a child may need
parental care, but the other situations will not benefit from a presumption. See id.
§ 3.052A cmt. b.
137. Id. § 3.052A(3).
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child care,” for example, then her effort to limit market employment may
be inappropriate, and her caregiving “excessive,”138 despite the facts that
her child is an infant and the parties’ previously agreed that in-home care
was desirable.
Moreover, the court need not allocate the caregiver’s loss proportion-
ally between the parents if it would be “inequitable to do so.”  The ALI
Principles state that it is inequitable to share the loss if the caregiver makes
much more money than the market worker.139  It is unclear at what pre-
cise income level it would be considered “equitable” for the market worker
to contribute.  It is also unclear why the disparity of income should relieve
a parent of all financial responsibility if he can otherwise afford it.  Imag-
ine a situation in which the primary caregiver works part-time for
$125,000, although she could earn $175,000 if she only had to shoulder
half of the child-care responsibilities.  Why should a father who earns
$75,000 working full-time be absolved of all responsibility for the
caregiver’s loss?
Additionally, the child support supplement provides payment only for
a very short period of time, even if a caregiver qualifies for it.140  Compen-
sation is presumptively available only until a child turns three (if the child
is an only child).141  No remedy is likely for the caregiver’s wage loss
throughout the remainder of the child’s minority.  Even during the first
three years of the child’s life, the remedy is a narrow one: it “reaches only
certain current costs of reduced labor-force participation.”142  It excludes,
among other things, “nonaccrual of work experience, seniority, and Social
Security coverage.”143
Finally, this supplement is part of child support and not an award to
the caregiver for her own use.  Although the supplement is meant to com-
pensate the caregiver for her injury, the recovery is technically her child’s.
Consequently, the caregiver’s spending is subject to some limits,144 and
she may have to account for the money.145
Given the limited scope of the child support supplement, the ALI
Principles provide two additional methods of compensating a caregiver for
caregiving, at least for a caregiver who was married or in a domestic part-
nership.  At the end of a marriage or a domestic partnership, the caregiver
138. See id. § 3.052A cmt. c.
139. Id. § 3.052A illus. 4.  A remedy in this situation would be “inequitable.”
See id. § 3.052A.
140. See id. § 3.052A cmt. d.
141. See id. cmt. c.
142. Id. cmt. d.
143. Id.
144. Cf. Deborah H. Bell, Child Support Orders: The Common Law Framework—
Part II, 69 MISS. L.J. 1063, 1076 (2000) (noting that parent recipient of child sup-
port is fiduciary for child and cannot compromise obligation by contract).
145. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 452.342 (2011).
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may qualify for an enhanced share of the marital property or for a com-
pensatory spousal payment.146
2. Property
The drafters of the ALI Principles proposed a “rough compromise”
between the competing approaches courts presently employ to allocate
marital property,147 whether that is “in proportion to the spousal contri-
butions to its acquisition [or] . . . according to relative spousal need.”148
The ALI’s approach is to award a presumptively equal amount of marital
property to each party, with departures allowed to compensate for recog-
nized losses.149  The remedy is grounded in the idea that the spouses con-
tribute “to the entire marital relationship, not just to the accumulation of
financial assets,”150 and domestic labor permits “the couple to raise chil-
dren as well as accumulate property.”151  The drafters felt it was reasona-
ble to adopt a presumption of equal contribution to the financial assets
because “no-fault divorce [permits] either spouse [to] unilaterally termi-
nate the marriage . . . [if he or she] believe[s] their relationship is seriously
one-sided . . . .”152  Since the presumption of equal division can be rebutted
to compensate for recognized losses, a caregiver might receive a larger
award of property to compensate for her earning capacity loss attributable
to marital caregiving.  Not all couples have enough property to cover the
caregiver’s loss, however.153  Therefore, the drafters also devised compen-
satory spousal support, which one scholar has described as “a residual
claim” that fills in the gaps left by the property division and child support
awards,154 but which—as described next—is a key mechanism in its own
right for addressing caregiver losses.
3. Compensatory Spousal Support
The ALI Principles authorize caregiver compensation in the form of
compensatory spousal support to married caregivers and domestically
partnered caregivers.155  Compensatory spousal support is a claim of enti-
tlement and is not based on need.156  The award is justified because the
“the cost of raising the couple’s children is their joint responsibility.”157
146. See PRINCIPLES § 4.09(2).
147. See id. § 4.09 cmts. a & b.
148. Id. cmt. a.
149. See id. § 4.09(1), (2)(a).
150. Id. § 4.09 cmt. c (emphasis added).  The presumptively equal division of
marital property “follows from the sharing premise.” See id. cmt. b.
151. Id. cmt. c.
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. See id. § 5.10 cmt. b.
154. See Carbone, supra note 1, at 57.
155. See PRINCIPLES §§ 5.03, 6.06.
156. Id. § 5.02 cmt. a.
157. Id. § 5.05 cmt. a.
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The remedy is specifically designed to compensate caregivers for the earn-
ing capacity losses experienced from disproportionate caretaking during
the marriage.158  The ALI’s remedy addresses the caregiver’s frustrated
expectation that she would share the obligor’s income in foregoing her
own earning capacity.159  The ALI Principles also contain other bases for a
compensatory award, and a caregiver might qualify on one of those alter-
native grounds too; however, the one just discussed is the only one that
focuses on caregiving per se.160  Adoption of the ALI Principles would be
a significant legal advance for caregivers because the Principles make ex-
plicit that caregiving causes the caregiver loss and that loss should be com-
pensable as part of spousal support.
The ALI Principles include a formula for computing compensatory
spousal support.161  Others have called the formula a “pragmatic solution”
because assessing the precise earning loss would be quite difficult.162  Es-
sentially, the caregiver receives the difference between the non-caregiver’s
and the caregiver’s incomes at dissolution multiplied by a factor that re-
flects the length of time that the caregiver cared for the children.163  This
measure supposedly calculates the approximate value of the caregiver’s
loss because she likely married someone from a similar socio-economic
background; therefore, the caregiver could have earned a similar amount
as the breadwinner, at least theoretically.164  The formula, however, does
not permit the caregiver to achieve income equality with the other parent.
158. Id. § 5.02(3)(a), § 5.05 & cmt. a.
159. Id. § 5.06 cmt. b.  The importance of the caregiver’s expectation is reiter-
ated in other parts of the commentary. See, e.g., id. § 5.05 cmt. e (explaining
choice of “proxy measure” to calculate earning-capacity loss); id. § 5.05 cmt. a.
Similar language is found again in an academic article by one of the Reporters. See
Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809,
847 (1998) (“[The provision] takes sacrifice seriously and encourages it by treating
it fairly.  It assumes that when different roles led to disproportionate individual
earning capacities, it was expected that those shared roles were part of a shared
enterprise rather than a lop-sided bargain favoring one partner over the other.”).
160. For example, the ALI Principles permit recovery for a loss in a spouse’s
standard of living if the marriage was of significant duration and the claimant has
less earning capacity or wealth. See PRINCIPLES § 5.03(2)(a).
161. See id. § 5.05(4).
162. See Carbone, supra note 1, at 69.
163. The award is the difference between the incomes of the spouses at disso-
lution, multiplied by a percentage, entitled the “child-care durational factor,”
which represents the period during which “the claimant provided significantly
more than half of the total care that both spouses together provided for the chil-
dren.” PRINCIPLES § 5.05(4)(a).  The award is to be a periodic payment with an
indefinite duration, if the claimant is old enough and the marriage long enough,
but otherwise with a fixed duration for “the length of the child-care period multi-
plied by a factor specified in the rule.” See id. § 5.06(1)(a)–(b).  The award is
meant to end when the loss is compensated, i.e., “the obligee will, after the speci-
fied period, have recovered all lost earning capacity.” Id. § 5.06 cmt. b.  It can be a
lump sum. See id. § 5.10(2)(c).
164. See id. § 5.05 cmt. e.
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The obligor is never required to pay the caregiver more than forty percent
of the difference between the two incomes.165
The ALI’s approach to spousal support is susceptible to a number of
criticisms even apart from the fact that it explicitly requires a marital or
domestic partnership before it is available, and it never permits income
equality.  First, a caregiver is only eligible for this remedy if her earning
capacity at divorce is “substantially less than that of the other spouse.”166
If her earning capacity is the same or slightly less than her spouse’s, it is
irrelevant that the caregiver’s earning capacity is lower than what it other-
wise would have been without the caregiving responsibilities.
Second, a presumption of entitlement exists only if the claimant pro-
vided “substantially more than half of the total care that both spouses to-
gether provided for the children.”167  This requirement gets at the notion
of disproportionality, but it excludes some worthy claimants and creates
inequities.  For example, a caregiver who does slightly more of the caregiv-
ing than the market worker but never shares in any of his income may face
more injustice than someone who does a substantial amount of caregiving
but fully shares in her partner’s wealth.
Third, and very importantly, the remedy does not compensate for fu-
ture loss caused by post-dissolution caregiving.168  By using the market
worker’s income at dissolution and the years of caregiving during the mar-
riage,169 the caregiver’s remedy is addressed to the effects of marital
caregiving, not the effects of post-divorce caregiving.  As already discussed,
the child support supplement can compensate for the effects of some post-
dissolution caregiving so long as the caregiver does not work full-time or
earn much more than the other parent, but the supplement typically is
165. See id. § 5.03 cmt. b; Starnes, supra note 93, at 237.
166. PRINCIPLES § 5.05(2)(c); see also id. § 5.05 cmt. d.  This is so even though
the Reporters acknowledge that “some may have a loss.” Id.  Why?
[I]t would be contrary to existing law virtually everywhere to require the
less affluent spouse to compensate the wealthier one, particularly if their
income gap is large.  One could argue that allowing these claims would
give lower-earning spouses an incentive to fulfill the primary-caretaker
role in order to avoid potentially devastating liability at dissolution, and
would in this way encourage a more efficient allocation of household du-
ties.  But the most efficient allocation may not be the best one, all things
considered, so it is unclear whether the law should attempt such an im-
pact on spousal choices.  And it is far from clear that such a rule would in
fact influence marital behavior, and if it did not the result would be large
awards against spouses who cannot afford to pay them.  On balance,
therefore, such claims are not allowed.
Id.  The rule is touted for administrative reasons, and the Reporters acknowledge
that it “is not entirely consistent with the section’s basic rationale.” See id.
167. Id. § 5.05(3).
168. The Reporters acknowledge that the section “does not compensate the
loss of earnings incurred by the spouse unable to realize the value of his or her
earning capacity because of post-dissolution custodial responsibilities.” Id. § 5.05
cmt. f.
169. See id. § 5.05(4).
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only available for a very limited time.  The clean-break philosophy is still
embedded within the ALI Principles, and compensatory spousal support is
an example of it.170
Fourth, the compensatory spousal support award typically terminates
on remarriage or when the recipient enters a domestic partnership.171
While spousal support typically terminates on remarriage, it makes little
sense when the award is not premised on need, but on compensation.
When an award is premised on need, the law assumes that any new spouse
will meet the recipient’s need.  However, when the award is premised on
compensation, the award is akin to a payment for a debt owed for work
done.  The caregiver’s new relationship should not extinguish a compen-
satory award, just as it would not extinguish any other debt.
The ALI’s approach to remarriage, just like the current law in most
places (including Massachusetts), imposes the costs of caregiving on a le-
gal stranger to the child.  It essentially shifts responsibility for the
caregiver’s financial loss from the child’s other parent to the caregiver’s
new spouse.  A second husband will be obligated to pay compensatory
spousal support if his wife cared for a non-joint child during their mar-
riage and she suffered a loss of earning capacity.172  The ALI justifies this
financial allocation by explaining that “[t]here is no basis for imposing
[the loss] on the noncustodial parent, who is not generally responsible for
voluntary earning-capacity losses incurred by his or her former spouse af-
ter the end of their marriage.”173  But that, of course, is the point: the law
should provide a basis to make the noncustodial parent an obligor for the
caregiver’s loss related to the care of their child.
Fifth, the ALI’s remedy will fail to remedy some caregivers’ frustrated
expectations, even though addressing frustrated expectations is one of the
goals of the remedy.  Married and domestically partnered caregivers are
not the only caregivers who rely on the availability of the other parent’s
income in foregoing their own.  An unmarried caregiver, for example,
may expect to share the other parent’s income because the parties cohab-
ited (albeit too briefly to become domestic partners), and/or were actually
sharing, and/or had an agreement to share (even if not a legally enforcea-
ble agreement).  The ALI Principles foreclose a more factually intensive
inquiry that could address all caregivers’ frustrated expectations.
The ALI Principles also foreclose the use of alternative legal theories
as a basis to afford a remedy, although other theories might sometimes
170. The award is modifiable if the loss upon which the order was based “is
substantially smaller than was expected . . . because of an increase in the obligee’s
income.” Id. § 5.08(1)(b).
171. See id. §§ 5.07 & cmt. a, 5.09.  Joan Williams raised many of these and
other criticisms to Ira Ellman’s initial proposal to compensate women for financial
loss by measuring their earning capacity loss, and the ALI Principles addressed
some of her concerns. See Williams, supra note 90, at 2254–57.
172. See PRINCIPLES § 5.05(1).
173. Id. § 5.05 cmt. b.
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better remedy injustices than the ALI Principles.  Loss theory undergirds
the ALI’s remedy, but, as explained below in Part V.C, it is not the only
approach to compensatory payments.  Sometimes another remedy might
be more appropriate given the facts of the case.  Consider the married
caregiver who never experienced any economic loss from her ten years of
caregiving because she was market challenged (i.e., she had low skills and
would have never advanced beyond an entry-level position even without a
child).  Nonetheless, her caregiving allowed the other parent to experi-
ence a financial or other benefit, and he will continue to benefit from her
labor in the future.  Imagine also that the couple has little property to
divide.  The absence of a remedy under the ALI Principles means that the
Principles permit morally problematic freeloading.
For unknown reasons, the rules in the ALI Principles on alimony and
child support have not caught on among the states.174  To the extent they
have, states sometimes incorporate only the worst aspects of the ALI Prin-
ciples.  Massachusetts is an example.175  Most notably, Massachusetts did
not amend its child support law to provide anything like a child support
supplement when it reformed its alimony law, although it did revise its
child support guidelines in 2013.176  It also did not broaden alimony eligi-
bility to include domestic partners, or expressly recognize loss theory or
the related formula.  Instead, perhaps influenced by the ALI Principles’
option for a compensatory spousal payment of a presumptively fixed dura-
tion, Massachusetts adopted an outer time limit for general term alimony.
Like the ALI Principles, Massachusetts capped the percentage that could
be awarded after computing the difference between the two parties’ in-
comes; Massachusetts, however, chose even a smaller percentage than the
forty percent proposed by the ALI Principles.177  Massachusetts followed
the ALI Principles in requiring termination of alimony upon remarriage
174. See Lynn Dennis Wardle & Laurence C. Nolan, United States of America, in
6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: FAMILY AND SUCCESSION LAW 242 (Wal-
ter Pintens ed., 2011) (“‘[N]o state has yet to formally adopt [those] Principles.’
Indeed, a comprehensive 2008 review of the impact of the ALI Principles on family
law in the states found that only one state has statutorily enacted any part of the
ALI Principles, and the dozen of [sic] so cases each year (average) that cite the
Principles do so as an ‘obligatory citation’ but neither adopt nor rely upon its
recommendations.” (footnote omitted)).
175. See Kindregan, supra note 75, at 17 (noting Massachusetts “partially in-
corporated” some of the ALI Principles, but in other places “the text of the Ali-
mony Reform Act of 2011 varies widely from the ALI Principles”).
176. Massachusetts did amend its child support law. See CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINES, supra note 14.  Minimal attention was given to how child support and
alimony are related. See id. at 5.  Judges were given discretion to designate child
support as alimony if the difference in tax consequences would be more equitable
for the child and the parties. See id.; see also QUADRENNIAL REVIEW, supra note 14, at
66–67.
177. Compare Alimony Reform Act of 2011, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 53(b)
(2012) (“Except for reimbursement alimony or circumstances warranting devia-
tion for other forms of alimony, the amount of alimony should generally not ex-
ceed the recipient’s need or 30 to 35 percent of the difference between the
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or cohabitation, although Massachusetts is even tougher on cohabi-
tants.178  Finally, neither Massachusetts nor the ALI Principles provide suf-
ficient compensation for post-divorce caregiving.
B. Scholars’ Thoughts
For a long time, scholars who cared about caregivers focused prima-
rily on married and divorcing caregivers when thinking about inter se obli-
gations between parents.179  Recently, unmarried caregivers have received
more attention from scholars.180  Often, however, scholars favor just a sub-
set of unmarried caregivers, and make only that subset eligible for any sort
of remedy.
For example, Professor Karen Czapanskiy recently recommended the
adoption of “chalimony” for caregivers, and made eligibility independent
parties’ gross incomes established at the time of the order being issued.”), with
PRINCIPLES § 5.03 cmt. b (establishing 40 percent difference).
178. Compare PRINCIPLES § 5.09 (automatic termination on finding establish-
ment of domestic-partner relationship), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49(d)
(general term alimony “shall be suspended, reduced or terminated” if recipient
maintains common household with another for three months).
179. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 82, at 1221; Martha Ertman, Reconstructing Mar-
riage: An InterSEXional Approach, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1215 (1998) (arguing for
adoption of Premarital Security Agreements to account for labor done by home-
makers); Estin, supra note 85, at 722 (arguing for revitalizing ethic of care and
according it recognition at divorce in economic awards); Martha Albertson
Fineman, The Social Foundations of Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 201, 226 (2005) (suggesting
that when marriage with children ends, equal treatment of parties might require
that assets should be divided “so that the party who is assuming caretaking respon-
sibilities, usually the mother, is able to maintain a living standard nearly equal to
that of the other spouse.  Under this theory, one could argue that periodic pay-
ments should continue for a substantial period of time to supplement the reduced
amount the caretaker will be able to provide in working for pay.”); Mary Ann Glen-
don, Family Law Reform in the 1980’s, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553, 1559 (1984) (recom-
mending “children-first principle” to guide marital property law); Elizabeth S.
Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 91 (1990)
(recommending “more substantial support obligations . . . and [ ] property distri-
bution schemes that are beneficial to children”); Singer, supra note 6, at 2454–60
(arguing for income sharing); Williams, supra note 90, at 2255–58 (suggesting
equalization of two households’ income post divorce, for at least child’s minority
plus two years); Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demor-
alization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45,
90–91 (1981) (proposing property rules for married couples with children that
would allow court to “delay ultimate property division between parents until all the
children reached eighteen”); cf. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE
FAMILY 170–86 (1989) (recommending greater amounts of child support for un-
married mothers, but not discussing compensation for unmarried mothers
themselves).
180. See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 90, at 26.  Professor Polikoff recognizes that
“there is no principled basis for restricting support awards today only to husbands
and wives” since the “[c]ontemporary justification for ongoing support after a rela-
tionship dissolves rests on the economic consequences of one person forgoing in-
dividual financial stability while making uncompensated contributions to a family.”
Id.
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of marital status.181  The award would be in addition to child support and
alimony, and would be for caregivers of children with disabilities or
chronic illnesses when the child’s care impacted the caregiver’s labor
force participation.182  To qualify for a remedy, however, the caregiver’s
loss must be “beyond the degree common for other caregiving par-
ents.”183  In addition, “at least one of the parents . . . [must] not be living
in the household with the child,”184 and the caregiving must reduce the
caregiver’s income-earning capacity.185  While her proposal has much to
commend it, its narrowness is of little benefit to most caregivers and, ar-
guably, even to those in the subset that she is trying to assist.
1. Limiting the Eligible Claimants
Others have also limited their proposals to a subset of caregivers, even
if marriage is not a prerequisite.  Professor Ayelet Blecher-Prigat and Pro-
fessor Cynthia Starnes have discussed the inadequacies of existing reme-
dies for caregivers and have argued that the parents’ relationship to each
other as parents should justify a new remedy when one parent alone bears
the costs of disproportionate caregiving.186  These academics wrote after
the ALI’s Principles were published and, in some respects, their recom-
mendations are a reaction to the ALI’s recommendations.  Neither author
embraced a remedy for all caregivers who suffer disproportionate and un-
fair caregiving, however.  Both think a remedy should exist only for those
caregivers who had a child within an intended, committed co-parenting
partnership.
Professor Starnes’s latest article focuses primarily on spouses and ex-
spouses, as they had a  “mutual commitment to take on the economic sup-
port and physical labor required to raise shared children,”187 although she
envisions possibly expanding her remedy to “intimate relationships other
than marriage that evidence commitment.”188  Qualifying relationships
might include those with an express contract for a “co-parenting commit-
ment,” or relationships that “clearly evidence intimate commitment” even
if they lack an agreement.189  However, for Professor Starnes, “couples en-
gaged in a one-night stand are clearly not committed and do not enter a
co-parenting partnership.”190
181. See Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Chalimony: Seeking Equity Between Parents of
Children with Disabilities and Chronic Illnesses, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 253,
254, 278 (2010).
182. See id. at 255.
183. Id. at 264–65.
184. Id. at 265.
185. See id. at 263.
186. See Blecher-Prigat, supra note 126; Starnes, supra note 93.
187. Starnes, supra note 93, at 234.
188. Id. at 237.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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Despite a professed willingness to extend her proposal beyond mar-
ried couples, Professor Starnes’s actual willingness appears quite grudging.
Her formulation would exclude most non-cohabiting couples who become
parents, as well as some cohabiting couples with children.  She explains,
“[n]or do marriage-eligible cohabiting intimates qualify as committed
couples, unless perhaps the circumstances of their relationship trigger a
state-imposed status, as the ALI has proposed.”191  Most surprisingly, she
even excludes some married caregivers from her remedy.  Professor
Starnes excludes caregivers whose spouses were divided on their desire to
add a child to the family, unless they stayed together after the child’s birth
(potentially evidencing co-parenting commitment), and neither parent re-
butted the “rebuttable presumption” of a co-parenting partnership.192
Professor Blecher-Prigat similarly limits the availability of her remedy.
Professor Blecher-Prigat suggests that the obligations to the caregiver
should only apply if the parties are voluntarily joint parents, such as those
who “enter into explicit agreements to have and raise a child together.”193
She wants the obligations that are imposed by parenthood to be a
“choice.”194  She therefore limits her remedy to parents who planned to
have a child, even for those in a committed relationship such as a mar-
riage.195  She appears most concerned about fathers who might be un-
fairly subjected to obligations, because women alone have the right to
abort and, sometimes, to place the child for adoption.  She concludes: “My
suggestion, then, is that the obligations imposed by a planned shared
parenthood and those imposed by unintended parenthood should be differ-
ent.”196  Because unintended conception is so common,197 even among
married and cohabiting couples, Professor Blecher-Prigat’s requirements
drastically limit the applicability of her proposal.
Professor Blecher-Prigat and Professor Starnes both choose to empha-
size voluntary co-parenting commitment, although they come at the issue
of voluntariness differently.  “Unintended parenthood” would not bother
Professor Starnes so long as the parties both welcomed the child and ex-
hibited some form of co-parenting commitment.  Professor Blecher-Prigat,
on the other hand, does not differentiate between “intimate committed
relationships” and other relationships, but seems only concerned with
whether the parties have a planned pregnancy and agree to co-parent.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 238.
193. Blecher-Prigat, supra note 126, at 205–06.
194. Id. at 207.
195. Id. at 207 n.77.
196. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
197. See Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Unintended Pregnancy in the United
States: Incidence and Disparities, 2006, 84 CONTRACEPTION 478, 478 (2011) (forty-nine
percent of pregnancies in 2006 were unintended and forty-three percent of unin-
tended pregnancies ended in abortion).
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Both authors’ formulations are problematic, apart from the fact that
they will exclude potentially large numbers of caregivers.  Consider first
Professor Blecher-Prigat’s recommendation, which appears to require both
a planned pregnancy and a post-conception agreement to co-parent.  Why
should a father be relieved of an obligation if both parents intended the
pregnancy, but the father absconds shortly after birth, thereby aban-
doning the child and the mother?  Why should the woman’s right to abort
or relinquish the child for adoption make any difference to the father’s
obligation if neither party took steps to avoid the pregnancy and the father
knows that the law allocates to the mother alone the decision to abort or
relinquish the child?  Why should a post-birth agreement be necessary if
the couple was in a committed, intimate relationship at the point of con-
ception or childbirth, since about half of all pregnancies involve unin-
tended conception?198  If “unintended conception” relieves a parent of
any obligation to the caregiver, won’t there be countless disputes about
whether the child was planned or not?
Apart from these questions, Professor Blecher-Prigat’s articulation of
when the obligation should arise is the wrong result as a matter of theory.
Professor Blecher-Prigat rests her case for an obligation only on the par-
ents’ consent and then defines consent narrowly.  A broader notion of
consent would justify imposing the obligation on almost all parents and
seems a more defensible line: voluntary sexual relations can be construed
as consent to the legal repercussions that follow from the act, including
compensation for disproportionate and unfair caregiving.  This approach
to consent currently justifies the imposition of child support obligations
on fathers who claim they never consented to the birth of a child.199  In
addition, the obligation to give care or share need not be justified solely
on grounds of consent.  Dependency causation can also support an obliga-
tion that is imposed by virtue of parenthood, even when parenthood was
“unintended” or achieved without an explicit agreement to have a
child.200
Professor Blecher-Prigat wants the imposition of an inter se obligation
to be fair—an admirable goal.  But she fails to realize that “choice” is not
the linchpin of fairness; rather, “wrongdoing” is the main component.  To
see why this is so, compare childbirth that results from a mother who lies
to the father about whether she is on birth control, and childbirth that
results after a mother forgets to take her birth control.  While both acts
198. See id.
199. See Jill E. Evans, In Search of Paternal Equity: A Father’s Right to Pursue a
Claim of Misrepresentation of Fertility, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1045, 1047 (2005) (“Both
case and statutory law effectively hold a putative father strictly liable should sexual
intercourse result in the birth of a child.  Child support obligations attach immedi-
ately upon birth, without regard to whether fatherhood was desired or conception
occurred through the mother’s deceit as to her fertility or use of birth control.”).
200. See Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?  An Evaluation of the Emerging
Law of Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 826–28 (2005).
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deprive the father of a choice to parent, the latter scenario should not
relieve him of his inter se obligation.  What differentiates these two scena-
rios is wrongdoing: parties having sex assume the risk of the innocent or
careless mistake, but not the risk of intentional deception.
The importance of wrongdoing becomes even more obvious when
one considers rape leading to involuntary parenthood, something not
mentioned by Professor Bletcher-Prigat.  No one should equate the rap-
ist’s actions with the victim’s subsequent decision not to abort; yet, under
Professor Blecher-Prigat’s analysis, both acts are similar.  Both parents are
subjected to involuntary parenthood, and both would be excused from
inter se obligations under her formulation.  The mother’s parenthood
would be involuntary because of the rape, and the rapist’s parenthood
would be involuntary because of the mother’s decision not to abort.  Yet
only the woman should escape the inter se legal obligations caused by the
child’s birth in this scenario, and this result requires that one focus on
wrongdoing instead of each party’s unimpeded choice.
Professor Starnes’s formulation is problematic for different reasons.
Why is an ongoing commitment between the parents necessary for inter se
obligations that address the repercussions of an intimate commitment?
Why should a person who voluntarily participates in conception be ab-
solved of responsibility for the costs of caring for the child just because he
or she does not stick around?  Why should it be a legal anomaly for an
unmarried, non-cohabiting couple to have a sufficient intimate commit-
ment to trigger an obligation for caregiver compensation?
A much simpler and better approach would be to create a remedy for
all caregivers, regardless of whether or not the couple exhibits committed
co-parenting.  Apart from the practical problem of how to assess commit-
ted co-parenting (a problem illustrated by some of the questions above),
requiring committed co-parenting essentially requires parents to opt in to
a framework that makes the legal remedy available, and that requirement
is unappealing for several reasons.
First, a requirement of committed co-parenting sends the wrong nor-
mative message.  If the law requires couples to be committed co-parents
before they share the costs of caregiving, then the law signals to individu-
als that freeloading is permissible among other couples.  It also signals that
it is acceptable for parents to avoid some of the obligations that should
attend parenthood and for caregivers to be left without a remedy.
Second, if caregiver compensation is only triggered when parties opt
for committed co-parenting, then the law will deter committed co-parent-
ing.  For example, some parties may leave the marital residence after the
birth to ensure that evidence exists to rebut the inference of a co-parent-
ing commitment.  In contrast, if the obligation to give care or share is
triggered at childbirth, then the law does not deter a co-parenting com-
mitment because no legal repercussion attaches to the act of becoming
committed partners.  Rather, an obligation triggered at childbirth would
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incentivize parties to consider the wisdom of reproduction before they
reproduce, and that is a good outcome.
Third, an opt-in approach leaves parties vulnerable to their own cog-
nitive errors, including the following: ignorance (couples may not know
the consequences of failing to opt in); discounting of risk (couples may
assume that a pregnancy will not occur or that they will never split up);
and, irrational decision-making in the heat of passion (couples may copu-
late without discussing the issue of caregiving costs).  It also leaves parties
vulnerable to advantage-taking, such as when one party falsely represents
his or her intention to stick around and help raise a child, but then does
not.
Some readers may be wondering about fraud, and whether it is fair to
impose the new obligation on someone if the other parent lied about his
or her fertility or contraceptive use.  In fact, the best solution for fraud is
debatable because there are legitimate arguments on both sides.  On the
one hand, the law rarely allows fraud to excuse the imposition of a child
support obligation.201  Courts reason that it would be an administrative
nightmare to allow fraud to defeat a child support obligation, as allega-
tions of fraud are easy to make and hard to resolve (they are often he-
said/she-said disputes).  Courts also reject the relevance of fraud in the
child support context because the remedy might diminish the child’s re-
ceipt of economic support.
These same arguments apply in the context of caregiver payments.
The determination of fraud is difficult.  The child would suffer if the
caregiver’s fraud could defeat a remedy.  The child is advantaged by
caregiver payments because the caregiver shares a household with the
child and, together, they constitute “one economic unit.”202  While impos-
ing an obligation of caregiver payments on a defrauded parent might
seem unfair to the defrauded parent, the defrauded parent, rather than
the innocent child, should arguably bear the repercussions.  The de-
frauded parent could have used contraceptives to protect against the possi-
bility of the other parent’s fraud, or could have abstained from sex until
the party’s trustworthiness was assured.
On the other hand, making a defrauded parent pay caregiver pay-
ments seems more unfair than making that parent pay child support.  The
equities in the two contexts do differ.  Caregiver compensation mainly
benefits the dishonest parent at the expense of the defrauded parent, and
any benefit to the child is more attenuated than in the child support con-
text.  Nonetheless, the administrative difficulties involved in adjudicating
fraud still weigh in favor of disregarding fraud altogether in this context,
just like allegations of fraud are disregarded altogether in the adjudication
201. See, e.g., Henson v. Sorrell, No. 02A01-9711-CV-00291, 1999 WL 5630, at
*4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 1999) (noting that suits in which father tried to re-
cover damages from mother for false representations concerning birth control
have been universally rejected, primarily on basis of public policy).
202. See PRINCIPLES § 7.05 cmt. c.
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of child support.  This approach also has the advantage of remedying the
law’s longstanding disregard of fraud at the time of conception that disad-
vantages caregivers.  There is no real legal repercussion for a parent who
falsely promised to stick around and help raise a child, especially if he pays
child support and maintains some minimal contact with the child.  Over-
all, the caregiver remedy should be available to all caregivers, even those
who engage in morally problematic behavior.
2. Limiting Judicial Discretion
The works of Professor Blecher-Prigat and Professor Starnes also di-
verge from this article’s recommendation in another important manner.
Both authors are committed to limiting judicial discretion.  Professor
Blecher-Prigat’s article is the more problematic of the two in this regard.
While the article is incredibly vague about the appropriate remedy for
caregivers, it simultaneously dismisses judicial discretion as a means to
move the law forward.
While Professor Blecher-Prigat’s article argues well for a financial ob-
ligation between parents,203 she does not propose a specific remedy, nor
does she tackle the difficult issues involved in formulating an appropriate
remedy.  She does, however, acknowledge that the undiscussed issues pose
“theoretical dilemmas and practical difficulties.”204  The scope of her arti-
cle prevented her from exploring these complicated issues.205  Professor
Blecher-Prigat admits that the remedy is the “most significant practical dif-
ficultly,” and briefly suggests that wage penalty data might help create a
formula, but that other childrearing costs “would require further think-
ing.”206  She leaves the reader wondering whether the nonfinancial bene-
fits of childrearing would be part of her formula or not, saying that the
question is a “policy decision.”207  She hints that she wants those benefits
ignored but gives scant reason to do so.208  Her silence on these and other
practical issues is unfortunate, both because the devil is in the details and
because she needs them resolved before her own proposal can be
adopted.
Despite the title of her work, The Costs of Raising Children: Toward a
Theory of Financial Obligations Between Co-parents, Professor Blecher-Prigat
avoids discussing in detail the appropriate theoretical basis for any particu-
lar remedy.  She hints that she likes the idea that caretakers might be com-
pensated for losses or supported as they caregive.  She makes passing
reference to the ALI’s approach, although she does not discuss the ALI’s
203. See Blecher-Prigat, supra note 126.  At bottom, Professor Blecher-Prigat’s
argues “that joint parents should share the costs of raising their children,” as this is
a component of co-parenthood. Id. at 190.
204. Id. at 203.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 204.
207. See id.
208. See id.
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caregiver supplement.  She presumably would not like the supplement be-
cause she disapproves of attaching the remedy to child support: “[C]hild
support payments end once the child reaches majority” and the effects of
childrearing may impact the parent much longer.209
Professor Bletcher-Prigat clearly dislikes using a partnership model
(predicated on a romantic or other, non-parental relationship), as a way to
determine the scope or content of the parents’ obligations to each other.
She dismisses it because such a partnership model values the caregiver’s
labor “only as a contribution to the spousal or partnership relation-
ship.”210  She believes, without explanation or justification, that “[t]he ob-
ligations that joint parents owe one another should be addressed through
the prism of their relationship as joint parents and not as spouses and
partners.”211  That position seems rather naı¨ve in the specific context of
caregiver compensation.  After all, caregiving is valuable, at least in part,
because it affects the parties’ positions as defined within their broader re-
lationship.  Also, the expectations related to caregiving can differ dramati-
cally depending upon whether the couple is married or cohabiting, or
whether the parents are non-cohabiting friends or strangers.  Any agree-
ment between them should be understood in terms of their entire rela-
tionship.212  The obligation to compensate a parent for caregiving should
be sensitive to the other aspects of the parents’ relationship.  In addition,
these other aspects of the parents’ relationship matter to the remedy be-
cause not all theories for compensation work equally well in all contexts,
as shown below.
Despite leaving unresolved all of these difficult issues, Professor
Bletcher-Prigat is not willing to give judges discretion to figure out the
answers to these questions.  Professor Blecher-Prigat rejects this approach
by stating, “It is not desirable that the costs of childrearing be legally calcu-
lated on a case-by-case basis.”213  The law should establish “presumptive
results,” rather than use a “discretionary standard.”214  Yet, if lawmakers
must develop such presumptive results before they can offer a remedy to
even her subset of caregivers (those that have “planned shared
parenthood”), then a remedy may not be forthcoming for a long time.
Her subset of caregivers encompasses couples with very different relation-
ships and circumstances, and it is debatable whether her “planned shared
parenthood” should erase those differences.  Certainly, if one wants to
make a remedy available for all caregivers, then one cannot forsake a dis-
cretionary standard.
Professor Cynthia Starnes does an excellent job of proposing and jus-
tifying a remedy, albeit for divorced co-parents, primarily mothers, who
209. Id. at 199.
210. Id. at 190.
211. Id. at 190–91.
212. See Ellman, supra note 125, at 30–31.
213. Blecher-Prigat, supra note 126, at 203.
214. Id. at 203.
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bear the “disproportionate responsibility for the costs of parenting.”215
She proposes income sharing for these parents, and she grounds her rec-
ommendation in the idea that the couple’s entire relationship is a partner-
ship, including the co-parenting.216  By emphasizing the notion of
partnership, she builds on her earlier work.217  Professor Starnes recog-
nizes that her proposal will raise a lot of questions, including “some of
them tough ones” that will require future conversations.218  She tackles
some of them, albeit briefly, including the “appropriate level of income
sharing.”219  She gives the nod to the approach found in the ALI
Principles.220
Professor Starnes, like Professor Blecher-Prigat, rejects giving judges
discretion to craft a remedy, although Professor Starnes’s position is more
subtle: “Whatever level of income sharing is chosen, it should be clear,
predictable and widely known, published perhaps in the form of guide-
lines.”221  Professor Starnes’s rejection of judicial discretion is perhaps un-
derstandable, given that she has a specific proposal for a specific
population.  Nonetheless, there are still open issues with her proposal, and
giving judges discretion to ensure that the relief is appropriate would be
an advantage.  Of course, if one wanted to expand her recommendations
in any way to reach more couples, then judicial discretion would become a
necessity because income sharing is inappropriate for some caregivers, as
mentioned below.
In sum, it is unrealistic to seek a formula in this context, at least at the
outset, and at least to the extent that one wants to provide a remedy to all
caregivers.  The requirement that a formula or clear guidelines exist
before the adoption of a general caregiver remedy will thwart legal
change.
V. REMEDYING DISPROPORTIONATE AND UNFAIR CAREGIVING
A. A General Obligation to Give Care or Share
Judges should be instructed to make the situation between the par-
ents fair when a caregiver experiences unfairness from disproportionate
caregiving during the child’s minority.  Such a broad mandate leaves open
the questions of how a court should determine whether unfairness exists
and what amount of money would be adequate to redress the injustice.
215. Starnes, supra note 93, at 238.
216. See id. at 232–34.
217. Cynthia Starnes had previously suggested using a “contribution” ratio-
nale because the reliance justification casts mothers as “victims of misfortune” and
advocated for a continuing award during the wind-up of the partnership. See
Starnes, supra note 55, at 1527.
218. See Starnes, supra note 93, at 236.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 237.
221. Id. at 238.
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The next two sections set forth factors and theory that should help judges
answer those questions.
Here, first, an explanation is provided about why a general obligation
is the right approach.  Simply, decades of family law doctrine and policy
have made coming up with a simple remedy controversial and difficult.
No consensus currently exists even about the appropriate alimony doc-
trine for divorcing couples.  As one legal scholar said in reference to that
topic, “reformers cannot agree on principles that will lead to fair out-
comes in the majority of cases.”222  Even the most recent attempts to craft
remedies, such as the ALI Principles discussed above, have drawn upon a
mixture of rationales and have thrown in some new ones, sometimes in an
inconsistent and incoherent manner, but in a way that still has merit.223
That hodgepodge was necessary because, as Professor June Carbone put it:
“The interests that should be protected at divorce are necessarily multiple,
conflicting, and incapable of full reconciliation without sacrificing some
for the benefit of others.”224  Similarly, parties to non-marital co-parenting
relationships also exhibit multiple and conflicting interests, in part be-
cause these co-parenting relationships are embedded in other relation-
ships of varying types.  To make matters even more challenging, alimony
theory does not always transfer well to address the situation of non-marital
couples that are ending their romantic relationship. In short, the law, re-
form proposals, and legal theory are not presently at a place that permits a
particular solution, such as a formula or uniform approach, for the vast
array of caregiving situations.
Unfortunately, the doctrine is not sufficiently settled, nor have opin-
ions sufficiently coalesced, to apply particular theories or approaches to
specific categories of caregivers either.  In addition, no theory fits well
every situation for which it was intended, and empirical evidence is lacking
about the merit of particular proposals, especially with regards to their
eligibility criteria and their remedies.  For example, should the law deny
recovery to a caregiver who loses half of her post-divorce income due to
her caregiving responsibilities, just because her income exceeds the other
parent’s income, as the ALI proposal requires?  Should an unmarried par-
ent that is abandoned by the other parent and left alone to care for their
child have no remedy, just because she was not in a committed relation-
ship at the time of conception, as some current proposals would suggest?
If gain theory provides a caregiver with a share of the market worker’s
post-divorce earning capacity (attributable to the caregiver’s post-divorce
labor), should that theory be used if the caregiver’s infidelity caused the
parties to divorce?  Answers to these sorts of questions must emerge after
222. See Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: The
Standardization of Family Law When There Is No Standard Family, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV.
319, 321 (2012).
223. See, e.g., Carbone, supra note 1, at 66–67, 70–72 (discussing various ratio-
nales and justifications).
224. Id. at 78.
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judges wrestle with the particular facts of cases, consider the values of a
community as embodied in existing law, and consider the policy implica-
tions of their answers.  The answers are best determined on a case-by-case
basis, over time, through judicial reasoning.  Only by tackling the many
unresolved questions incrementally through the adjudicatory process will
all caregivers begin to receive justice.
Fortunately, judges are up to the task of resolving claims for caregiver
compensation, despite the unresolved questions.  Family court judges are
skilled at taking facts and applying them to general principles in order to
arrive at “just” outcomes.  In fact, judges have exercised similar discretion
before, such as when they ordered child support without the benefit of
child support guidelines, or currently, when they award an “equitable” di-
vision of property,225 or an appropriate amount of alimony.226  Judges do
not require formulas to operate.  In fact, judges often want the flexibility
to do justice.  For example, they seek “wide discretion in choosing the
amount and nature of the [alimony] award,” even in relatively straightfor-
ward cases that focus only on a spouse’s need and an obligor’s ability to
pay.227  Many state legislatures recognize that judges need discretion to
decide the amount and duration of alimony, in part by refusing to em-
brace alimony guidelines.228  When legislators do give guidelines to
judges, judges sometimes ignore them or apply them inconsistently in
their quest to do justice.229
Embracing the common law method, with all of its uncertainty, will
help improve the law.  First, it allows judges to gain experience from actual
cases, find patterns, develop proxies and presumptions, and move the law
along to a better place through experience.  Over time, the common law
turns patterns into rules and even formulas, as has happened with child
support.  The actual cases provide the substance and detail that permits
appellate courts, and eventually legislatures, to craft limits on judicial dis-
cretion.  The common law method promotes judicial ingenuity.
225. See Alicia B. Kelly, The Marital Partnership Pretense and Career Assets: The
Ascendancy of Self over the Marital Community, 81 B.U. L. REV. 59, 74 (2001).
226. See Baker, supra note 222, at 337 (“[A]ll commentators would agree that
alimony remains the least coherent and most discretionary area of family
obligation.”).
227. Willocks v. Willocks, No. E-2012-00378-COAR3CV, 2013 WL 125927, at
*2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2013); see also Tismo v. Tismo, No. 91 CA 3, 1991 WL
238190, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1991); McVey v. McVey, No. 52706, 1987 WL
17891, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1987).
228. “[No] state has applied a formula to ordinary alimony,” and only a few
have used them for pendente lite alimony.  Alexandra Harwin, Ending the Alimony
Guessing Game, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/04/
opinion/04harwin.html. See generally Tiffany Brown, Alimony: A Survey of Formulas,
1 UTAH J. FAM. L. Fall–Winter 2010, at 30–40 (describing formulas used around
country).
229. See Baker, supra note 82, at 1195 (describing legal confusion that sur-
rounded factors used to determine alimony awards twenty-five years ago).
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Second, the common law method is the only way that scholars will get
a clear sense of a “fair” outcome for all caregivers.  No baseline yet exists
that establishes fairness for all caregivers.  Once actual cases are resolved,
patterns will emerge from the varied circumstances.  Academics and law
reformers can then think about guidelines to help judges become more
efficient at their task.  The case outcomes will constitute important empiri-
cal evidence.  Without this first step, the law may ossify instead of develop
in a more holistic manner.
Canada provides evidence of the advantage of such an organic law-
making process.  Canada struggled in the alimony context for many years
with notions of rehabilitation (to permit a clean break), compensation,
and need.  Initially, Canadian courts imposed a “broad obligation” on
marital and marital-like couples at the relationship’s end, but the law
lacked “a sense of guiding principles” so that the obligation was “some-
what uncertain and unpredictable in its actual contours.”230  Courts ap-
plied the standard on a case-by-case basis, making each case subject to the
trial court’s discretion.231  Over time, however, a national set of guidelines
emerged that made sense of the courts’ decisions, and could address typi-
cal cases.232  The reformers found patterns in cases between couples with
dependent children and those without, came up with a formula, embod-
ied the formula in a computer program, and thereby gave litigants and
courts a range of possible awards in both amount and duration.233  Now,
claimants with children receive compensation (after the payment of child
support) both for past caregiving and future caregiving, regardless of the
marriage’s length.234  Typically, the recipient receives an indefinite award
of between forty and forty-six percent of the parties’ combined net in-
comes, after child support is deducted.235  This award is subject to modifi-
cation when the youngest child completes high school.236
The United States should follow a similar approach to developing
guidelines, but the United States should start with an obligation that
would apply to all parents.  Eventually the case law could provide the foun-
dation for guidelines that would assist with the adjudication of claims for
all caregivers.
Despite the reasons that judicial discretion should be embraced as a
necessary part of legal reform and as an essential mechanism for affording
all caregivers access to a remedy sooner rather than later, judicial discre-
230. Carol Rogerson, The Canadian Law of Spousal Support, 38 FAM. L.Q. 69, 70
(2004).
231. See, e.g., Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] S.C.R. 420, 422 (Can.); Rogerson,
supra note 230, at 94.
232. See Rogerson, supra note 230, at 106.
233. See generally Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson, The Canadian Experiment
with Spousal Support Guidelines, 45 FAM. L.Q. 241 (2011).
234. See id. at 256–57.
235. See id. at 256.
236. See id. at 257–58.
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tion makes people nervous.  After all, there has been a consistent trend
away from discretion in family law over the last half century.  Child sup-
port is no longer calculated according to a “just and proper” standard, but
is set according to guidelines.  Child custody is often not determined pur-
suant to a best interest standard alone, but pursuant to a best interest stan-
dard modified by a number of presumptions.  In some places, an
approximation approach exists that uses the couple’s past caregiving pat-
tern to establish the future allocation of custody, at least presumptively.  In
many places, divorce determinations are no longer made within a fault-
based regime, which required courts to determine if fault existed and how
much a property award should reflect fault, but are made in a no-fault
system coupled with presumptions that a homemaker and market worker
each contributed equally to the acquisition of property.  Proposals to limit
judicial discretion have emerged in the alimony context specifically,237
with some recommendations, like those in Massachusetts, becoming law.
The ALI Principles are chock-full of formulas and rebuttable presump-
tions to help achieve consistency and predictability.
For some, judicial discretion is so undesirable that it is better to come
up with a formula, any formula, even if it is unfair, inaccurate, or arbi-
trary.238  Formulas are applauded because they provide “quick, stable
numbers.”239  Stated another way, formulas are valuable because they as-
sure an answer quickly, although sometimes (and perhaps often) the an-
swer is wrong.
People dislike judicial discretion because they equate it with uncer-
tainty, arbitrariness, and inefficiency.240  Judges might misapply the vari-
ous alimony theories.241  Or, judicial discretion might “devolve[ ] policy to
the predispositions of individual judges.”242  Judges might also undervalue
caregiving out of ignorance about its worth, or fail to award much
caregiver compensation because they equate it with alimony.  The uncer-
tainty associated with judicial discretion may inhibit claimants from invok-
ing the remedy at all: one source reports that the uncertainty surrounding
alimony determinations has caused litigants to “forego even attempting to
237. For example, a popular idea is to base a formula on the length of the
marriage and the income disparity between the spouses as a way to decide the level
and duration of alimony. See Baker, supra note 222, at 359.  The American Acad-
emy of Matrimonial Lawyers proposed a formula in 2007 that reflects these factors.
There are also factors that allow for deviation, including if the spouse is the pri-
mary caretaker of a dependent minor. See AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS,
CONSIDERATIONS WHEN DETERMINING ALIMONY, SPOUSAL SUPPORT OR MAINTENANCE
(Mar. 9, 2007).
238. See Baker, supra note 222, at 361–62.
239. See id. at 362.
240. See id. at 321.  It also leads to criticism of the legal system. See Krauskopf,
supra note 88, at 276.
241. See Rogerson, supra note 230, at 95.
242. PRINCIPLES § 1.01 cmt. a.
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secure alimony because bargaining for it is too difficult.”243  Others have
mentioned the difficulty lawyers have advising clients about alimony and
engaging in “cost-effective settlement negotiations.”244  The unpredictabil-
ity also means, apparently, that alimony contests are “a disproportionate
source of litigation.”245
Although these concerns may be compelling, it is best to evaluate
them a little more critically before deciding that a broad general obliga-
tion, with its benefits, is untenable.  First, a new caregiver remedy might
not add delay or uncertainty to proceedings since the available remedies
are already described as chaotic.  The benefits of expedition, achieved
with formulas, may not be essential for this remedy anyway.  Expedition is
important in the child support context because “so many children and
adults [are] dependent on child support,”246 but no one is yet dependent
upon caregiver payments since they do not currently exist.  Alimony
awards, to the extent that they overlap with caregiver payments, are re-
ported to be few and far between anyway.  No reason exists why courts
should not award alimony pendente lite and child support while they de-
termine the more complicated remedy for disproportionate and unfair
caregiving.  This approach should eliminate a major reason to fear delay.
Second, while litigants might experience inconsistent outcomes, this
criticism has to be kept in perspective: many claimants would receive noth-
ing at all without a caregiver compensation remedy.  Moreover, divergent
awards are likely to decline over time with appellate guidance.
Third, the proposal here is not one for unfettered judicial discretion.
Decisions ought to rest on the four considerations of fairness set forth
below and, primarily, the three compensatory theories that have devel-
oped within the context of alimony.  These factors and theories should
help judges exercise discretion within reasonable limits and permit mean-
ingful review by an appellate court.  Courts will have case law, scholarly
writing, and policy makers’ insights to help guide their decision-mak-
ing.247  In fact, a study that examined the exercise of judicial discretion in
the context of alimony awards found that judges’ decisions were not deter-
mined by the individual proclivities of the judge; rather, identifiable fac-
tors predicted outcomes.248  The same was found in Canada before the
advent of guidelines.249  The same should be true for caregiver payments,
with certain factors predicting particular outcomes over time.
243. Baker, supra note 222, at 359; see also Elgin, supra note 87, at 47; Roger-
son, supra note 230, at 96.
244. Rogerson, supra note 230, at 96.
245. Ellman, supra note 78, at 813.
246. Baker, supra note 222, at 362.
247. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES § 5.03.
248. See Robert F. Kelly & Greer Litton Foxh, Determinants of Alimony Awards:
An Empirical Test of Current Theories and a Reflection on Public Policy, 44 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 641, 700–01 (1993).
249. Although Carol Rogerson criticized the unpredictability of Canada’s
spousal support system with its conflicting rationale before the adoption of guide-
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A discretionary standard also has some real advantages, apart from
those already discussed.  First, uncertainty as to the size of a potential
award can encourage a couple to settle the matter themselves, contrary to
the assertion of some scholars who argue that uncertainty necessarily ham-
pers settlement.250  People bargain in the shadow of the law.251  Uncer-
tainty only harms settlement if the parties have particular risk
preferences.252  If both parties are risk averse, for example, then uncer-
tainty actually increases the rate of settlement.253  When only one party is
risk averse, the effect on settlement is hard to predict.254  It is only when
both partners prefer to gamble that uncertainty fosters litigation.255  Even
if both parties are gamblers, however, the uncertainty will not tempt them
to litigate if the caregiver payment is intertwined with other issues about
which one or both of the parties are risk averse.  Uncertainty can also in-
crease the rate of settlement if the parties cannot afford to litigate the
issue,256 and most people in domestic relations litigation, in fact, lack the
resources to do so.257  Finally, litigiousness declines when people see the
remedy as an entitlement that they either expect to receive or pay,258
which should be the case with the caregiver remedy.
If history is a guide, then the uncertainty surrounding the precise
remedy for disproportionate and unfair caregiving should not hamper set-
tlement.  Family law remedies have almost always been clouded by uncer-
tainty, especially in the past.  Over thirty years ago, law professors Robert
Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser wrote: “[E]xisting legal standards gov-
erning custody, alimony, child support, and marital property are all strik-
lines, she admits that the most problematic cases—that is, the least predictable—
were those that are based on need, not compensation, and those typically did not
involve relationships with children. See Rogerson, supra note 230, at 98–100.  In
fact, in some cases, it was easy to discern patterns, especially in long-term marriages
where the spouse bore a disproportionate amount of the childrearing responsibil-
ity. See id. at 100.  While other caregiving relationships produced less predictable
results, Rogerson noted increasing judicial attention to the economic costs of
ongoing custody responsibility and the children’s standard of living in the house-
hold. See id. at 102.
250. See Blecher-Prigat, supra note 126, at 203–04; George L. Priest & Benja-
min Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14–16 (1984).
251. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
252. See id. at 970.
253. See id. at 976.
254. See id. at 977.  While the “risk preferer” usually has the advantage in ne-
gotiations, it is hard to know which parent, if either, would prefer the risk in this
context. See id.
255. See id. at 976–77.
256. Cf. id. at 972.
257. See Leslie Feitz, Pro Se Litigants in Domestic Relations Cases, 21 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL L. 193, 193 (2008); Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts Handling Pro Se
Litigants?, 82 JUDICATURE 13, 14 (1998).
258. See Craig Martin, Unequal Shadows: Negotiation Theory and Spousal Support
Under Canadian Divorce Law, 56 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 135, 153 (1998).
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ing for their lack of precision and thus provide a bargaining backdrop
clouded by uncertainty.”259  This uncertainty did not foster litigation, how-
ever.  It fostered settlement.  As Mnookin and Kornhauser explained:
“[M]ost divorcing couples never require adjudication for dispute settle-
ment.”260  Rather they settled because they wanted to avoid the risks, un-
certainties, and transactions costs.261
In addition, any uncertainty about how a court might resolve a claim
for caregiver payments may encourage parties to work out these issues
themselves before conception or at the outset of parenthood, or to avoid
parenthood altogether. Parties can minimize uncertainty by negotiating a
solution that will apply to their relationship, assuming that such an agree-
ment is either enforceable or relevant to the court’s assessment of an ap-
propriate remedy.  This article proposes that a court give weight to any
such agreement in its assessment of fairness, thereby giving the parties a
strong incentive to work these issues out themselves.
The uncertainty surrounding the remedy also has the benefit of plac-
ing the parents in an equal bargaining position when they are negotiating
such an agreement.  When the litigated outcome is clear and favorable to
one of the parties, the other party may have insufficient bargaining power
to get an agreement that alters that outcome.  Many unmarried caregivers
are in such a position presently.  An unmarried caregiver is unlikely to
convince the other parent to compensate her for caregiving since the
caregiver is legally entitled to nothing.  However, a caregiver would be
more likely to convince the other parent to reach an agreement about
sharing if a court were required to provide a remedy for disproportionate
and unfair caregiving, and the amount of the remedy was uncertain.
In sum, the world is not going to end if judges are told to remedy
disproportionate and unfair caregiving without more specific guidance.
The law can and should move forward instead of being stymied by com-
plexity and the desire for simple answers.  A discretionary approach is the
most pragmatic solution at this time and the only realistic way to achieve a
caregiver remedy for all caregivers.
B. The Factors That Make Caregiving “Unfair”
Judges would have two important tasks when adjudicating a claim for
a caregiver remedy.  A judge must first determine eligibility for the remedy
259. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 251, at 969; see also Brinig & Car-
bone, supra note 1, at 904 (discussing alimony); Ellman, supra note 125, at 4–5
(same).
260. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 251, at 974.
261. See id.  Admittedly, the authors criticize uncertainty in the context of cus-
tody disputes. See id. at 977–80.  However, the dynamics involved in custody litiga-
tion are entirely different than the dynamics related to a new remedy for economic
compensation.  It is not clear Mnookin and Kornauser would disapprove of the
uncertainty in this context, although they would certainly point out that such un-
certainty could increase transaction costs. Id. at 979.
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and then determine the precise remedy that rectifies the unfairness.  A
determination that disproportionate caregiving is or was “unfair” is cer-
tainly not mechanical.  A determination of “unfairness” is highly individu-
alized and requires an assessment of four intertwining factors: (1) the time
each parent spends working in the market and the home; (2) the relative
allocation of market work and non-market work between the parties; (3)
the couple’s sharing behavior; and, (4) their agreement, whether explicit
or implicit, about their allocation of market and non-market work and
their sharing of economic resources.
1. The Time Each Parent Spends Working in the Market and the Home
If one parent earns all the income and does all the non-market work
(e.g., child care and related housework), and the other parent engages
solely in leisure, then the allocation of work between them seems unfair, at
least on the surface.  Our assessment of fairness might change if we knew
that the couple takes turns, i.e., they alternate on a yearly basis who en-
gages in the work activities.  Nonetheless, a comparison of the time each
parent spends at work or in leisure is useful information, even if we must
sometimes enlarge the timeframe to capture what is really happening.
In many cases, comparing the parties’ work hours may not unearth
much unfairness at all.  Most couples do not have very lop-sided arrange-
ments, and enlarging the timeframe does not typically change this fact.
Both parents typically work consistently in ways that benefit their child,
whether their labor is expended at home, in the labor market, or in both
places.  Men and women are generally doing about equal amounts of work
(approximately eight hours a day on a combination of home and paid
work) and have similar amounts of down time.262  Even when the focus is
on families with children, women still only spend about twenty minutes
more a week on work.263
Nonetheless, there are some times when caregivers do much more
work.  When both parents are fully employed and their child is under six,
for example, women’s total working time exceeds men’s total working
time by about five hours a week.264  In addition, if the mother is the sole
262. See United States: Work-Life Balance, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, http://www
.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/united-states (last visited Nov. 10, 2013)
(“[M]en are more likely to spend more hours in paid work, while women spend
longer on unpaid domestic work.  Men in the United States, spend 154 minutes
per day cooking, cleaning or caring, more than the OECD average of 131 minutes
but still less than American women who spend 258 minutes per day on average on
domestic work. . . .  [B]oth men and women devote approximately 14 hours per
day to personal care and leisure.”).
263. See Ruth Davis Konigsberg, Chore Wars, TIME (Aug. 8, 2011) http://con
tent.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2084582,00.html (“For [married
couples] who had children under the age of 18, women employed full time did just
20 min. more of combined paid and unpaid work than men did . . . .”).
264. See id. (reporting “a difference of five hours more of combined paid and
unpaid work for women a week” according to data from 2003–2005 among dual-
earner couples with children under age of 6); cf. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN
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breadwinner, the combination of her paid work, child care, and house-
work exceed her partner’s workload by an additional twenty-five hours a
week; in contrast, if the father is the sole breadwinner, his total workload
exceeds his partner’s by eleven hours per week.265
The amount of leisure each parent enjoys is another way to assess
relative contributions.  Each party’s leisure time is not a mirror image of
that party’s work time. Leisure time is a residual category and reflects the
time that is left after one subtracts all paid and unpaid work, personal
care, and transportation time from the twenty-four hours in the day.266
Arguably leisure time is an appropriate point of comparison because lei-
sure time strongly affects how one perceives the quality of one’s life.267
Certain parents have a leisure deficit compared to the other parent.
Comparing the leisure time of male and female sole breadwinners, for
example, reveals that female sole breadwinners have twenty hours less lei-
sure per week than their partners, and male sole breadwinners have four
hours less leisure per week than their partners.268  In addition, mothers
have much less “uncontaminated leisure” time than do fathers, that is, lei-
sure time apart from other activities such as housework or child care.269
Mothers who are single and poor, have custody of their child, and
work both inside and outside the home270 sometimes have the greatest
PARENTHOOD: ROLES OF MOMS AND DADS CONVERGE AS THEY BALANCE WORK AND
FAMILY 29, 39 (2013) [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD]
(finding fathers in dual-income couples spend ten to eleven hours more than
mothers in paid work, while women spend about nine hours more per week in
household work and child care; additionally, “the gender gap in leisure is about
five hours per week”).  Married fathers have three hours per week more leisure
than the mothers when their children are under eighteen years old, and cohab-
iting fathers with similarly aged children have about four hours per week more
leisure than the mothers. See id. at 7, 41.  Leisure time represents time relaxing in
various activities. See id. at 7.  While researchers sometimes arrive at different num-
bers for the amount of time men and women spend engaged in work or leisure, it
is not the point of this article to reconcile any discrepancies.  For example, accord-
ing to the Pew Research Center, married men with children under eighteen work
1.4 hours per week more than married women with children under eighteen. See
id. at 29.  The most accurate assessment of the leisure time enjoyed by particular
mothers and fathers would be their time diaries.
265. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD, supra note 264, at 6.
266. See, e.g., id. at 46.
267. See Sut Jhally, Commercial Culture, Collective Values, and the Future, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 805, 809 (1993).
268. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD, supra note 264, at 29–30.
269. See SUZANNE M. BIANCHI ET AL., CHANGING RHYTHMS OF AMERICAN FAMILY
LIFE 102–03 (2006).
270. To the extent these lower-income mothers are not working in the labor
market, it is often because they cannot find affordable child care for their chil-
dren. See generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS & HEATHER BOUSHEY, THE THREE FACES OF
WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT: THE POOR, THE PROFESSIONALS, AND THE MISSING MIDDLE
16–17 (2010) available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
issues/2010/01/pdf/threefaces.pdf.
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leisure deficit of all.271  These mothers were recently blamed for the fact
that the United States ranks twenty-eighth in the world in the work-life
balance, just above Mexico.272  Not only do mothers in single-parent
households often work more hours in the workforce than employed mar-
ried women,273 but labor-saving devices and life’s conveniences may be
unavailable to them.274  They frequently feel stressed because they are
largely going it alone.275  Researchers in the Netherlands noted that these
mothers “seldom [have] any leisure time.”276
The results for couples might change if we include personal time
(e.g., time spent eating, sleeping, grooming, etc.) with leisure time, but it
is best to exclude personal time.  Time spent on these activities is heavily
influenced by cultural expectations and physical needs, and can feel less
discretionary.  Moreover, caregivers’ “personal time” often involves simul-
taneous acts of caregiving.  A mother’s “personal time” eating and sleep-
ing, for example, is much more likely to be encumbered by her child’s
presence.  A mother, more than a father, is likely to be the one cuddling
with the child when the family sleeps.277  If one were to focus solely on
“adult free time” (free time spent alone or with other adults, but not with
children), one finds that mothers have less of it.278  As one set of sociolo-
gists noted, adult free time is “perhaps the most refreshing kind of
leisure.”279
271. See Sanik & Mauldin, supra note 47, at 56 (noting that single employed
mothers sacrifice time in personal care, such as sleeping, and recreation to meet
family’s needs).
272. See Derek Thompson, How Did Work-Life Balance in the U.S. Get So Awful?,
THE ATLANTIC (June 1, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2013/06/how-did-work-life-balance-in-the-us-get-so-awful/276336/.
273. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD, supra note 264, at 41
(comparing paid work between married and single mothers in chart titled
“Mothers’ Time by Family Structure”); cf. Sanik & Mauldin, supra note 47, at 55
(reporting single employed mothers spent less time with children than married
employed mothers when age of younger child was controlled).
274. See Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and Their Children, 26
CONN. L. REV. 817, 829–30 (1994); cf. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD,
supra note 264, at 41 (noting single mothers spend five hours less doing housework
than married mothers and two hours less than cohabiting mothers).
275. Cf. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD, supra note 264, at 1 (re-
porting 56 percent of working moms feel stressed about juggling work and family
life, as compared to 50 percent of working dads).
276. Wilma Bakker & Lia Karsten, Balancing Paid Work, Care and Leisure in Post-
separation Households: A Comparison of Single Parents with Co-parents, 53 ACTA SOCIO-
LOGICA 173, 183 (2013). But see PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD, supra
note 264, at 41 (indicating that single mothers have several hours more of leisure
beyond their married sisters because single mothers spend less time on child care
and housework).
277. See SARAH A. BURGARD, JENNIFER A. AILSHIRE & N. MICHELLE HUGHES,
GENDER AND SLEEP DURATION AMONG AMERICAN ADULTS 16 (Population Studies
Ctr., Research Report No. 09-693, 2010), available at http://www.psc.isr.umich
.edu/pubs/pdf/rr09-693.pdf.
278. See BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 269, at 102–03.
279. Id. at 103.
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Perceptions of fairness tend to correlate with how much market work
the caregiver is doing.280  Women who are substantial economic contribu-
tors tend to object more than other women about the division of house-
hold labor.281  That makes sense because their partners often have a
“leisure surplus,”282 while they suffer a “leisure deficit.”
In the overall scheme of things, however, these sorts of time differ-
ences are not the biggest component of unfairness that may exist between
the parents, although a disparity of five hours a week can seem hugely
unfair in the moment.  Rather, most of the unfairness relates to the fact
that caregiving has negative economic repercussions compared to market
work.  Many caregivers do not focus on the long-term, negative repercus-
sions of disproportionate caregiving because they assume that they will be
treated well by their partners,283 they do not know the negative, long-term
effects associated with the caregiving role, and/or they realize that no le-
gal remedy exists.
2. The Relative Allocation of Home Work and Market Work Between the
Parents
Doing more of the non-market work has economic costs that are very
real and at times very substantial.  Work patterns are frequently gendered.
A mere 6.6% of employed fathers engage in part-time market work, com-
pared to 26.6% of employed mothers.284  For every stay-at-home dad,
there are thirty-two stay-at-home moms.285
Women typically engage in a higher percentage of household and
caregiving activities than men as an overall component of each party’s
“work.”  The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that on an average day,
only nineteen percent of men do housework (e.g., cleaning or laundry)
compared to forty-eight percent of women.286  With respect to child care,
mothers with children under six years old spend 1.1 hours providing phys-
ical care for their children, but fathers spend only twenty-six minutes do-
ing the same.287  Mothers also multi-task more often than fathers, by
280. See PAUL R. AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER: HOW MARRIAGE IN AMERICA
IS CHANGING 154–56 (2007).
281. See id. at 155.
282. Sara Raley & Vanessa Wight, The Leisure Surplus of Fathers in Working
Families (Aug. 3, 2008) (unpublished paper presented at American Sociological
Association Annual Meeting), available at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/
p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/4/1/2/8/p241289_index.html.
283. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 54, at 89 (2001).
284. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD, supra note 264, at 37.
285. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS BUREAU REPORTS FAMILIES WITH CHIL-
DREN INCREASINGLY FACE UNEMPLOYMENT (Jan. 15, 2010), available at http://www
.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/families_households/cb10-08.html
(noting 5.1 million stay-at-home moms in 2009 and 158,000 stay-at-home dads).
286. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, USDL-12-1246,
AMERICAN TIME USE SURVEY—2011 RESULTS 2 (2012), available at http://www.bls
.gov/news.release/archives/atus_06222012.pdf.
287. Id. at 3 & tbl.9.
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caring for their children while engaging in another primary activity, such
as cleaning the house.  Therefore, a mother with a child under six spends,
on average, approximately 6.5 hours per day with her child in tow, while a
father spends approximately 4.25 hours per day with his child in tow.288
Consequently, despite the total number of hours worked being similar be-
tween mothers and fathers, “[w]omen still do twice as much housework
and child care as men” in two-parent families.289
Even when both parents are employed in the paid workforce, and
even when women earn more than half the household income, most hus-
bands do less than a fair share of the domestic labor.  In one study, forty-
one percent of the men in dual-income households with “higher-earning”
wives did “a substantial portion of the domestic labor” (i.e., one-third to
one-half of that labor), but approximately fifty-nine percent of these men
performed less than one-third of that labor.290
When the parents live apart, the unequal allocation of caregiving usu-
ally intensifies.  Unwed and divorced mothers do huge amounts of caregiv-
ing by themselves.  Both unmarried and divorced fathers’ involvement
with their children tends to decline after their romantic relationship with
the mothers end.291  One set of researchers noted that the father’s prior
“nontrivial” help with housework and caregiving disappears upon divorce,
causing the caregiver to face increased time pressures that go uncompen-
sated.292  As a consequence, at the point of family breakup, freeloading
can either begin or intensify.
The allocation of domestic labor affects women’s work patterns.  Re-
gardless of whether a woman is a high or low earner, caregiving affects her
market participation.  The New York Times reports, for example, that four
out of ten female doctors between ages thirty-five and forty-four work part-
time, and full-time female doctors work on average 4.5 fewer hours each
288. See id. at 3 & tbl.10; cf. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD, supra
note 264, at 3 (finding that fathers spend approximately seven hours per week on
child care and mothers spend approximately fourteen hours per week on child
care).
289. BIANCHI ET AL., supra note 269, at 113; see also BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, supra note 286, at 3 & tbl.9 (showing women spend approximately twice as
much time caring for children as men no matter age of youngest child).
290. See VERONICA JARIS TICHENOR, EARNING MORE AND GETTING LESS: WHY
SUCCESSFUL WIVES CAN’T BUY EQUALITY 40–41 (2005) (discussing study comparing
division of domestic labor between men and their wives who are “nearly sole bread-
winners” or “higher-earning”); see also Edmund L. Andrews, Survey Confirms It: Wo-
men Outjuggle Men, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/
09/15/politics/15labor.html?_r=0; David H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, Family Diver-
sity and the Division of Domestic Labor: How Much Have Things Really Changed?, 42 FAM.
REL. 323, 326 (1993).
291. See William Marsiglio et al., Scholarship on Fatherhood in the 1990s and Be-
yond, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1173, 1184 (2000) (mentioning decline in “quality
and quantity of contact between fathers and children” after divorce).
292. See CONNELLY & KIMMEL, supra note 46, at 124.
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week than male doctors.293  Almost seventy-five percent of female pediatri-
cians “take extended leave at some point—five times higher than the per-
centage for male pediatricians.”294
As Part II.B discussed,295 the choices reflected in these patterns have
real economic consequences. Caregivers suffer economic loss and market
workers enjoy economic gains, and these results are enduring.  Any assess-
ment of fairness must be informed by the fact that disproportionate
caregiving likely has long-term, negative economic consequences for the
caregiver.
Parents themselves recognize the unfairness inherent in these pat-
terns.  In one national sample of 234 married parents, mothers were more
likely to think things were “unfair” to them when fathers “were actually
doing less nurturant parenting than the mothers thought was ideal.”296
Likewise, fathers believed the labor division was “unfair to the mother”
when the fathers reported “doing more breadwinning” than the fathers
thought was ideal.297  Simply, both parents recognized that when work be-
comes polarized by gender more than the couple thinks is ideal, the
caregiver is the one to experience the unfairness.
The Noneconomic Costs and Benefits
What about the world of noneconomic benefits that is also associated
with non-market work?  Some undeniable noneconomic rewards are asso-
ciated with caregiving, such as emotional satisfaction from comforting
one’s crying infant or witnessing one’s preschooler successfully tie her
shoe for the first time.  In Dr. Laura Schlessinger’s book, In Praise of Stay-at-
Home Moms,298 one woman revealed that she “can’t compare” being there
for her twenty-month-old daughter’s “ ‘firsts’” “to anything in the
world.”299  Raising her daughter “is what life is all about.”300  Should these
noneconomic benefits be considered when assessing whether the parents’
allocation of work is unfair?  Are caregivers not compensated for their in-
come loss by their children’s smiles?
The pleasure from a child’s smile should not be underestimated, even
if the pleasure—like the smile—is only fleeting.  Nonetheless, the
noneconomic rewards from caregiving should be ignored in assessing the
fairness of the parents’ arrangement.  No one would deny that these bene-
293. See Karen S. Sibert, Don’t Quit This Day Job, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/12/opinion/12sibert.html?pagewanted=all.
294. Id.
295. For a discussion of economic consequences, see supra notes 54–60 and
accompanying text.
296. Melissa A. Milkie et al., Gendered Division of Childrearing: Ideals, Realities,
and the Relationship to Parental Well-Being, 47 SEX ROLES 21, 21, 36 (2002).
297. Id.
298. LAURA SCHLESSINGER, IN PRAISE OF STAY-AT-HOME MOMS (2009).
299. Id. at 137.
300. Id. at 138.
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fits exist, but they are difficult to measure.  The difficulty explains why we
say it is “priceless” for a parent to witness his or her child’s first steps.  The
term “priceless” acknowledges the subjectivity involved in valuing the ex-
perience.  We might try to insert some objectivity into the valuation exer-
cise by asking what a “reasonable parent” would say the experience is
worth, but it is a lot easier and more comfortable to conclude that the
experience is simply “priceless,” precisely because the value of the experi-
ence is so individualized.  Courts that have been asked to monetize the
noneconomic benefits of family life have sometimes refused to do so, rea-
soning that, “While the benefits of family life may be significant . . . the
benefits are intangible and too difficult to measure.”301
Valuation becomes even more problematic when its purpose is to off-
set the amount of economic harm that the caregiver experiences.  A
caregiver would be put in the uncomfortable position of minimizing her
emotional benefits from her child in order to reduce the offset effect.
More importantly, the emotional benefits of childrearing do not actually
diminish the very real monetary sacrifices associated with the activity.  A
caregiver cannot put food on the table with the joy that she feels from
watching her child score a soccer goal.  Comparing noneconomic benefits
and economic costs is like comparing apples and cars, not even apples and
oranges, because they are truly incommensurable.
Moreover, if noneconomic benefits are relevant to a fairness assess-
ment, then so too are the “noneconomic costs” of caring for children.  But
it is equally difficult to put a dollar value on the unpleasantness involved in
cleaning up after a sick child or the aggravation felt from dealing with a
disobedient child.  Again, that is not to say that these costs are not real, or
in some general sense measureable.  In fact, author Diane Ehrensaft docu-
mented that the day-to-day burdens of caregiving are particularly great for
mothers, even when mothers and fathers are equally co-parenting.302
Mothers tend to worry more than fathers.303  She explained:
[T]he mother will tend to carry the child around in her head,
even when the child is not with her.  This can be referred to as
the psychological “labor” of childrearing.  It embodies thoughts,
feelings, and even obsessions about how the child is doing.
The father, in contrast, even in the shared parenting family, ap-
pears to feel more separate from his child.304
301. Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 620 (N.M. 1991) (Alarid, J.,
appended New Mexico Court of Appeals’ opinion).
302. See, e.g., DIANE EHRENSAFT, PARENTING TOGETHER: MEN AND WOMEN SHAR-
ING THE CARE OF THEIR CHILDREN 57–75 (1987) (using clothing choices, worrying,
and psychological management as examples of greater burdens on women, even in
equal parenting relationships).
303. See id. at 65–66.
304. Id. at 67.
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This disparity existed regardless of the mother’s and father’s profes-
sional obligations.305  Consequently, men were better at being “off” when
at work, whereas women had their children on their mind throughout the
day.306
Regardless of whether it is mothers or fathers who experience more
of the noneconomic burden of childrearing, these noneconomic burdens
(just like the noneconomic benefits) are virtually impossible to monetize.
In fact, it makes a lot of sense to assume that caregivers experience an
equal amount of nonmonetary costs and benefits and that these non-
monetary components balance each other out.  This reasonable assump-
tion means that noneconomic considerations can be ignored in an
assessment of fairness.  That is a good outcome, because no one wants to
go swimming in a swamp.
3. The Living Arrangement of the Couple
The parents’ caregiving arrangement may not be unfair even if they
do not split caregiving equally.  The primary breadwinner may be sharing
his or her income with the caregiver and the parents may be content with
the arrangement.  When the parents are living together, each parent is
likely benefiting from the other’s labor regardless of whether they have
agreed to their respective roles and regardless of whether these allocations
meet both parents’ ideal preferences.  In these “sharing” relationships, the
market worker is sharing his earnings but typically also his companionship
and emotional support, and the caregiver is sharing her caregiving and
homemaking, as well as her companionship and emotional support.
Couples’ sharing behavior is typically influenced by their marital sta-
tus, cohabitation arrangement, and romantic relationship, although these
three factors are imperfect determinants of it.  Selfish behavior sometimes
exists between cohabiting spouses,307 and generous sharing behavior
sometimes exists among unmarried, non-cohabiting, non-dating parents.
While couples exist that are exceptions to the general patterns, these prox-
ies are convenient and generally accurate indicators of sharing behavior.
Sharing occurs in most marital and marital-like relationships, in part
because that is the societal expectation.  Unmarried couples share less
than married couples,308 although unmarried couples that act like mar-
ried couples, especially if they have children, are more likely to share than
other unmarried couples.  Law professor Cynthia Bowman reports that “a
majority of both cohabitants and married couples do maintain joint fi-
305. See id. at 67–68.
306. See id. at 99.
307. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W. 2d 336 (Neb. 1953) (describing
husband’s treatment of wife, which included refusing to install plumbing or work-
ing furnace in home).
308. See Catherine Kenney, Cohabiting Couple, Filing Jointly?  Resource Pooling
and U.S. Poverty Policies, 53 FAM. REL. 237, 243 (2004).
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nances,”309 and “virtually all” cohabitants with a common child pool their
income.310  A romantically-involved couple that lives apart is less likely to
be sharing resources than is a cohabiting-married or cohabiting-unmar-
ried couple, but more likely to be sharing than non-cohabiting parents
with a platonic relationship.311
After the romantic relationship ends, voluntary sharing behavior
often ends too, regardless of whether the couple was previously married,
cohabiting, or romantically-involved but non-cohabiting.  People tend to
view themselves as individuals and not part of a couple.  For most
caregivers, it is as if they receive a pay cut after the romantic relationship
ends despite the fact that they are doing the same amount, or more, of the
caregiving.  Whereas the market worker before shared his income (and
some of the day-to-day caregiving labor), now he shares none (or less) of
his income and provides no (or little) day-to-day help.  The task of caregiv-
ing going forward continues to disadvantage the caregiver economically
while her efforts continue to benefit the market worker.  He gets the ser-
vices of a nanny par excellence at bargain basement prices, if he has to pay
anything at all.  He can be the ideal worker and see gains in his earning
power.  He can have a disproportionate amount of leisure time.  He can
freeload and the law permits it.
Some might dispute the existence of any unfairness after the couple
splits, noting that the market worker’s employment typically benefits the
couple’s child and the caregiver after the couple has broken up.  After all,
the earnings of the primary breadwinner reduce the caregiver’s need to
contribute economically to their child.  Courts typically allocate child sup-
port in proportion to the parents’ ability to pay.  The argument, therefore,
is that the market worker’s labor benefits the caregiver even after the ro-
mantic relationship ends, just as a caregiver’s labor benefits the market
worker.  Both are carrying a disproportionate burden in their respective
spheres.
This argument has appeal until numbers are attached to a scenario.
Imagine, for example, that the market worker makes $62,445 a year
($5,204 per month), the average earnings for a full-time male worker in
2009.312  The market worker is required to pay approximately $804 per
month in child support for one child if the caregiver is unemployed and
309. Bowman, supra note 64, at 23.
310. See id. at 35.
311. See Ariel Kalil & Rebecca M. Ryan, Mothers’ Economic Conditions and Sources
of Support in Fragile Families, FUTURE CHILD.: FRAGILE FAMILIES, Fall 2010, at 44, 55,
available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/jour-
nals/article/index.xml?journalid=73&articleid=530; Hyeyoung Woo & R. Kelly
Raley, A Small Extension to “Costs and Rewards of Children: The Effects of Becoming a
Parent on Adults’ Lives,” 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 216, 217 (2005).
312. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 2012, IN-
COME, EXPENDITURES, POVERTY, AND WEALTH 459 tbl.703 (2012).
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expected to contribute nothing.313  If the caregiver were also working in
the paid work force, and she earned the average earnings of a full-time
female worker in 2009, or $44,857 ($3,738 per month),314 then her
monthly child support obligation would be $427 and his would be $589.
Consequently, his labor (and his higher payment of child support) argua-
bly benefits her either $427 per month (if she is out of the labor force
entirely) or $81 per month (if she is also employed (the difference be-
tween $589 and $427, divided by two)).  Yet those amounts are less than
the value of her labor to the market worker.  Her caregiving is worth more
to the market worker than $81 per month or even $427 per month.
How do we measure the value of her caregiving to him?  At a mini-
mum, the value of her care is the cost of purchasing equivalent care in the
market.  The caregiver is not quite like the average child-care worker, who
earns approximately $9.28 per hour,315 but is more akin to a nanny, be-
cause she gives the child one-on-one attention.  A full-time live-out nanny
earns about $705 per week,316 or $2,820 per month.  Stated another way,
the market worker provides the caregiver a benefit of $427 per month, but
the caregiver provides the market worker a benefit of $1,410 per month
(half the cost of $2,820).  Of course, her caregiving likely has a higher
value to the market worker than is reflected in the cost of a live-out nanny.
The $1,410 per month does not reflect the added value of having a loving
parent care for one’s child, and the peace of mind that accompanies
knowing that such a person is the caregiver.  Nor does it reflect the fact
that the non-custodial parent is able to enhance his earnings, acquire se-
niority, earn credit towards social security benefits, and sock away retire-
ment benefits, while the caregiver is getting no such benefits.
If the couple has a more egalitarian relationship with respect to the
allocation of their caregiving and market work, the difference in the value
of their exchange may diminish, but it does not disappear.  Assume both
parents are working full-time and earning an average amount, and the
caregiver has custody of the child sixty percent of the time while the mar-
ket worker has custody of the child forty percent of the time.  The
caregiver will still provide the market worker with child care worth much
more than $81 per month.  Assuming she cares for the child eight hours
more each week than he does, or thirty-two hours more a month, and even
313. This number is derived from a highly simplified and generalized applica-
tion of an income-shares model to the Oregon Child Support Tables. See OR.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OREGON CHILD SUPPORT BENCH BOOK 93–111 (2013), available at
http://www.oregonchildsupport.gov/publications/docs/oregon_child_support_
bench_book.pdf.
314. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 312, at 459 tbl.703.
315. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, CHILDCARE WORKERS (2012), available at http://www.bls
.gov/ooh/Personal-Care-and-Service/Childcare-workers.htm (summarizing facts
about child-care workers, including 2010 median pay).
316. See Nanny Salaries, NANNIES INT’L INC., http://www.nannies4hire.com/
tips/983-nanny-salaries.htm (citing 2012 INA Nanny Salary and Benefits Survey).
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assuming her labor is worth only what a child-care worker is paid ($9.28
per hour), she still provides a service worth $297 per month.  Moreover,
the caregiver will probably not receive the full $81 benefit from the fa-
ther’s market work because the father’s higher level of caregiving should
reduce his child support obligation.
The economics of the situation can certainly change depending upon
a myriad of factors.  Altering the parties’ income and the value of the
caregiver’s labor can affect the calculations.  Sometimes these changes will
diminish the disparity in the value of their contributions; sometimes these
changes will increase the disparity.  The point, however, is not to prejudge
the likely effects here.  Rather, these sorts of factors should be examined
to see whether any unfairness exists, and, if it does, the law should provide
a remedy.
4. Any Agreement, Explicit or Implicit, Regarding the Allocation of Market and
Home Work and the Sharing of Economic Resources
The final factor that influences an assessment of fairness is whether
the parties have agreed to their allocation of labor and resources, and
whether they are acting consistently with their agreement.  Generally, if
the parents have agreed to an arrangement and the parties are acting con-
sistently with it, then there is no unfairness between them.  This conclu-
sion is consistent with one of the premises of contract law: the parties’
freely negotiated agreement is assumed to be the best outcome for the
parties, unless the contract is unconscionable.317
In fact, most married couples see the division of labor during their
ongoing relationship as fair.  A study by Paul Amato and his colleagues
found that few married men and only about one-fifth of married women
thought the allocation of housework and child care between them was
unfair.318  Others have reported similar results.319  Parties’ own assess-
ment of fairness is notable because the couples’ arrangement often differs
from their expectations at an earlier time in their relationship: “Before the
arrival of the first child, couples tend to share the housework fairly equally.
But something about a baby encourages the resurgence of traditional gen-
der roles.”320  Research on the views of unmarried cohabiting couples is
317. See WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 5, § 18:10.
318. See AMATO ET AL., supra note 280, at 154.
319. See Catherine E. Ross & Marieke Van Willigen, Gender, Parenthood, and
Anger, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 572, 583 (1996) (“[T]he majority of [married] wo-
men, even those objectively overburdened by child care, report that it is a fair
arrangement.” (citing Mary Clare Lennon & Sarah Rosenfield, Relative Fairness and
the Division of Housework: The Importance of Options, 100 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 506
(1994))).
320. CRITTENDEN, supra note 54, at 25; see also AMATO ET AL., supra note 280, at
148.
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hard to find, but presumably these couples are similarly content with their
division of labor.321
Not only do many people characterize their division of labor as fair,
but their division of labor usually reflects their preferences.  Mothers often
prefer not to work outside the home full time.322 Lower-income women
especially express resentment about their paid employment, in part be-
cause their jobs are unfulfilling.  They would rather be home with their
children, but economic circumstances make that impossible.  Similarly, fa-
thers are generally happy working in the market: seventy-two percent of
fathers thought a full-time job was the ideal situation for them,323 al-
though twelve percent would prefer part-time work and sixteen percent
would prefer working solely inside the home.324  While men are increas-
ingly finding themselves in a work-family bind,325 men do not necessarily
want to give up their breadwinning role.326
Well, what about those men and women who are unhappy with their
division of labor?  Does one party’s dissatisfaction mean that their agree-
ment is unfair?  After all, some situations are suboptimal for one of the
parents because he or she would prefer a different arrangement.  Con-
sider, for example, a woman who prefers to work full time and have her
spouse care for their children, despite the fact that this arrangement
would bring the family less income than if the roles were reversed.  The
woman prefers paid employment because she finds adult interaction re-
warding.  She also wants her husband to stay at home with their children
because she strongly believes that one parent should do so.  However, her
partner is unwilling to agree to her plan.  When she ultimately acquiesces
321. Cf. Sabra L. Katz-Wise et al., Gender-Role Attitudes and Behavior Across the
Transition to Parenthood, 46 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 18, 27 (2010). But see Mau-
reen Waller, How Do Disadvantaged Parents View Tensions in their Relationships?  In-
sights for Relationship Longevity Among At-Risk Couples, 57 FAM. RELS. 128, 132 (2008)
(half of respondents from subset of Fragile Families population mentioned ten-
sions over household and child-care responsibilities during first year of child’s
life).
322. The recession increased the number of married mothers with minor
children who preferred full-time work from seventeen percent to twenty-three per-
cent, and had a similar effect on unmarried women (from twenty-six percent to
forty-nine percent). See PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD, supra note
264, at 13.
323. PEW RESEARCH CTR., FEWER MOTHERS PREFER FULL-TIME WORK: FROM
1997 TO 2007, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2007/07/
12/fewer-mothers-prefer-full-time-work/.
324. See id. at 3.
325. See Jessica Baumgardner, The New Daddy Guilt, REDBOOK (Feb. 2, 2013),
http://www.redbookmag.com/kids-family/advice/working-dad-stories (discussing
challenges men face as they balance work and fatherhood).
326. See BRAD HARRINGTON ET AL., THE NEW DAD: CARING, COMMITTED, AND
CONFLICTED 14 (Bos. Coll. Ctr. for Work & Family, 2011), available at http://www
.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/cwf/pdf/FH-Study-Web-2.pdf (discussing sur-
vey finding that new fathers reportedly rarely took more than two weeks off for
paternity leave and ranked “provide financial security” as important factor for be-
ing “good father”).
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to an arrangement in which she stays at home with the children and her
partner works full time in the market, is that unfair?  Is her frustrated pref-
erence relevant to an assessment of fairness?
Probably not.  While we certainly should have some sympathy for this
woman, she probably deserves no more sympathy than any other person
who finds their choices constrained by life’s circumstances.  We may fault
her for inadequately vetting her partner before conception, but perhaps
she did so and her partner later changed his formerly egalitarian orienta-
tion.  Or, perhaps, her own views about the importance of market work
only crystalized once she had children.  Going forward, she is not without
options.  No one can stop her from taking a full-time job and enrolling
her children in day care, not even her partner.  Nor can anyone stop her
from leaving the relationship and requesting visitation instead of custody.
Of course, neither of these options is a great solution, nor even a good
solution.  Nonetheless, her decision to stay home with her children—if
freely made—is not the sort of decision that the law should be concerned
about just because it does not reflect her ideal preferences.  Most people’s
lives have been influenced and constrained by reality.327  The law should
only be concerned if her partner does not fairly compensate her for that
caregiving.
Not everyone would agree.  Reporter Ann Crittenden would argue,
for example, that women do not bargain from a point of equality after the
first child arrives.  At that point, the woman’s bargaining power decreases
because she is less likely to leave the relationship.  “If he refuses to clean
up after dinner, what is she going to do?  Threaten to leave with the baby?
Not likely.”328  While a woman has less bargaining power the more she
becomes dependent upon her partner for money,329 similar pressures ex-
ist for the market worker after the child’s birth.  A market worker may
have the money to leave the relationship, but he may remain in a relation-
ship because he fears losing contact with his child, or losing the other
parent’s ability to caregive (especially if maintaining two households
would require her to work more in the labor market).  To put it another
way, if she refuses to clean up after dinner, what is he going to do?  The
child probably constrains both parties’ ability to bargain about their re-
spective roles, but it certainly does not eliminate their ability to bargain, or
even to leave.  In fact, women with children initiate more divorces than
men with children.330
327. The fairness of their arrangement is not affected by the economic ration-
ality of the decision.  The same conclusion could be drawn even if she would have
made more money than her spouse.
328. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 54, at 113.
329. See id.
330. See Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, “These Boots Are Made for Walk-
ing”: Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AMER. L. & ECON. REV. 126, 126–27
(2000).
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The parties’ agreement is an important component of assessing fair-
ness because it also provides a standard against which to measure the ade-
quacy of the parties’ sharing behavior.  Breaches of an agreement are
generally an indication of unfairness.  Breaches can occur during the ro-
mantic relationship or at its conclusion.  A breach is essentially when one
parent alone decides to change the arrangement so that it solely or
predominantly benefits him or her.  The parents can certainly change
their agreements as their circumstances change, but the beauty of an
agreement is that both people must decide together what is a fair arrange-
ment for the new normal.
Assuming the parties’ have an agreement, the agreement by itself
should not be the sole measure of whether unfairness exists.  Otherwise,
the adjudication would be akin to a contract-based claim.  As Professor Ira
Ellman explained in his important article, A Theory of Alimony, certain lim-
its exist to a contract-based approach to alimony.  Similar limits exist to a
contract-based approach to caregiver payments.  While some of his con-
cerns might be obviated by a requirement that a written agreement ex-
ist,331 others remain.  For example, a contractual approach necessitates an
assessment of who was at fault for breaching the agreement,332 and assess-
ing fault is now passe´ in the divorce context in many locations.  Also, a
contractual approach suggests that a market worker should be entitled to
a remedy if the caregiver ceases or reduces her caregiving in a way that is
contrary to their agreement, and that seems misguided.  A purely contrac-
tual remedy would also work only for unmarried caregivers,333 as spouses
cannot enforce a contract about compensation for household labor under
existing family law.334  If the agreement were an important component of
any fairness analysis, instead of an enforceable contract, then the law
could treat all parents similarly.  Although all parents could also be treated
similarly if all contracts were enforceable, this approach is inferior because
the level of compensation has sufficient public importance that the par-
ties’ determination should not be definitive.  Family circumstances can
change overtime, including the parents’ romantic and legal relationship
to each other, and a contract can become unfair.
Although an agreement is an important component of assessing fair-
ness, making the parties’ agreement relevant to a legal action is not with-
out its downsides.  If the agreement was oral, there may be disagreement
about its existence, its terms, and its subsequent modification, and assess-
ing credibility in this context might be difficult and time consuming.  For
this reason, judges may limit relevant agreements to those that are written.
331. Among other things, he argues that the parties’ understanding is rarely
known and too vague if known. See Ellman, supra note 125, at 20.
332. A remedy requires a material breach of the agreement even if the disso-
lution will cause her disproportionate hardship. See id. at 19.
333. See id. at 11, 23.
334. For a discussion of the unenforceability of household labor compensa-
tion contracts under current law, see supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
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Another concern is whether parents might start “bean counting” dur-
ing the relationship if an agreement is an important component of the
fairness assessment.  That is, will parents undertake elaborate record keep-
ing to track who is doing what and their sharing behavior?  Such record-
keeping might be burdensome and foster distrust.  This concern should
not be discounted, but its importance should not be overstated either.
Certainly a party will need to prove who does what type of work, in what
proportion, and for what type of remuneration, in order to prevail in
court on a claim for disproportionate and unfair caregiving.  However,
bean counting is triggered by both the availability of a remedy and a
party’s feeling that the arrangement has become unfair.  It seems mis-
guided for society to ignore the potential injustice just because addressing
it requires the aggrieved party to document it.  Moreover, bean counting is
not something to be feared.  Recording actual patterns of behavior can
help the parties resolve their dispute without court intervention.  A re-
cording helps parents visualize what is actually happening, thereby al-
lowing them to better understand it and change it.
Finally, courts will eventually need to resolve many subsidiary issues if
agreements matter to an assessment of unfairness, and this takes time and
energy.  In the absence of an actual agreement, should the law infer an
agreement for certain categories of couples?  If so, what would that agree-
ment look like?  For example, should a court presume that the parties
agreed to the existing allocation of labor and an equal sharing of income
in any marital or marital-like relationship until the child reaches eighteen,
even after the romantic relationship ends, absent a written contract sug-
gesting otherwise?  Should a court presume that a non-cohabiting, unmar-
ried couple did not agree to an equal sharing of income as compensation
for disproportionate caregiving, absent a written contract suggesting oth-
erwise?  While these questions are important, they do not detract from a
court’s ability to use the parties’ actual agreement to inform a determina-
tion of fairness when such an agreement exists.  Moreover, some of these
questions should be answered in the context of determining the appropri-
ate alimony theory to apply to the situation, as discussed below.
In the end, the four factors set forth above should help a decision-
maker decide whether the disproportionate allocation of caregiving is un-
fair.  The next question is, “so what?”  Judges will then need to canvas the
available theoretical approaches to compensation and choose the most ap-
propriate one in light of the parties’ circumstances.
C. Theoretical Tools That Will Help Determine the Remedy
The hardest part of the court’s task will be to craft the remedy for
disproportionate and unfair caregiving in a particular case.335  The judge
335. The caregiver should have access to the remedy when she no longer co-
habits with the other parent, or at any time if the couple never cohabited.  This
approach to the timing of the remedy best comports with family law doctrine.  It
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should award an amount to compensate the caregiver as opposed to rem-
edy her needs, for reasons explained below.  The judge should draw upon
the existing theoretical work on alimony, as appropriate, to determine fair
compensation.  The most compelling theory will depend upon case-spe-
cific factors, such as the nature of the couple’s broader relationship, the
contours of property and alimony law in that jurisdiction, and the diffi-
culty of the fact-finding task at the time of the adjudication.  The court
must coordinate the new remedy with the existing remedies, such as ali-
mony and property division.336  The new caregiver remedy must not harm
divorcing caregivers by lowering the total amount of money they receive
upon divorce, nor should it subject a divorcing obligor to pay for some-
thing twice.
Although courts should draw upon the existing theoretical work on
alimony to fashion a remedy, two caveats are necessary.  First, judges must
not allow existing alimony theory to stymie their ingenuity.  Alimony and
its theoretical underpinnings are tied to the marital context.  Equating
caregiver payments to alimony, or embedding caregiver payments within
alimony for married couples, may import a lot of unnecessary and inap-
propriate doctrinal baggage, such as a requirement of “need,”337 or the
award’s termination upon remarriage of the recipient.338  It may also in-
will also make it easier for a court to coordinate this remedy with other remedies,
and to ensure that a party is not receiving a double recovery.  The caregiver pay-
ment fills the gaps for couples that are eligible for alimony and property division,
and a court needs to consider all three remedies together.  In addition, limiting
the remedy’s availability to the end of the cohabiting relationship allows a claimant
to reassess fairness in light of the entire relationship.
Perhaps the biggest disadvantage of this approach is that parents may be en-
couraged to end their cohabiting relationships in order to access the remedy. See
generally Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse,
1991 BYU L. REV. 197.  There are several responses.  First, not all parents should
cohabit.  Some parents should not live together or should separate, and it would
be beneficial if the remedy incentivized this behavior for that group. See Ellman,
supra note 125, at 56.  Second, for most couples with a healthy relationship, one
remedy alone will probably not affect the couple’s willingness to cohabit or marry.
Third, the remedy will incentivize the acts of the likely obligor just as much as it
incentivizes the acts of the likely recipient, and it is anyone’s guess how these dy-
namics will play out for a particular couple.  If anything, the remedy may en-
courage cohabitation because the obligor has more to gain from successful
cohabitation than the recipient has to lose from unsuccessful cohabitation.  After
all, the caregiver’s remedy does not disappear upon cohabitation, but is only
delayed until cohabitation ceases.
336. Courts already coordinate alimony and property awards. See, e.g., June R.
Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic
Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 999 & n.202 (1991); Laura Mor-
gan, “Double Dipping”: A Good Theory Gone Bad, 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 133
(2012).
337. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 308 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A.
446 (1998).
338. See Carbone, supra note 1, at 70–71 (explaining remarriage would affect
expectancy measure but not unjust enrichment measure based upon ideas of miti-
gation of damages); cf. Perry, supra note 9, at 29 (noting that when alimony is
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hibit the development of totally new approaches to remedying this type of
injustice.
Second, the focus here on alimony as a source of inspiration is not
meant to suggest that the law of property should be ignored.  Rather, ali-
mony is discussed here because of the historic differentiation between
property division and alimony, and because of the current legal gaps for
remedying unfair, non-marital and post-marital caregiving.  Professor
Krauskopf explained that divorce law differentiates between assets and ob-
ligations on the one hand, and personal gains and losses on the other
hand.339  The theory that justifies splitting a couple’s assets and obliga-
tions upon divorce is the idea that the marriage is a partnership to which
both parties contribute time and effort for the benefit of the entire family
and from which both expect to share any gains.340  In contrast, alimony is
awarded to “fairly share gains and losses in personal earning capacity”341
in order to prevent unjust enrichment.342  Admittedly, Professor Kraus-
kopf’s explanation is a little dated today,343 but it is still useful because it
emphasizes that marriage involves an expectation that the parties will
share the accumulated property.  Co-parenthood, without more, does not
have that same social meaning, although sometimes it might for a particu-
lar couple.  Since the law’s present gaps mostly affect unmarried and di-
vorced caregivers, and since these caregivers are much less likely than
married caregivers to have a broader economic partnership or expecta-
tions about sharing all of their property, property doctrine seems less help-
ful.  In contrast, alimony doctrine, which includes compensation for
unjust enrichment, seems useful for a wide array of caregivers.
Alimony is also a good analogy for caregiver payments for another
reason.  Any new remedy needs to draw from a market worker’s future
income if it is to be meaningful.  A property award typically relies upon
property in existence at the time of the award, whereas an alimony award
typically relies upon the obligor’s future income.  Most couples have too
little property at the time of breakup to compensate for both past and
future caregiving.344  As law professor Cynthia Starnes starkly noted,
conceived of as compensation for work done, it makes no sense to terminate it
upon remarriage or cohabitation).
339. See Krauskopf, supra note 88, at 257–58.
340. See id. at 258–59.
341. Id. at 266.  There are other purposes, including compensation for loss of
marriage prospects and for physical or mental injury. See id. at 266–67.
342. See id. at 260.
343. The lines demarcating alimony and property awards have become
blurred over the years.  Most courts draw on some of the same considerations to
award both property and alimony according to “their own notions of fairness.” See
Ellman, supra note 125, at 12.
344. See Starnes, supra note 93, at 211 (noting that average divorcing couple
only owns property worth approximately $25,000 when home equity is excluded).
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“[n]othing from [n]othing [l]eaves [n]othing.”345  Since the breadwinner
will typically have a lifetime of earnings, that stream of income should be
accessible to compensate the caregiver.
Although alimony is the better analogy for the new caregiver pay-
ment, nothing in this article is meant to prohibit a court from awarding
property to compensate caregiving efforts, especially when courts already
do so.  A property award might even be an appropriate option to compen-
sate future caregiving if a moocher has tremendous assets but no antici-
pated future income.  It might also be appropriate when the parties
agreed to share property as fair compensation for caregiving.  The point is
not to foreclose further legal developments or to limit courts’ discretion,
but rather to point out those tools that are most likely to help courts rem-
edy the situations that are most in need of a remedy.
1. Need Versus Compensation
While meeting economic “need” and affording “compensation” are
both goals of alimony, and while both can justify an award to a parent for
disproportionate and unfair caregiving, compensation is preferable to
need as an objective.  After all, not all caregivers are needy.  A compensa-
tory rationale is broader than a need rationale.
A compensatory rationale is also a preferable theory even for needy
caregivers.  First, a caregiver’s financial need may be unrelated to her
caregiving.  The caregiver may have needed public assistance regardless of
whether she ever had a child.  If so, there is scant reason that her co-
parent should be responsible for her needs as opposed to the public, espe-
cially if they are unmarried.  While caregiving may exacerbate the
caregiver’s financial need, it would be a very complicated task to try to
figure out how much her caregiving contributed to her need.  The slipper-
iness of the need concept will also contribute to the challenges associated
with a determination of need.346
Second, even if caregiving causes the caregiver’s dependency or need,
most caregivers would probably prefer to receive compensation for a bene-
fit conferred rather than support for their dependency, assuming the
amounts were similar.  Appropriate messaging is one of the reasons that
the authors of the ALI Principles, discussed above, re-characterized the
purpose of alimony from satisfying needs to affording compensation: it
“transforms the claimant’s petition from a plea for help to a claim of
entitlement.”347
Third, a compensatory rationale would probably attract less political
opposition than a need rationale in light of the fact that the caregiver
345. Id. at 209 (quoting BILLY PRESTON, Nothing from Nothing, on NOTHING
FROM NOTHING (A&M Records 1974)).
346. See PRINCIPLES § 5.05 reporter’s note, cmts. a & f; Ellman, supra note 125,
at 4.
347. PRINCIPLES § 5.02 cmt. a.
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remedy will extend to unwed parents.  Those who want to protect the insti-
tution of marriage may think that requiring an income transfer for need
blurs the line between marriage and unwed co-parenthood too much.
One of marriage’s hallmarks is that a spouse is required to support his or
her partner when that partner is in need.  Compensation, however, is a
concept that is not tied to marriage.  It currently justifies payments be-
tween all sorts of people, including strangers.  In fact, the law regulating
business partnerships embodies a compensatory concept, akin to restitu-
tion.  A partner who contributed a disproportionate share of labor to the
business partnership may be entitled to compensation after the partner-
ship ends;348 it is an exception to the rule that partners have no ongoing
obligations to each other after liquidation.349
A study by Ira Ellman and Stanford Braver arguably challenges the
assumption that a compensatory rationale will have more popular appeal
then a need rationale.  Their study indicated that people would rather see
the law award alimony for current caregiving than as compensation for the
loss in earning potential associated with past caregiving.350  In their study,
subjects preferred to award alimony to a woman with adult children
slightly more than a woman who was childless (forty-eight percent to forty-
five percent), but subjects were most willing to award alimony to a woman
with young children (fifty-eight percent received alimony).351  The au-
thors concluded that the subjects “care most of all about the claimant’s
responsibility as primary caretaker of the couple’s minor children, to some
extent but noticeably less about the partner’s marital status and their rela-
tional duration, and very little at all about the claimant’s history of having
cared for the couple’s now-grown children.”352  In fact, their survey may
have even undercounted the full number of respondents who would favor
an award for current caregiving because the respondents were told that
the caregiver would receive child support; the respondents may have as-
sumed that the child support was also meant for the caregiver.353
The study’s results are certainly open to interpretation and may sug-
gest little about the political feasibility of a compensatory rationale.  After
348. See Ellman, supra note 125, at 37.
349. See id. at 35.
350. See Ellman & Braver, supra note 31, at 239–40.
351. See id. at 224.
352. Id. at 239–40.
353. Survey respondents may have assumed that caregivers already received
something equivalent to alimony (whether for need or compensation) through
child support, and this assumption may have repressed their willingness to award
additional amounts.  Respondents were told that child support was being awarded
and they may have inferred from the numbers that the child support award was
also to benefit the caregiver.  In fact, amounts were higher than what the child
support guidelines required and had built in premiums for marriage and marital-
like relationships, at least when the noncustodial parent had sufficient resources.
See id. at 226–27.  Survey respondents did award lower amounts of alimony for
married couples when the child support amount was higher, although the effect
was less evident for unmarried couples. See id. at 227.
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all, almost half the respondents did want to award alimony to a woman
with adult children for her past caregiving.  If anything, the results may
suggest that the survey respondents were expressing a preference about
the timing of the remedy more than rejecting a “compensatory rationale”
in favor of a “need rationale.”  Respondents might have shown great sup-
port for a compensatory rationale if the award were given to the caregiver
as she did the work.  Caregiver compensation, as proposed in this article,
would be available for many unmarried and all divorced caregivers as they
did the caregiving work.
The discussion now turns to compensation, because a compensatory
rationale often seems superior for the reasons specified above.
2. The Possible Theories Behind the Remedy If the Goal Is Compensation
The decision to compensate a caregiver instead of provide for her
need does not end a judge’s task.  What does it mean to compensate a
caregiver?  No single answer exists in the context of alimony, although
scholars have successfully identified several theoretical approaches.  Pro-
fessor Cynthia Starnes has catalogued well the three basic approaches,354
noting that they correspond loosely to expectation, reliance, and restitu-
tion damages under contract law.355  The usefulness of these compensa-
tory theories differs depending upon the particular caregiving fact
pattern.  As will become obvious, all three theories make some sense, some
of the time, for some disproportionate and unfair caregiving.  The inabil-
ity to find one all-encompassing theory makes it essential that decision
makers have access to all of the theories and match the best theory to the
circumstances.
a. Gain Theory
Gain theory is the first possible approach to compensation.  In the
marriage context, this theory means that alimony should reflect the gain
that the claimant would have obtained had she remained married.  The
amount would include a share of her husband’s post-divorce income to
the extent that her efforts during the marriage contributed to his ability to
earn this future income.  Gain theorists recommend a remedy that is an
amount either to “equalize income or household standards-of-living or . . .
[that reflects] a percentage of income disparity based on the duration of
the marriage.”356
Gain theory makes a lot of sense for parents who were in a marital or
marital-like relationship and are seeking a remedy at the end of that rela-
354. See Starnes, supra note 20, at 278–79.
355. See id. at 278.  Although the contract law analogy is helpful, at least one
of the theories—loss theory—is also justified on functional grounds unrelated to
contract concepts. See Ellman, supra note 125 (arguing that contract and partner-
ship concepts are futile and proposing functional understanding of alimony).
356. Starnes, supra note 20, at 290.
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tionship.  The remedy is appropriate because the parties’ marriage in-
volved an implicit agreement that both would contribute to maximize the
couple’s collective well-being and both would share in the bounty, includ-
ing the couple’s economic prosperity.  As mentioned, this theory already
guides courts and legislatures in their approach to property division on
divorce.  Cynthia Starnes explains that this theory justifies awarding the
caregiver a share of the market worker’s enhanced earning capacity since
it is the “spouses’ combined efforts” that created it, and the market worker
will continue to enjoy it.357  Professor Starnes herself recommends this
remedy for married couples with children based on the parenting
enterprise.358
While gain theory is an attractive approach to remedy the effects of
marital caregiving for divorcing parents (and perhaps also to remedy the
effects of post-marital caregiving, see below), it seems like the wrong ap-
proach for some other parents, such as parents who only had a short dat-
ing relationship.  In part, the measure helps compensate for a married
individual’s foregone opportunity to marry another person who would
have an obligation of support,359 but an unmarried caregiver does not lose
that opportunity (although the child may diminish it).  Moreover, gain
theory rests on the idea that the caregiver had legitimate expectations to
share the market worker’s income over the long term.  Marriage involves a
broad agreement between the parties.  Professor Katharine Baker once
noted: “Marriage involves an agreement to share profits and liabilities in
all enterprises forever.”360  Nothing like that necessarily exists in a parent-
ing relationship created by a one-night stand.  Neither the caregiver nor
the market worker is likely to expect long-term income sharing without a
broader partnership akin to marriage.  Marriage is the relationship that
gives rise to such expectations, although certain marriage-like arrange-
ments can do so also.  If gain theory were always used to remedy dispro-
portionate and unfair caregiving, regardless of the parties’ broader
relationship, then the remedy would turn all parental relationships into
something that felt like marriage, contrary to the parties’ expectations.
Relatedly, gain theory seems inappropriate when the parents lack a
marital-like relationship because the market worker’s prosperity is less
likely to be attributable to the caregiver’s efforts.  A market worker’s en-
hanced earning capacity is likely attributable to his spouse’s caregiving,
but also to her emotional support, companionship, general housekeeping,
and perhaps activities like the hosting of business dinners.  Gain theory
seems to make the most sense when the parties are married or in a marital-
like relationship, because the couple probably had a broad partnership
that involved these other types of contributions too.
357. Starnes, supra note 55, at 1543–44.  Starnes recommends, “[s]uch a hus-
band should therefore buy out the interest of his wife at divorce.” Id. at 1544.
358. See Starnes, supra note 93, at 201.
359. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 1, at 878.
360. Baker, supra note 82, at 1198.
71
Weiner: Caregiver Payments and the Obligation to Give Care or Share
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-1\VLR104.txt unknown Seq: 72  3-APR-14 13:18
206 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 135
Gain theory also seems the more appropriate for caregiving in marital
relationships because the marital caregiver is more likely than other
caregivers to share the market worker’s liabilities at break-up.  It is ques-
tionable whether the caregiver should get to share in the market worker’s
gains if the caregiver has no potential exposure for any of the market
worker’s debts.
Finally, gain theory also has limited appeal for unmarried couples in
some specific contexts.  For example, it would be difficult to apply during
an ongoing romantic (but non-cohabiting) relationship because the
caregiver’s expectations of sharing in the gain may not have been conclu-
sively frustrated, but only delayed.
Gain theory could also be used to compensate a caregiver for her
post-divorce caregiving by awarding her the market worker’s enhanced
earning capacity that is attributable, at least in part, to her efforts.  This
would rest on the idea that a marital couple expected to share the market
worker’s future income in exchange for caregiving, that this expectation
extended to the child’s entire minority, and that the caregiver’s post-di-
vorce efforts will help the market worker enhance his earnings.  On the
other hand, gain theory may be an unappealing measure for post-divorce
caregiving.  After all, the caregiver can now remarry, and her post-divorce
caregiving may contribute much less to the market worker’s enhanced
earning capacity than the combination of caregiving, homemaking, com-
panionship, and emotional support that she provided during the mar-
riage.  Additionally, after the marriage ends, the caregiver has no
responsibility for the market worker’s financial failures.  The market
worker might also question whether the parties expected to share his post-
divorce enhanced earning capacity in a world of prevalent divorce shaped
by a “clean break” ideology.
Arguably, gain theory is inappropriate when the caregiver is to blame
for the romantic relationship’s end.  Imagine a married caregiver who
walks away from the relationship and the sharing that the market worker
was willing to do in order to be with her new boyfriend.  To some, it will
seem unjust to the market worker to award the caregiver the amount she
would have received had she stayed in their relationship.  Even assuming
gain theory should be used as a basis for remedying her disproportionate
and unfair marital caregiving (because the caregiving labor occurred
before her blameworthy behavior caused the breakup of the marital rela-
tionship), it certainly seems problematic to give the adulterer a share of
the other parent’s enhanced earning capacity accrued after the relation-
ship ends, even if her post-marital caregiving contributes to his enhanced
earning capacity.  In fact, in some states, adultery and desertion could dis-
qualify the caregiver from receiving alimony altogether,361 and in others it
361. Twenty-two statutes consider fault in determining support. See Carbone,
supra note 1, at 55 (citing PRINCIPLES).
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could affect the application of a gain theory measure.362  If the parents
never married, the philandering caregiver would not technically be an
adulterer or deserter.  Although no legal concept of fault is applicable, the
caregiver’s behavior is still arguably condemnable.  Without a clear defini-
tion of fault in the context of the unmarried co-parenting relationship,
gain theory may always be inappropriate, or at least inappropriate for rem-
edying disproportionate and unfair caregiving provided after the relation-
ship’s end.  On the other hand, if a no-fault state deems fault irrelevant to
alimony determinations,363 then gain theory should be available both to
married and unmarried couples regardless of fault (although other rea-
sons might justify distinguishing between divorcing and unmarried
couples for purposes of the theory’s availability).
b. Loss Theory
Loss theory is another approach to alimony.  Under this theory, ali-
mony compensates the claimant for her losses attributable to her mar-
riage.  Historically, the “most important loss was the opportunity to have
married another” and receive support from that person.364  The availabil-
ity of no-fault divorce makes the expectation of life-long marriage and sup-
port debatable,365 so losses are now identified as the lost economic
opportunities from caregiving during the marriage.  The remedy seeks to
“put the injured spouse ‘in as good a position as he [or she] would have
been in had the [marriage] not [occurred].’”366  The caregiver’s losses
are shared because they will continue after divorce, and are not offset by
the sharing that occurred during marital cohabitation.  The measure of
the loss is generally the claimant’s lost earning capacity (i.e., the differ-
ence between the claimant’s current earning capacity and that which she
would have had if she had never married),367 so long as her efforts re-
sulted in a financial gain to her spouse.368
Loss theory rests on the idea that the caregiving spouse made her
decision to caregive with the expectation that her relationship and the
sharing behavior would continue, at least long enough to get “a return” on
her investment in the relationship.369  When the romantic relationship
362. See Carbone, supra note 1, at 44, 53 (explaining that expectation measure
embodied in gain theory has historically been tied to fault, and measure may make
most sense only for innocent recipients).
363. See generally PRINCIPLES ch. 1 intro., topic 2, pt. III (giving reasons to ex-
clude consideration of fault); see also Carbone, supra note 1, at 72–73 (describing
why determination of who “breached” may not be relevant); Ellman, supra note
125, at 66 (arguing fault is not relevant under his proposal).
364. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 1, at 873.
365. See Rogerson, supra note 230, at 72.
366. Starnes, supra note 20, at 284 (footnote omitted).
367. See id. (citing Ellman, supra note 125, at 49).
368. See Ellman, supra note 125, at 67.
369. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 1, at 894; see also PRINCIPLES § 5.05 cmt.
a.
73
Weiner: Caregiver Payments and the Obligation to Give Care or Share
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-1\VLR104.txt unknown Seq: 74  3-APR-14 13:18
208 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 135
ends, the caregiver should be compensated with an amount that would
put her back in the position that she would have been in had she never
married.
Loss theory has also been justified functionally: loss theory “en-
courage[s] socially beneficial sharing behavior in marriage.”370  Propo-
nents claim that it allows the couple to arrange the allocation of market
work and caregiving between them according to their preferences because
the caregiver’s investment is protected.371  Most couples will probably
choose to have the higher-income individual engage in more of the paid
work because that arrangement provides the couple with the most eco-
nomic resources.372
The loss measure has some distinct advantages over gain theory.
Fault, or any other reason for a break up, appears irrelevant to an award
predicated on loss theory, unlike with an expectation measure.373  Even a
blameworthy caregiver deserves compensation for her past caregiving to
the extent that it causes her enduring losses and the other parent bene-
fited from her work.  Fault, however, is probably not completely irrelevant.
For example, courts would likely disallow this remedy for a claimant who
wrongfully abducted the children and thereafter claimed that she was
owed compensation for her lost earning capacity.  Perhaps some types of
fault are relevant because the blameworthy behavior undermines the func-
tional rationale for the measure; the behavior makes impossible an agree-
ment about the best allocation of market and caregiving work.
Just like the expectation measure, the loss measure seems consistent
with the norms of some co-parenting relationships, but not others.  Many
couples enter the co-parenting relationship expecting to share the bread-
winner’s income, although unmarried caregivers may have a more modest
expectation about sharing than married couples.  The unmarried
caregiver’s expectation, however, may still be significant enough to cause
her harm when the sharing stops.  Other couples have no expectation of
sharing anything, and, therefore, the measure seems misplaced for those
couples.  To the extent that the measure rests on a functional rationale (to
encourage the best allocation of market and home work for the
couple),374 then a loss measure seems appropriate for parents that make
decisions together about the allocation of caregiving work and the sharing
of resources, regardless of their marital and romantic status.
Even if loss theory seems applicable, it is not always the best compen-
satory measure.  It can pose real challenges for a claimant in certain situa-
tions.  Loss theory—to the extent that it addresses opportunity costs—
370. Ellman, supra note 125, at 12.
371. See, e.g., id. at 50–51.
372. See id. at 46–47.
373. See id. at 66; Brinig & Carbone, supra note 1, at 879, 895–96, 901–02.
374. For a discussion of a functional rationale where spouses allocate market
work depending on income capacity, see supra notes 356–59 and accompanying
text.
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requires an assessment of losses actually experienced that were not offset
by past sharing in a partner’s prosperity.  Trying to assess whether a party
has received the “full value during the marriage [or relationship] is impos-
sible,”375 and determining precisely how much value a caregiver received
may be even more difficult for unmarried couples that share.  In addition,
determining the caregiver’s actual losses attributable to caregiving can also
be problematic.  The caregiver’s current earning capacity may reflect fac-
tors like her ability and ambition, rather than factors related to her
caregiving, at least in part.376  In addition, calculating actual earning ca-
pacity loss can be “costly to the extent it requires expert evidence.”377
Loss theory also undercompensates those who are “market challenged,”
i.e., people with low education or ability.  These individuals may have lit-
tle, if any, real income loss from caregiving, although they provide a useful
service to the other parent.378
The ALI Principles use loss theory as a basis for spousal compensa-
tion, but they do not try to compensate opportunity costs in a strict fash-
ion.  Among other adjustments, the ALI Principles get around some of
these valuation problems with a unique formula for calculating loss, but
this solution does not work so well for unmarried parents.  Judges are sup-
posed to subtract the caregiver’s current income from her partner’s in-
come and then multiply the difference by a number that represents the
number of years of caregiving.  Her partner’s income supposedly reflects
the level of income that she could have earned, and therefore likely lost,
because people tend to marry someone from the same socio-economic
background.  Unmarried parents, however, are not married to each other,
and it may be wrong to assume that they come from the same socio-eco-
nomic background, at least without particular evidence establishing that
fact.
Professor Starnes reports that the difficulties of calculating loss have
led some proponents of loss theory to fall back on the remedies proposed
by gain theorists.379  This solution seems particularly inappropriate if the
parents lacked a broader partnership like marriage or lacked an expecta-
tion of sharing economic gains, or if the measure is applied to post-rela-
tionship caregiving in a jurisdiction where fault is relevant and the
claimant’s wrongful behavior caused the relationship’s end.
c. Contribution Theory
Some courts rely on contribution theory, also known as “unjust en-
richment,” in order to award a spouse the amount he or she has contrib-
uted to the other spouse’s prosperity.  The remedy tries to address the
375. Ellman, supra note 125, at 55.
376. See Schneider, supra note 335, at 230.
377. See Rogerson, supra note 230, at 84.
378. See Singer, supra note 6, at 2443.
379. See Starnes, supra note 20, at 285.
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situation in which one parent unjustly benefits at the expense of another.
The focus is on the value of what the non-market spouse gave to the mar-
ket spouse, measured either by the caregiver’s actual uncompensated
monetary and nonmonetary contributions, or by the effect that these con-
tributions had on the market worker’s earnings.  This measure is typically
used when one spouse contributes financially to the other spouse’s educa-
tion, but then receives none of the benefits from the spouse’s degree be-
cause the parties divorce shortly after the degree is conferred.380  The
claim disappears if the contribution conferred was conferred as a gift.
The rationale behind contribution theory makes sense for all parents
regardless of marital status.  It does not require that a party have any ex-
pectation about long-term sharing or an agreement to engage in any shar-
ing at all; nor does it require a broader relationship that typically gives rise
to expectations of sharing.  A caregiver need not suffer a measurable loss
to her income from caregiving in order to recover.  Contribution theory is
generally unaffected by whether the claimant is at fault.381
Contribution theory is not a panacea, however.  Contribution theory
will not always be the best measure to remedy disproportionate and unfair
caregiving because it sometimes does not comport with the parties’ legiti-
mate expectations.  Caregivers in a long-term committed relationship
would be disappointed if they only received reimbursement for their ef-
forts when they legitimately expected to share in the fruits of their part-
ners’ prosperity.382  Also, valuing the contribution for purposes of
reimbursement is fraught with difficulty.  The market typically values
caregiving at a very low rate.383  If a court only uses the actual market
value of the care to determine the dollar value of the remedy, then higher-
income individuals will be discouraged from caregiving.384  Perhaps a bet-
ter measure of the care’s value is the true cost to the caregiver to provide
the care; but that measure then requires one to calculate lost opportuni-
ties, with all of its difficulties.
Measuring the effect of the caregiving on the market worker’s earn-
ings also poses problems.  Earnings may not capture the true value of the
service provided because parental caregiving confers unique benefits that
defy monetization.  The market worker receives important nonfinancial
benefits, such as having his children “raised in accordance” with his “pref-
erence[ ] for direct parental care.”385  The market worker also gets to
structure his time with fewer constraints, and this flexibility can produce a
sense of personal freedom in addition to the job-related financial benefits
380. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 533–34 (N.J. 1982).
381. See Carbone, supra note 1, at 44 (“[P]ortions of the divorce award, most
notably those that approximate restitution principles, are independent of the rea-
sons for the breakup of the marriage.”).
382. See Starnes, supra note 20, at 286.
383. See Baker, supra note 222, at 337.
384. See Ellman, supra note 125, at 72.
385. Carbone, supra note 1, at 68.
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(from longer and more uninterrupted work hours).  While some scholars
and judges have called upon courts to capture these types of gains,386
courts generally do not do so because it is a complicated task,387 so they
instead focus on what was given.388
Some scholars dismiss unjust enrichment as a remedy for dispropor-
tionate caregiving for other reasons.  Professor Starnes, for example, dis-
likes this compensatory remedy, in part, because it would require courts to
“‘total up and compare [the spouses’] individual contributions’” instead
of working off a presumption that both contribute equally to the mar-
riage.389  This concern has merit for marital couples (and Professor
Starnes focuses on those couples), but it has no merit for non-marital
couples, because no presumption is currently operating or should necessa-
rily operate for them.  Totaling up contributions is arguably a better ap-
proach than no remedy at all for unmarried couples, which is the position
at present.  Moreover, courts could develop tools to minimize the account-
ing involved, such as a rebuttable presumption that the caregiver’s contri-
bution is as valuable as the market worker’s earnings during the relevant
period, or that members of a cohabiting couple shared the breadwinner’s
income fairly between themselves.  The real question is whether such pre-
sumptions are warranted at all given the value of the activities and the
absence of a broader economic partnership between the parents.
Professor Ira Ellman dislikes the restitution analogy for the marital
context because any claim for excessive contributions requires the court to
know a typical spouse’s contribution, and such a yardstick does not ex-
ist.390  Again, however, courts and legislatures could create a yardstick in
the caregiver compensation context: the default rule could be one of
equal caregiving effort during the parenting enterprise.  Whether any dis-
proportionate caregiving rose to the level of “unfair” would be the next
question, and the answer would depend upon the factors identified above.
As to whether their sharing behavior was adequate, the law could presume
that a caregiver is entitled to the greater of either 1) half of the amount of
the market worker’s income attributable to the time during which the
caregiver did excessive work or 2) the market value of the caregiving.
That measure would be the yardstick.  If a caregiver did seventy percent of
386. See Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital Residuals: Applying an
Income Adjustment Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 23,
49–50 (2001); Rogerson, supra note 230, at 86 (mentioning Canadian case law);
Singer, supra note 6, at 2445–47, 2454–55 (proposing post-marital income
sharing).
387. Cf. Witmer & Warner, supra note 14, § 9.4 (noting practitioner’s diffi-
culty putting on evidence for reimbursement alimony).
388. See Starnes, supra note 20, at 286–87; see also Cox v. Cox, 762 A.2d 1040,
1046 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
389. Starnes, supra note 20, at 287 (citing June Carbone, Economics, Feminism,
and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1483
n.87 (1990)).
390. See Ellman, supra note 125, at 39.
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the caregiving, then the market worker should owe the caregiver half of
his income earned during the twenty percent of the caregiver’s time that
covered his responsibility or an hourly wage based on the hours of care
she provided, whichever is greater.  If she received less than that amount
from him, then she should be compensated for her disproportionate and
unfair caregiving, absent an agreement or other facts that make their ar-
rangement fair.
The discussion above illustrates the difficulty of choosing one mea-
sure to address all situations.391  Courts need access to all of the measures
in order to do justice in the cases before them.  It is not science, but arriv-
ing at a remedy is not unprincipled either.
VI. DISADVANTAGES TO THE PROPOSAL: THE FEAR AND THE SNEER
Giving all caregivers access to justice would be the main benefit of a
new obligation to give care or share.  In addition, a new obligation to give
care or share would send a stronger normative message than any message
that may currently exist from divorce remedies for marital caregiving (i.e.,
the message would be to give care or share).  Do these benefits outweigh
the potential disadvantages?  Apart from process concerns related to judi-
cial discretion, do other potential disadvantages outweigh the benefits
from such a proposal?
One potential disadvantage is that an award for disproportionate and
unfair caregiving may encourage caregivers to perform an economically
inefficient amount of caregiving, that is, to become freeloaders themselves
by engaging in excessive caregiving.  The temptation may be especially
great for caregivers who could get a caregiver payment as great or greater
than what they could earn in the market.
Assuming for purposes of this analysis that caregiving can be “exces-
sive,” this risk seems relatively minor, especially in light of the systemic
freeloading done presently by market workers.  After all, the caregiver pay-
ment may have little or no effect on the absolute level of caregiving per-
formed by caregivers because people partake in paid labor for lots of
reasons—including self-esteem, economic need, retirement benefits, and
a Protestant work ethic.  In addition, excessive caregiving would under-
mine a claim that the level of sharing is unfair.  A court would probably
consider any agreement the parties had about the appropriate level of
caregiving, or, absent an agreement, use other tools to assess the argu-
ment’s merit, such as the work requirements found in Temporary Assis-
391. This discussion has avoided arguments that challenge the assumptions of
the existing alimony theories, such as the fact that the parties’ expectations guide a
decision about the appropriate theory.  Arguably, the parties’ expectations should
be irrelevant since the law heretofore has shaped those expectations, perhaps in an
unfair way.  Advocates, of course, could make these types of arguments when ask-
ing for a particular remedy, and it would be up to judges to determine what seems
“just” given the circumstances.
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tance to Needy Families (TANF)392 or demographic data that specifies the
average amount of parental caregiving children receive in a particular
socio-economic class.  Courts could also look to information about the
availability of safe and affordable child care in an area.  In short, courts
have ways to determine if caregivers are freeloading, assuming that the
concept of excessive caregiving does not violate public policy.
Second, critics might claim that the remedy is unfair to market work-
ers.  Various arguments fall under this “unfairness” umbrella, including
the concern that the proposal lacks a remedy for the market worker who
does a disproportionate and unfair amount of market labor that benefits
the child.  Perhaps an assessment of fairness should not be limited to dis-
proportionate caregiving but should encompass disproportionate effort
generally that benefits the child?  If so, then not only should some
caregivers not receive a remedy, but some market workers should get a
remedy instead.
This criticism has appeal only if it is considered at the highest level of
generality.  There are two important differences between a caregiver who
performs a disproportionate amount of caregiving and a market worker
who performs a disproportionate amount of market labor.  First, the effect
of the other parent’s freeloading is much more detrimental to a caregiver
than a market worker.  The market worker’s excessive efforts will produce
its own reward in terms of benefits associated with market employment.
The market worker captures these gains under the status quo.  If he is
unmarried, the gains are his alone.  If he is married, the law likely gives
him control over the use and disposal of the property he earns during the
marriage.393  Even at divorce, the market worker may get a larger share of
the financial pie due to his excessive contributions.  Some of these bene-
fits have no comparable counterpart for the caregiver.
Second, the likely income disparity between the caregiver and market
worker makes it unwise to award the market worker a financial remedy
from the caregiver, even assuming the correct focus is on parental effort
and not parental caregiving.  Requiring the caregiver to pay the market
worker money would potentially harm the child because the child and the
caregiver constitute one economic unit.  Assuming the market worker de-
serves a remedy, an appropriate remedy may be a declaratory judgment
acknowledging the disproportionate and unfair parental labor benefiting
the child.  However, the limited usefulness of this type of remedy may sug-
392. See generally HEATHER HAHN ET AL., URB. INST., RESEARCH SYNTHESIS BRIEF
NO. 5, TANF WORK REQUIREMENTS AND STATE STRATEGIES TO FULFILL THEM 6
(2012), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412563-TANF-Work-Re-
quirements-and-State-Strategies-to-Fulfill-Them.pdf.
393. Most states have a common law (or “separate”) property regime, and not
a community property regime.  Even some states with a community property re-
gime, however, allocate the control of assets (such as earnings) solely to the party
that earned it. See, e.g., LESLIE J. HARRIS, LEE E. TEITELBAUM & JUNE R. CARBONE,
FAMILY LAW (4th ed. 2010).
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gest the claim itself is not a good idea, both because the market worker
would have to impugn the caregiver’s efforts in a way that could corrode
the parents’ relationship, and because there are public costs associated
with resolving the claim.
Those critics who are willing to concede that a remedy should exist
only for disproportionate and unfair caregiving might still argue that any
financial sacrifices made by the market worker related to caregiving are
relevant to an assessment of unfairness.  For example, shouldn’t a court
consider the financial sacrifices made by a divorced father who decides to
relocate with the mother and child to be closer to them so that he can
participate more in childrearing?394  If courts had to consider these types
of economic sacrifices, then the adjudicatory task would increase in com-
plexity.  In addition, since caregivers also make financial sacrifices to bene-
fit their children (like living in a safer but more expensive neighborhood),
it is probably fair (and best) to ignore all such contributions.  Nonetheless,
valuing these types of sacrifices and offsetting the caregiver’s claim with
their value may make sense in some cases.  Acknowledging this fact does
not negate the need for a caregiver remedy; it only affects its value in some
cases.
Critics might also question the appropriateness of a remedy when the
caregiver makes more money than the market worker.  Should the other
parent owe money to such a caregiver?395  There is no theoretical reason
why a financially advantaged caregiver should be denied a remedy for the
other parent’s mooching, although the caregiver may not collect much, if
anything, given the market worker’s financial situation.396
Third, and finally, critics might claim that a caregiver remedy will fur-
ther entrench gendered patterns of caregiving.397  Because caregivers will
be entitled to an award for disproportionate and unfair caregiving, women
may opt into these arrangements more, guided by cultural expectations
that they are ultimately responsible for this caregiving work anyway.  The
caregiver remedy may also reinforce female caregiving because the higher-
earning party (most likely, but not always, a man) will probably want to
compensate the lower-earning party to do the caregiving rather than do it
himself.  In contrast, the lower-earning parent may not earn enough to
afford the other parent’s labor, depending upon the way the caregiver
remedy is calculated.  In short, the remedy might contribute to the
gendered patterns of caregiving labor.  If so, the remedy will also reinforce
394. See Schneider, supra note 335, at 225–26.
395. Professor Ellman is not bothered by the higher-earning spouse making a
claim, so long as the other party financially benefited from the higher-earning
spouse’s foregone opportunity. See Ellman, supra note 125, at 59.
396. Alternatively, a court may find that the appropriate remedy is simply a
declaratory judgment recognizing the disproportionate and unfair labor.  This is
Ellman’s proposal. See id. at 60–61.
397. Caregiver support payments might “foster traditional family roles, eco-
nomic dependence, and the corresponding gender roles that many men and wo-
men find oppressive.”  Estin, supra note 85, at 799–800.
80
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-1\VLR104.txt unknown Seq: 81  3-APR-14 13:18
2014] CAREGIVER PAYMENTS 215
gender inequality in the market, including the wage gap between men and
women.398
The dollar value of the remedy should affect who does the caregiving,
but it is hard to predict what patterns, if any, will emerge.  On the one
hand, if the remedy for disproportionate and unfair caregiving requires
that a wage earner split with the caregiver his income earned during the
period of disproportionate caregiving, then the remedy would provide a
strong incentive for the higher-earning parent to caregive.  Imagine a per-
son who earns $100 per day and has to give $50 per day to the caregiver if
he does none of the caregiving.  If he instead splits the caregiving labor
with her, he would not have to pay her anything, although he may earn
only $50 per day because he cannot work the same amount of hours.  The
cost to the market worker is the same whether he pays for caregiving or
does it himself.  Consequently his interest in the type of work, rather than
his interest in money, should dictate his behavior.399  On the other hand,
if the court only requires him to pay $20 a day for the caregiving, he would
get an economic advantage by continuing the same level of market work.
The financial incentives will also affect the caregiver’s willingness to
do the work.  A low caregiver payment may cause caregivers to reassess
their willingness to do a disproportionate share of the caregiving, and they
may decide to engage in more market work instead.  A lower level of com-
pensation may also make it more likely, however, that a lower-income par-
ent could afford to pay a higher-income parent to do a disproportionate
share of the caregiving,400 although the higher-income parent may find
the compensation insufficient to take the caregiving.  Depending upon
how the remedy is calculated, the remedy may affect the parents’ choices,
but the gender implications are unpredictable.
The fact that gender roles are currently in flux makes the concern
about gender entrenchment less weighty.  Undeniably, gender roles are
changing.  Women’s educational progress has been steady and now their
educational achievement surpasses men’s.401  In 2011, seventy-one per-
cent of mothers with children under eighteen years old were in the labor
market, compared to forty-seven percent in 1975.402  More and more wo-
398. See Singer, supra note 6, at 2441 (citing Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at
Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89, 95–96
(1993)).
399. See id. at 2454–55 (arguing that income sharing for period of time after
divorce would encourage more caregiving by men).
400. The lower level of compensation could occur either from splitting the
lower-paid parent’s employment income or using the market value of caregiving.
401. See generally Women in America: Indicators of Social and Economic Well-Being,
WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS, http://www.whitehouse.gov/adminis-
tration/eop/cwg/data-on-women (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
402. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT 1040, WO-
MEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 19 tbl.7 (2013), available at http://www.bls
.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2012.pdf.
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men are earning the majority of a couple’s income, and these results are
particularly pronounced in many African American families.403
Men are becoming more involved in the home than ever before.  Fa-
thers today spend three times as much time with children each week and
twice as much time on housework as fathers did fifty years ago.404  Young
fathers are also spending much more time with children than in the
past.405  Men are valuing family involvement more than ever before,
too.406  In one survey, only twenty-nine percent of men surveyed were
“work-centric,” i.e., someone who prioritized work; thirty-six percent of the
men were family-centric; and thirty-five percent were dual-centric.407  A
Pew Research Center survey confirms that men, ages eighteen to thirty-
four, are more focused on parenting than in the past: forty-seven percent
of the men said that being a good parent is one of the most important
things in their life, up from thirty-nine percent in 1997.408  Quite amaz-
ingly, a recent study of approximately 1000 fathers with white-collar jobs
found that fifty-three percent agreed or strongly agreed with the state-
ment, “If my spouse/partner made enough money for our family to live on
comfortably, I would feel okay if I didn’t work outside the home.”409
The younger generations hold particularly strong views about the de-
sirability of gender equality in the allocation of nonmarket work.410  Sev-
403. See SARAH JANE GLYNN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE NEW BREADWINNERS:
2010 UPDATE 3 (2012), available at http:///www.americanprogress.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/issues/2012/04/pdf/breadwinners.pdf (“Among African American
families, more than half (53.3 percent) of working wives earned as much or more
than their husbands in 2010 . . . marking a dramatic increase from 1975 when 28.7
percent were breadwinners.”).  Approximately thirty-seven percent of women up to
age 44 earn as much as, or more than, their husbands, and that number increases
to forty-three percent for women 45 and over. Id. at 4 & fig.4.
404. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD, supra note 264, at 6, 27
(noting child care performed by fathers has increased from 2.5 hours per week in
1965 to 7.3 hours per week in 2011, while fathers also spend “more than twice as
much time doing housework as they did in the 1960s”); see also ELLEN GALINSKY ET
AL., FAMILIES & WORK INST., TIMES ARE CHANGING: GENDER AND GENERATION AT
WORK AND AT HOME 14 (rev. Aug. 2011), available at http://familiesandwork.org/
site/research/reports/Times_Are_Changing.pdf (finding that fathers with paid
employment spend over one hour more time with their children on daily basis
than they did thirty years ago).
405. See GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 404, at 15 (reporting fathers under
twenty-nine years old spend average of 4.1 hours per workday with their children
in 2008 compared to 2.4 hours per workday in 1977).
406. See KERSTIN AUMANN ET AL., FAMILIES & WORK INST., THE NEW MALE MYS-
TIQUE 1 (2011), available at http://familiesandwork.org/site/research/reports/
newmalemystique.pdf.
407. Id. at 7.
408. EILEEN PATTEN & KIM PARKER, PEW RESEARCH CTR., A GENDER REVERSAL
ON CAREER ASPIRATIONS: YOUNG WOMEN NOW TOP YOUNG MEN IN VALUING A HIGH-
PAYING CAREER 5 (2012), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/04/
19/a-gender-reversal-on-career-aspirations/.
409. HARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 326, at 17.
410. See id. at 11; see also Matthew N. Weinshenker, Imagining Family Roles: Pa-
rental Influences on the Expectations of Adolescents in Dual-Earner Families, in BEING TO-
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enty percent of boys and sixty-eight percent of girls expect to share
housework equally, and seventy-eight percent of boys and sixty-six percent
of girls expect to share caregiving equally.411  On the job front, equal
numbers of both male and female millennials want jobs with great respon-
sibility, and young women’s views do not vary depending upon whether
they are mothers.412  Another survey found that sixty-six percent of wo-
men ages eighteen to thirty-four rate having a career high on their list of
life priorities, while only fifty-nine percent of men do.413
Society is increasingly tolerant of departures from classic gender
roles.414  In 2010, seventy-one percent of Americans surveyed thought that
a marriage was more satisfying if both spouses had labor-market jobs, as
opposed to a marriage in which the couple had traditional gender roles—
up from fifty-eight percent in 2002.415  Most people favor gender equality,
including the ability of women to work outside the home.416  Most men
and women believe that equal participation in childrearing is
important.417
Of course, there is still much work to be done to eliminate gender
roles in the market and home spheres.  Children accept a woman’s labor
market participation much easier than they accept a father’s role as the
caregiver.418  High school students differ by gender regarding their expec-
tations of who will take time off from work when they get older, marry, and
have children, with boys and girls both pointing to the girls.419  Even chil-
GETHER, WORKING APART: DUAL-CAREER FAMILIES AND THE WORK-LIFE BALANCE 365,
374 tbl.14.1 (Barbara Schneider & Linda J. Waite eds., 2005).
411. Weinshenker, supra note 410, at 374 tbl.14.1.
412. See GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 404, at 1–2.
413. PATTEN & PARKER, supra note 408, at 1–2.
414. See, e.g., SCOTT COLTRANE, FAMILY MAN: FATHERHOOD, HOUSEWORK, AND
GENDER EQUITY 201–06 (1996).
415. PEW RESEARCH CTR., GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, GENDER EQUALITY UNI-
VERSALLY EMBRACED, BUT INEQUALITIES ACKNOWLEDGED: MEN’S LIVES OFTEN SEEN AS
BETTER 8 (2010), available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/07/01/gender-
equality/.
416. Id. at 1–2.
417. See HARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 326, at 2, 23; Milkie et al., supra note
296, at 36.
418. See Stefanie M. Sinno & Melanie Killen, Moms at Work and Dads at Home:
Children’s Evaluations of Parental Roles, 13 APPLIED DEVELOP. SCI. 16, 22, 25 (2009);
cf. Christine Schuette & Melanie Killen, Children’s Evaluations of Gender-Stereotypic
Household Activities in the Family Context, 20 EARLY EDUC. & DEVELOP. 693, 707
(2009) (“[C]hildren were more stereotypic and inflexible about male-stereotypic
activities than about female stereotypic activities.”); see also Ellen A. Greever, Patri-
cia Austin & Karyn Welhousen, William’s Doll Revisited, 77 LANGUAGE ARTS 324,
326–27 (2000) (“Children who are influenced by adults to challenge gender ste-
reotypes are more likely to be aware of that influence than those who are influ-
enced by adults to accept gender stereotypes.”).
419. See generally ELLEN GALINSKY ET AL., FAMILIES & WORK INST., YOUTH AND
EMPLOYMENT: TODAY’S STUDENTS TOMORROW’S WORKFORCE: SUMMARY AND DISCUS-
SION GUIDE (2003), available at http://familiesandwork.org/site/research/summa
ry/yande.pdf.
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dren’s letters to Santa still show that girls, but not boys, want the toys that
are related to domestic work.420  This is not surprising given that gender
stereotypes still permeate the media.421  Nonetheless, society is headed in
the right direction, and this fact makes any concern about entrenching
gender roles less pressing because the gender roles today are more fluid.
It is impossible to predict accurately whether a new gender-neutral
caregiver remedy would accelerate this change.422  Since a caregiver rem-
edy would make caregiving costs a joint responsibility of both parents, it is
possible that the gender-linked roles of caregiver and market worker
would further weaken.  As Ann Crittenden stated: “[M]en are more likely
to share the increasing responsibilities involved in raising children if
mothers have more leverage to convince fathers that the children come
first.”423
More predictable is the remedy’s likely effect on freeloading, which is
largely done by men to women.  It should reduce freeloading, regardless
of which parent does a disproportionate amount of the caregiving.  For
this effect, this end-of-the-relationship remedy would have to affect behav-
ior during the relationship.  Scholars have raised legitimate questions
about the efficacy of an end-of-the-relationship remedy on relationship be-
havior.  Professor Carl Schneider once explained that the law of alimony
was not an effective hortatory tool—i.e., to exhort couples to act fairly in
their allocation and remuneration of child-related work—because people
often “don’t know what the law’s incentives are,” or if they know, they
never think it will apply to them because they do not imagine getting di-
vorced.424  Nor do people investigate the law of divorce before marriage
because that suggests they are not confident in the success of their own
marriage.425  Professor Schneider also suggested that if a remedy were to
have any possible effect on marital behavior, then a simple remedy was
420. See Carol J. Auster & Claire S. Mansbach, The Gender Marketing of Toys: An
Analysis of Color and Type of Toy on the Disney Store Website, 67 SEX ROLES 375, 377
(2012).
421. See id. at 386 (finding that online Disney Store perpetuates gender ste-
reotypes regarding domestic work); James Gentry & Robert Harrison, Is Advertising
a Barrier to Male Movement Toward Gender Change?, 10 MARKETING THEORY 74, 89
(2010) (finding commercials aimed at children perpetuate gender stereotypes;
specifically, only 7 of 225 commercials in one study showed father and no commer-
cial showed father in nurturing role); Kimberly A. Powell & Lori Abels, Sex-Role
Stereotypes in TV Programs Aimed at the Preschool Audience: An Analysis of Teletubbies
and Barney & Friends, 25 WOMEN & LANGUAGE 14 (2002) (finding gender stereo-
types infiltrate children’s television shows, such as Barney & Friends and Teletubbies).
422. Susan Okin argued, “[A]ny just and fair solution to the urgent problem
of women’s and children’s vulnerability must encourage and facilitate the equal
sharing by men and women of paid and unpaid work, of productive and reproduc-
tive labor.” OKIN, supra note 179, at 171.
423. CRITTENDEN, supra note 54, at 130.
424. Schneider, supra note 335, at 205–06.
425. See id. at 207.
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required, so that people could understand exactly what the remedy might
be.426
Now Professor Schneider’s admonition has less force for the caregiver
payments proposed here: this remedy should actually minimize the free-
loading that occurs because the proposed remedy is simple.  “Give care or
share, or else the judge will make it fair,” is an easy slogan to popularize.
This remedy, therefore, might assuage Professor Schneider’s concerns, as-
suming of course that individuals do not need to know the precise amount
of the remedy, or understand the way it would be calculated.  In addition,
the remedy’s universality will make it common.  The caregiver remedy will
be like child support in its familiarity.  Since most parents, regardless of
marital status, experience difficulty in their romantic relationship upon
the transition to parenthood,427 the potential applicability of an end-of-
the-relationship caregiver remedy will be salient almost immediately; the
remedy, therefore, should affect the parties’ behavior during their parent-
ing relationship.
In the end, it is hard to believe that providing a remedy for the cur-
rent situation—a situation in which many parents (mostly men) freeload
off of the other parent (mostly women)—is worse for women than the
status quo.  Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with a commit-
ment to caregiving or even to more women caregiving than men.  It is only
the social ramifications of the gender imbalance that are problematic.  It
seems misguided to blame a caregiver payment for the broader social ine-
qualities between men and women.  Nothing about a caregiver payment
would stop simultaneous work on other social policies that might equalize
caregiving by men and women or further reduce the disadvantages associ-
ated with caregiving.  Scholars have noted the need for such things as
equal pay, an end to job segregation, a flexible workday, paid maternity
leave, affordable and safe child care, and paid family leave to care for sick
family members.428  Improvements in all of these areas are necessary to
see true and sustained social change around gender roles.  The caregiver
payment has the advantage of making all parents invested enough in the
act of caregiving that more parents might encourage employers and the
government to accommodate families’ real needs.
426. See id. at 208.  He believed Professor Ellman’s complex remedy did not
qualify. See id.
427. See Erika Lawrence et al., Marital Satisfaction Across the Transition to
Parenthood, 22 J. FAM. PSYCH. 41, 47 (2008); Philip A. Cowan & Carolyn Pape
Cowan, Changes in Marriage During the Transition to Parenthood: Must We Blame the
Baby?, in THE TRANSITION TO PARENTHOOD: CURRENT THEORY AND RESEARCH
118–19 (Gerlad Y. Michaels & Wendy A. Goldberg eds., 1988).
428. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN
AND CLASS MATTER 35–36, 42 (2010); Maxine Eichner, Families, Human Dignity, and
State Support for Caretaking: Why the United States’ Failure to Ameliorate the Work-Family
Conflict Is a Dereliction of the Government’s Basic Responsibilities, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1593,
1624–25 (2010).
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CONCLUSION
The law should have a remedy to redress disproportionate and unfair
caregiving.  The law should recognize that freeloading off of a caregiver is
not acceptable, regardless of whether the caregiver is married, unmarried,
or divorced.  The judge hearing the claim should assess unfairness by ex-
amining such issues as the amount of leisure time each parent enjoys, the
allocation of market and non-market work between the parents, the extent
to which the caregiver shares the market worker’s financial resources, and
the parents’ agreement, if any, about caregiving and sharing.  If a court
determines that a caregiver has borne a disproportionate and unfair allo-
cation of the caregiving, the court should provide compensation.  The
amount awarded should depend upon the most appropriate compensa-
tory alimony theory (gain, loss, or contribution), which in turn should be
influenced by the facts: the parties’ broader relationship, the parties’
agreement, the ability to prove damages under a particular theory, and the
relevance of fault in the jurisdiction.  The complexity and highly fact-spe-
cific nature of the task suggest judicial discretion is essential to afford
caregivers justice.  Practically, affording all caregivers access to a remedy
for their disproportionate and unfair caregiving requires the adoption of a
standard: courts should award a just amount in light of the obligation to
give care or share.  Adjudication under such a standard is also the best way
to obtain empirical information about fair outcomes so that the law can
continue to move forward.
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